End of life decision making in a children's hospital : ethical and practice implications by Henley, Lesley D
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wnEnd of Life Decision Making in a Children's Hospital 
Ethical and Practice Implications 
Lesley D. Henley 
University of Cape Town 
2001 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
DECLARATION 
I, Lesley Henley, declare this dissertation embodies only my original work, 
except where acknowledgement indicates otherwise, and that no part of it 
has been, or is being submitted for a degree at this or any other University. 
I empower the University of Cape Town to reproduce for research purposes 
either the whole or any portion of the contents of the dissertation. 
Signed: 
li(}fhy flu,~ 
Date: 19th March 2001 · 
TABLE of CONTENTS 
Abstract 
Abbreviations 
Definitions 
List of Tables 
List of Appendices 
Acknowledgements 
Chapter 1 Introduction, Aims and Methodology 
1.1 
1.2 
1.2.1 
1.3 
1.3.1 
1.3.2 
1.3.3 
1.3.4 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
Introduction 
Aims 
Objectives 
Methodology 
Design 
Setting 
Sample 
Data Collection 
Analysis 
Ethical Considerations 
Overview 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.3.1 
2.3.2 
2.3.3 
2.3.4 
2.4 
2.4.1 
2.4.2 
2.4.3 
2.5 
2.5.1 
2.5.2 
2.5.3 
2.5.4 
2.6 
Introduction 
Policies on Forgoing Life-sustaining Treatment 
in Infants and Children 
Ethical Considerations in Forgoing Life-sustaining Treatment 
in Children 
Do Not Resuscitate Orders 
Withholding and Withdrawing Life-sustaining Treatment: 
A Moral Distinction 
Ordinary versus Extraordinary Treatment 
Artificial Nutrition and Hydration 
Empirical Studies of End Of Life Decision Making among 
Children Dying in Acute Hospitals 
End of Life Decision Making in Children with Chronic Diseases 
End of Life Decision Making in Neonates 
End of Life Decision Making in Children 
Palliative Care and Pain Management in Infants and Children 
Policies on Palliative Care and Pain Management in Infants 
and Children 
Ethical Considerations in Pain Management in Infants and Children 
Empirical Studies of Pain Management in Children 
Attitudes and Beliefs about Pain Management in Children 
Medical Education for End of Life Care for Children 
ii 
Page 
iv 
V 
vi 
vii 
ix 
X 
1 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
6 
6 
7 
8 
8 
8 
13 
13 
14 
16 
16 
19 
19 
20 
21 
23 
23 
25 
27 
28 
30 
Page 
Chapter 3 Results 33 
3.1 Sample Characteristics 33 
3.2 End of Life Decisions and Life-sustaining Interventions 35 
3.2.1 Do Not Resuscitate Orders 35 
3.2.2 Evidence of Dying and Comfort Care Plans 38 
3.2.3 Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment 39 
3.2.4 Paediatric Intensive Care and Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation 40 
3.2.5 Morphine Administration 41 
3.2.6 Social Work and Spiritual Intervention 42 
3.2.7 Associations between End of Life Decisions and Length of 43 
Stay, Age and Severity 
3.2.8 Timing of End of Life Decisions 46 
3.3 Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Life 48 
3.3.1 Associations between Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Life 49 
and Age, Severity and Length of Stay 
3.3.2 Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Life and Location of Death 54 
3.3.3 Associations between Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Life 54 
and End of Life Decisions 
3.4 Pain and Distress in the Last 48 Hours of Life 60 
Chapter 4 Discussion 63 
4.1 Introduction 63 
4.2 End of Life Decisions: Positive Findings 64 
4.2.1 Do Not Resuscitate Orders 65 
4.2.2 Evidence of Dying and Comfort Care Plans 66 
4.2.3 Paediatric Intensive Care 67 
4.3 End of Life Decisions: Negative Findings 70 
4.3.1 Do Not Resuscitate Orders 70 
4.3.2 Evidence of Dying 73 
4.3.3 Comfort Care Plans and Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Life 75 
4.3.4 Presence of Pain and Distress in the Last 48 Hours of Life 80 
Chapter 5 Summary of Main Findings & Key Recommendations 84 
5.1 Summary of Main Findings 84 
5.1.1 Clinical Characteristics 84 
5.1.2 Do Not Resuscitate Orders 84 
5.1.3 Evidence of Dying 85 
5.1.4 Comfort Care Plans 85 
5.1.5 Paediatric Intensive Care 86 
5.1.6 Pain, Distress and Palliation 87 
5.2 Limitations of Study 88 
5.3 Key Recommendations 89 
5.3.1 Improvements at the Bedside 89 
5.3.2 Improvements in Institutional Practice 89 
References 91 
iii 
Abstract 
Aims 
To evaluate end of life practices among hospitalised children who died of HIV/AIDS. 
Design 
Retrospective chart review. 
Setting 
A public, secondary and tertiary children's teaching hospital in a developing country. 
Patients 
A consecutive series of in-patient deaths among HIV-infected children. 
Main Outcome Measures 
Identification of patients as dying, presence of do not resuscitate (DNR) orders, documentation 
of comfort care plans, whether end of life decisions were discussed with parents or caretakers, 
nature of diagnostic and therapeutic interventions in the last 24 hours of life, and presence of 
pain and distress in the last 48 hours of life. 
Results 
165 out of 167 in-patient deaths were reviewed. 79% of patients died in the general wards. 
The median age of patients was 4 months. The median length of hospitalisation was 6 days. 
30% of patients fell in Category B. Patients with shorter lengths of stay were more likely to fall 
in Category B (median 4 days versus 7 days, P=0.0000). About 1 quarter of patients had a 
median length of stay of 25 days. 84% of patients had a DNR order, with a median of 4 days 
between admission and documentation of the order. DNR orders appeared simultaneously in 
only 41 % of medical and nursing entries. 39% and 63% respectively of doctors did not 
document their justification for the DNR order or whether it had been discussed with parents. 
50% of patients were identified as dying. Terminology such as 'TLC' and 'keep comfortable' 
designated 44% of patients to receive comfort care only. The median time between admission 
and identifying a patient as dying and documenting a comfort plan was 5 days and 7 days 
respectively. In 44% of folders there was no indication of whether the comfort plan had been 
discussed with parents. 73% and 62% respectively of patients with comfort plans received IV 
fluids and IV antibiotics in their last 24 hours of life. 55% of patients who died in general wards 
experienced pain and distress in the last 48 hours of life. Respiratory symptomatology and oral 
and oesophageal candidiasis accounted for most discomfort. 2 in 5 patients with a comfort 
plan failed to receive analgesia, despite pain and distress. 
Conclusions 
Despite extreme diagnostic and prognostic uncertainty, doctors made key end of life decisions. 
Doctors' practices often failed to meet procedural and ethical requirements in professional 
guidelines. Failure to discuss DNR orders or comfort plans with parents ignores their role as 
principal decision makers for their children. The low rate of comfort plans, compared to DNR 
orders, suggests doctors had difficulty making the transition from curative to palliative care. 
Many comfort plans were incoherent and included interventions neither meant for, nor likely to 
promote patients' comfort. Whilst fear of hastening death may explain doctors' reluctance to 
prescribe adequate analgesia, undertreating pain and distress in a dying child is of more 
concern morally and medically than the risk of suppressing respiratory effort. To achieve better 
end of life care for HIV-infected children, it will be necessary to improve practice patterns. A 
structured medical treatment plan that focuses on goals of care is proposed to manage 
transitions from life-sustaining treatment to palliation. 
iv 
Abbreviations 
AAP Academy of Pediatrics 
AIDS acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
CCP comfort care plan 
DNR do not resuscitate 
HB02 headbox oxygen 
HIV human immunodeficiency virus 
ICU intensive care unit 
IPPV intermittent positive pressure ventilation 
IV intravenous 
LP lumbar puncture 
N-G nasogastric 
NP02 nasal prong 
PCP Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia 
PICU paediatric intensive care unit 
RCPCH Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health 
RXH Red Cross War Memorial Children's Hospital 
SCCM Society of Critical Care Medicine 
TB tuberculosis 
TLC tender loving care 
TPN · total parenteral nutrition 
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Definitions 
End of Life Decisions 
An end of life decision was defined as documentation in the patient's folder of at least one of 
the following: 
• a do not resuscitate order 
• identification (i.e. evidence) of the patient as dying 
• a comfort care plan 
• other restriction orders to withhold or withdraw specific interventions 
No end of life decision was defined by the absence of a specific order to limit interventions. 
Evidence of Dying 
Language in the folder such as 'end stage', 'dying', 'situation hopeless', 'prognosis poor', 
'terminal' was interpreted as evidence of dying. 
Do Not Resuscitate {DNR) Order 
DNR orders were defined as explicit orders to limit the use of cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
(CPR) in the event of cardiac arrest and/or mechanical ventilation in the event of respiratory 
arrest. Orders restricting admission to the paediatric intensive care unit were interpreted as 
decisions to withhold ventilation since this intervention only takes place in the intensive care 
setting in Red Cross Children's Hospital (RXH). DNR orders in RXH are typically abbreviated 
as 'Not for CPR' ('not for cardiopulmonary resuscitation') or 'Not for IPPV' ('not for intermittent positive pressure 
ventilation'). 
Comfort Care Plan 
A comfort care plan was defined by notations such as 'palliative care only', 'TLC', 'supportive 
care measures only'. 
Withholding Treatment 
Withholding treatment was defined as the considered decision not to institute a medically 
appropriate and potentially beneficial intervention. 
Withdrawal of Treatment 
Withdrawal of treatment was defined as discontinuation of active interventions already in use. 
Pain and Distress 
Pain and distress was broadly defined as: 
• behavioural distress such as 'crying+++', 'very miserable baby', 'very irritable' 
• descriptive reports of pain and distress such as 'mouth very sore', 'working very hard', 
'buttocks excoriated', 'penile ulceration' 
• symptomatology that suggested pain or discomfort such as, 'recessing+++,' 
'distressed+++', 'distended+++', 'oral thrush+++'. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction, Aims and Methodology 
1.1 Introduction 
Improvement of care at the end of life has been the focus of intense investigation,1 critical 
commentary,2-3 and commissioned articles4,5 in prestigious medical journals to raise 
professional awareness of the subject. Rapid expansion of web sites dedicated to end of life 
care extends accessibility of information well beyond specialist medical and nursing journals, 
and is further testimony to worldwide interest. This interest has evolved from the recognition 
that while we have the capacity to sustain patients through many life-threatening illnesses, we 
will at times be unsuccessful, and if it is no longer possible to prolong life we must provide 
compassionate care in the face of death. Despite the substantial literature addressing the care 
of dying patients, serious problems still exist in the medical care of children at the end of life. 
Many children suffer significant pain and other distressing symptoms,6-8 continue to receive 
aggressive care in intensive care units (ICUs) until the last few days of life,8,9 and lack 
continuity in their care.10 
Interest in end of life care for children is not new. Medical experts have written about doctors' 
responsibility to gravely ill children,11,12 ethicists have proposed guidelines for treatment at the 
end of life,13-17 and medical councils, professional associations and working committees have 
published recommendations for care of critically and terminally ill infants and children.1s-23 
Difficulties in developing policies for withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, that 
need to accommodate different moral viewpoints and meet specific legal requirements, are also 
described.24 In addition, empirical studies spanning continents have explored doctors' 
practices regarding limitation of life-sustaining treatment in neonates2s-26 and children.27-35 
Studies have also surveyed doctors' attitudes towards the termination of life-saving care.36-38 
Yet noticeably missing from this considerable literature is information on end of life care for 
children with HIV/AIDS. Except for limited research6 and commentary on pain management,39 
little is known about the process of end of life decision making in children with terminal 
HIV/AIDS, a uniformly lethal disease in the developed and developing world. 
Furthermore, scant attention has been paid in the paediatric literature to subsequent 
management of patients once a decision to forgo life-sustaining care has been made. Many 
issues need to be addressed if humane care is to be given to these children until they die. For 
example, which treatments should be discontinued? Should all life-prolonging treatment be 
stopped simultaneously? If not, in what order should treatments be withdrawn? What is the 
rationale at work in the withdrawal of treatment and what are the goals of care in these 
situations? According to data from adult studies, doctors prefer to withdraw or withhold life 
support in sequence, or forgo some forms of life support while retaining others.404 1 Rarely is all 
life support withdrawn simultaneously. Evidence also shows doctors withdraw treatment they 
perceive as expensive, scarce or artificial.42 In general, for example, physicians prefer to 
withdraw blood products and prefer not to withdraw intravenous fluids. Moreover, doctors 
choose to withdraw forms of therapy supporting organs that failed for natural rather than 
iatrogenic reasons, recently instituted rather than longstanding interventions, and therapies that 
result in immediate death. On the other hand, they may continue therapies that delay death in 
the face of diagnostic uncertainty _43 Likewise, health care professionals in a paediatric 
intensive care unit prefer to limit invasive interventions such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
and haemodialysis compared with less invasive care such as antibiotics.44 Collectively, these 
findings signify that once decisions to limit life-sustaining therapies are taken, the actual 
process reflects other moral, social and clinical goals which though satisfying clinicians' own 
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perceptions of what is right or wrong, may interfere with achievement of what for the patient is 
arguably the ultimate goal: a peaceful, dignified death. That said, recent policies to provide 
palliative care for children with life-threatening or terminal conditions, and the growing body of 
evidence to underpin better pain and symptom control are noteworthy developments.45-48 
Yet, with one exception,33 published data depict end of life practices for children in developed 
countries. In South Africa (SA) research evidence is limited to one study, which describes the 
process of withdrawing and withholding care among adult patients in an ICU .49 There are no 
similar data for children who die in hospital, although one attitudinal survey in a teaching 
hospital revealed marked value differences between doctors and nurses and mothers towards 
withdrawal of ventilation in hypothetical scenarios of severely compromised infants.50 
Certainly, findings from a survey in 1997 of randomly selected professional nurses in a local 
children's hospital are cause for concern.51 Two in five respondents indicated they had 
recently nursed a child they felt had suffered unnecessarily in hospital. A further 9 out of 10 
nurses felt parents were ill informed when signing consent for medical interventions. 
Unsurprisingly, 98% of respondents believed the children's hospital needed an ethics 
committee. 
In short, not enough is known about end of life practices relating to limitation of life-sustaining 
treatment or relief of suffering to assess whether doctors adopt a systematic and 
compassionate approach to the care of dying children. Arguably, to provide exemplary end of 
life care a doctor must first decide a child is dying, then he should provide medical care 
appropriate for a terminally ill child. Crucially, improving terminal care for hospitalised children 
depends on clinicians' ability to recognise that patients are dying, and their readiness to limit 
aggressive treatment and plan comprehensive palliative care. Generally this requires a shift in 
goals from cure or prolonging life to a primary concern for comfort. Ideally this should prompt a 
complete reassessment of a patient's care, from diagnostic evaluations and medications, to 
discontinuing treatment that does not contribute to the new goals, particularly where the burden 
of such interventions outweighs their benefits. Yet, according to the evidence, many children 
are denied a peaceful and dignified death owing to prolonged aggressive life-sustaining 
treatment, with inadequate attention to relief of pain and suffering. 
However, given universally low patient:staffing ratios in public hospitals in developing countries, 
any attempts to raise the quality of end of life care that rely exclusively on improvement of 
individual doctor-patient decision making may be misguided. In this regard the final comments 
of the principal investigators in the SUPPORT (Study to Understand Prognoses and 
Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments) intervention are instructive.52 Based on 
the wholesale failure of this costly intervention that aimed to improve end of life decision 
making, Lynn and co-workers believe improvement in end of life care will only be achieved 
through system level innovation, and quality improvement in routine practice patterns. Indeed, 
these investigators now reject the basic assumption on which SUPPORT was based: that the 
course of care for seriously ill hospitalised patients is the result of individual, patient-level 
decision making that could be improved with better counseling and information. Instead, they 
consider the course of care is more likely to be shaped by how the system of care is organised. 
In light of these findings, this study investigated end of life decision making among HIV-infected 
children with a view to identifying areas of practice requiring bedside and institutional level 
reform. 
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1.2 Aims 
The evaluation of current end of life practices is a necessary first step to improve the quality of 
care of children dying in hospital. Indeed increased medical accountability for the quality of end 
of life care demands rigorous examination of underanalysed areas of practice. Evidence from 
well-resourced countries highlights gaps in end of life care for children. For terminally ill 
children with HIV/AIDS, shortfalls in knowledge regarding end of life practices are even more 
substantial. There are no published data on end of life care for children who die in public 
hospitals in SA. Data on end of life decision making among children with HIV/AIDS are 
necessary because HIV/AIDS accounts for an escalating proportion of hospital admissions and 
hospital deaths in SA. To this end, this study aimed to investigate end of life decision making 
among children with HIV/AIDS who died in one children's hospital. The findings are intended to 
assist the development of clinically and ethically appropriate policies for comprehensive and 
compassionate medical and nursing care for dying children. In turn, such improvements may 
go some way towards surmounting the sense of hopelessness among health professionals 
dealing with overwhelming numbers of dying patients in a context of diminishing resources and 
limited treatment options. 
1.2.1 Objectives 
More specifically, the study aimed to determine: 
1. The proportion of patients identified as dying. 
2. The proportion of patients with documented Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders and other 
care restrictions. 
3. Any documented rationale for the DNR order. 
4. The provision of comfort care plans. 
5. Whether DNR orders or comfort care plans were discussed with parents or caretakers. 
6. The extent and nature of diagnostic and therapeutic interventions in the last 24 hours of 
life. 
7. The presence of pain and suffering in the last 48 hours of life. 
8. Associations between end of life decisions and clinically relevant variables such as age, 
severity and length of stay. 
1.3 Methodology 
1.3.1 Design 
A chart review of a consecutive series of in-patient deaths was performed to examine end of 
life decision making during patients' terminal hospitalisation. 
1.3.2 Setting 
The study was undertaken in Red Cross War Memorial Children's Hospital (RXH), a public, 
secondary and tertiary teaching hospital providing comprehensive medical care to an ethnically 
diverse, predominantly low-income population. Rotating registrars and senior house officers 
under consultant supervision provide most medical and surgical services. Limited 
multidisciplinary services including physiotherapy, occupational therapy and social work are 
provided. 
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1.3.3 Sample 
The sample included all patients who died from HIV/AIDS-related causes between February 
1998 and June 2000 in RXH. The study sample was drawn from a computerised register of 
deaths at RXH. The confidential register, instituted in February 1998 by a paediatric 
consultant, contains the folder number, age at death and certified cause(s) of death of all 
children who die at the hospital or whose death at home is certified by a RXH doctor. Two 
hundred and eleven children died from HIV-related causes between February 1998 and June 
2000. To meet the study's objectives, only patients who died in the in-patient medical and 
surgical, general and intensive care wards were included. Patients were excluded if they died 
at home or in the hospital's emergency services (Table 1). One hundred and sixty seven 
patients were eligible for inclusion. However, given an under-certification rate of 11.4% (95% 
confidence interval 6-17%) for HIV-related deaths, this figure may underestimate the actual 
number of deaths caused by HIV/AIDS at the hospital.53 
Table: 1 
Sample Selection 
Sample Population 
Exclusionary criteria: 
Died at home 
Died in the emergency out-patient service 
Died in the emergency out-patient ward 
No documentation of death in the folder 
Died at a Day Hospital 
PCR negative at post mortem 
N 
211 
22 
10 
8 
2 
1 
1 
Subtotal 44 
lnc/usionary criterion: 
Died in in-patient wards 167 
1.3.4 Data Collection 
A structured questionnaire (Appendix 1) was used to collect data from patients' medical and 
nursing records, medicine charts and death summaries. Although most data extraction was 
limited to the terminal hospitalisation, occasionally it was necessary to review previous 
admissions for evidence of prior DNR orders or decisions to withhold invasive investigations 
and life-sustaining treatment. Data collected included the following areas: 
• Sociodemographic and clinical characteristics of patients 
• Place of death 
• PICU admissions and deaths 
• Resuscitation 
• DNR orders or any other orders limiting care 
• Evidence of dying 
• Evidence of a comfort care plan 
• Length of time between admission to end of life decisions and from decision points to death 
• Social work intervention 
• Morphine administration 
• Diagnostic and therapeutic interventions in last 24 hours of life 
• Evidence of pain and distress in last 48 hours of life 
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For purposes of this study, end of life decisions include identification (i.e. evidence) of patients 
as dying, issuing a DNR order, recommendations for a comfort care plan and decisions to 
withdraw or withhold life-sustaining interventions. Assessment of whether a clinician 
considered a patient to be dying was determined by language in the medical notes such as 
"end stage", "dying", "situation hopeless", "prognosis grim", "moribund" and the like.54 
Reference to patients as being critically ill was not considered evidence of dying. DNR orders 
were defined as explicit orders to limit the use of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) in the 
event of cardiac arrest and/ or mechanical ventilation in the event of respiratory arrest (Not for 
IPPV - not for intermittent positive pressure ventilation). Orders restricting admission to the 
paediatric intensive care unit were interpreted as decisions to withhold ventilation since this 
intervention only takes place in the intensive care setting in this hospital. Data on DNR orders 
were transcribed verbatim in order to evaluate their clarity and scope. Statements in the 
medical notes such as "no heroic measures" were considered too imprecise to constitute a 
DNR order, although the frequency of such statements was noted. Documentation of orders to 
limit other life-prolonging measures, "no blood transfusions", for example, was also recorded 
verbatim as evidence of intent to withhold life-prolonging treatment. Withdrawal of treatment 
was defined as discontinuation of active interventions already in use, for example, extubation 
and removal from the ventilator. Evidence of a comfort care plan was based on notations such 
as "comfort care only", "supportive measures only" and "palliative care only". Information on 
resuscitation was cross-referenced with a manual record of "red box" use, kept by a nursing 
sister in charge of the central sterilisation service at the hospital. Equipment needed for 
resuscitation is kept in red boxes. Nursing sisters, following use of a red box for CPR, 
complete forms that are returned to the central sterilisation service. These forms provide an 
accurate record of actual episodes of CPR in the hospital. 
A pilot study of 10 records from general wards and the PICU of patients who had died of 
HIV/AIDS revealed the most frequent diagnostic and therapeutic interventions during 
hospitalisation. With the exception of routine nursing care (weighing and mouth care, for 
example) and micronutrient supplementation, all common interventions were itemised in the 
questionnaire to facilitate data collection. Less frequent interventions, such as a CT scan to 
confirm a brain death, were recorded in an open-ended format. A specific intervention was 
counted only once. For example, if 1 or more nebulisations was administered in the last 24 
hours of life, the treatment was counted only once for that patient. The presence of pain and 
distress in a patient's last 24 hours was determined by phrases in doctors' and nurses' notes 
such as "distressed +++". "patient very miserable", "crying+++" or "very irritable". Social work 
visits were noted if there was a direct entry by these services in the medical record or a 
mention of their intervention by another discipline. 
A paediatric consultant independently reviewed 12 randomly selected, completed 
questionnaires to evaluate content validity and reliability of data collection. Consensus 
regarding interpretation of evidence of dying and comfort care plans was reached through 
discussion. Agreement between the researcher and reviewer on other areas was high, 
although interrater reliability was not statistically assessed. The consultant also offered 
practical guidance about the location of selected information in medical records. The same 
consultant determined disease severity (A-mild, B-moderate, C-severe)55 for 102 (62%) 
patients. In the remainder, the researcher classified patients as falling into Category C based 
on documented use of this classification in patients' notes or reference to patients as having 
terminal or end-stage AIDS. The classification system is based on signs and symptoms or 
diagnoses related to HIV infection.s6 In this system, infected children are assigned to one of 
four mutually exclusive clinical categories: Stage N, no signs or symptoms; Stage A, mild signs 
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or symptoms; Stage B, moderate signs or symptoms; or Stage C, severe AIDS-defining signs 
or symptoms. Although most children pass from Stage N to A, B and C in that order, others 
may pass directly from N to B or N to C. Examples of conditions in Category A include 
recurrent or persistent upper respiratory infection or otitis media and dermatitis. Examples of 
conditions in Category B include anaemia, single episodes of bacterial meningitis, pneumonia 
or sepsis, recurrent or chronic diarrhoea, persistent (>2 months) oropharyngeal candidiasis 
(thrush) in a child >6 months and lymphocytic interstitial pneumonia. Examples of conditions in 
Category C include multiple or recurrent serious bacterial infections (septicaemia, pneumonia, 
meningitis, abscess of an internal organ), oesophageal or pulmonary candidiasis, 
pneumocysitis carinii pneumonia and wasting syndrome in the absence of a concurrent illness 
other than HIV infection. Categorisation according to immunological status is not routinely 
undertaken at RXH. 
1.4 Analysis 
Quantitative data were summarised and analysed on a personal computer using Epi Info 
Version 6. Qualitative data, such as verbatim pain reports and verbatim comfort care plans, 
were categorised according to themes and counted. Key independent variables, in particular, 
age and length of stay, were analysed as categorical and continuous variables. For example, 
to better understand practice patterns, the sample was divided into quartiles according to 
length of stay, each consisting of approximately 40 patients. In contrast, age groupings (0-6 
months, 7-12 months, 13-24 months, 25+ months) were based on local findings that HIV-
infected children below 6 months of age at time of diagnosis have a higher risk of death than 
older children (odds ratio of 4.7 and median survival of 2 months).57 Accordingly, age 
groupings were unevenly skewed towards younger groupings. Analyses that treated age and 
length of stay as continuous variables offered valuable additional information that may have 
been lost due to rigid categorisation of these variables. 
Frequency and percentage distributions, single and multiple cross tabulations, and Kruskall-
Wallis one-way analysis of variance were the most commonly used statistical analyses. Mantel 
Haenszel chi-square, Fisher's Exact Test (when expected values were less then 5) and 
Kruskall-Wallis chi square equivalent were used respectively to test the statistical significance 
of associations between categorical variables and differences between means for ordinal data. 
A probability level of less than 0.05 was used to establish statistical significance. In general, 
probability levels are reported in the main text when they reflect statistically significant results. 
Non-significant P-values are tabulated in appendices. P-values for analyses involving very low 
cell counts are not reported since the analyses are considered too unreliable. Most 
percentages are rounded to the nearest number. 
With the exception of frequency counts, disease severity Category A was excluded from 
analyses because only 1 patient in this study fell in this category. 
1.5 Ethical Considerations 
Neither patients' nor doctors' identifying details were extracted from medical records. 
Therefore, parental consent was not necessary for the study. Permission to undertake the 
study was obtained from the Chief Medical Superintendent of RXH, the Head of the 
Department of Paediatrics and Child Health and the Research Ethics Committee of the Health 
Sciences Faculty of the University of Cape Town. 
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1.6 Overview 
In the following chapter, policies and consensus statements of professional associations as 
well as empirical data relating to end of life decision making in children are reviewed. The 
literature review includes a synopsis of research findings related to withdrawing and 
withholding treatment in neonates and children. Whilst most published data relate to care 
restrictions in intensive care settings, several studies examine end of life decision making in 
hospital generally and among children with chronic diseases specifically. The review includes 
policies, practices and attitudes relating to pain management in children. Included in the review 
is a limited ethical analysis of important distinctions that influence medical decision making. 
Examples include perceived distinctions between withholding and withdrawing medical care, 
extraordinary and ordinary care, artificial hydration and nutrition, and the doctrine of double 
effect. Analysis and discussion of empirical data from this study are presented respectively in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Finally in Chapter 5 recommendations are offered to improve end of life 
care of hospitalised HIV-infected children. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
A report from the United Kingdom58 suggests 12 principles necessary for a good death, 
important among which is knowing when death is coming and understanding what to expect, 
retaining a measure of control over what is happening, being afforded dignity and privacy, 
adequate pain relief and symptom control, access to spiritual and emotional support, and 
crucially, being able to leave when it is time to go, by not having life pointlessly prolonged. 
Fulfilling the promise of a good death or, put differently, improving care at the end of life, is the 
focus of intense international study. In SA, where paediatric HIV/AIDS accounts for between 
one half and one quarter of all ward deaths in some teaching hospitals, the need to examine 
whether children experience a good death is compelling. 
Published policies and recommended ethical guidelines on end of life care for children provide 
the starting point for this literature review. These are followed by a review of empirical studies 
of end of life practices in acute hospital settings. Despite the best societal intentions, research 
shows children continue to receive aggressive care at the end of life with inadequate attention 
to pain and symptom control. These studies remind us that for many children a good death 
remains more a hope than standard medical practice. Recent policy developments to address 
palliation and pain relief are examined, followed by a review of ethical issues and doctors' 
attitudes to pain management. Finally, reports of perceived educational needs and initiatives to 
improve skills of persons caring for terminally ill children are briefly examined. 
2.2 Policies on Forgoing Life-sustaining Treatment in Infants and Children 
In the past decade, task forces of medical and ethical experts have developed guidelines to 
assist clinical decision making in situations where technological advances enable prolongation 
of life even in circumstances where there is no reasonable hope for recovery to a functional or 
interactive existence. In the early stages consensus statements focused mainly on end of life 
decision making among adult patients but more recently prestigious bodies such as the 
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) 18-20 and The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child 
Health (RCPCH)21 have issued authoritative position papers on aspects of end of life care for 
children. Likewise, paediatric subspecialties have published position statements on, among 
others, children in persistent vegetative state17 and children with cancer.23 Based on critical 
analysis of available evidence on end of life care, these policies provide practical ethical and 
legal guidance respectively to clinicians and the courts and legislatures on end of life matters. 
Important features of these policies, in particular the locus of decision making and the ethics of 
withdrawal and withholding life-sustaining medical treatment, are examined. 
Policies developed in the USA are examined first, followed by frameworks produced in the UK 
and Europe. In general a chronological approach is used. In 199018 and 199519 respectively 
the AAP published guidelines on forgoing life-sustaining medical treatment in children and high-
risk newborns. The AAP noted that limiting or stopping life support is appropriate if treatment 
serves only to preserve biological existence or if the overall goal of therapy has shifted towards 
the maintenance of comfort. Recognising no intrinsic moral difference between categories of 
treatment, the AAP defined life-sustaining medical treatment as encompassing all interventions 
that may prolong children's lives. Thus life-sustaining medical treatment includes both dramatic 
interventions such as mechanical ventilators and kidney dialysis machines and less technically 
demanding measures such as antibiotics, chemotherapy, and artificial nutrition and hydration. 
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The AAP18 sees no legal or ethical distinction between initiating or discontinuing a treatment, 
although it recognises that reluctance to stopping therapy may prevent clinicians beginning 
treatments that may help some patients, particularly in the face of uncertainty. The AAP 
recognises that starting a therapy is often necessary to adequately evaluate a patient's 
condition. Any treatment derives its medical justification from the benefits that the parents (and 
patients) and clinician hope to achieve by employing it. When the treatment has achieved 
those benefits or can no longer be expected to do so, it loses its justification and may be 
withdrawn. Indeed, according to the AAP, continuing nonbeneficial treatments may harm 
patients and may therefore constitute a legal as well as moral wrong. 
The AAP18 accords parents the primary authority to make decisions regarding life-sustaining 
treatments for their children. This assumption is based on the fact that most parents have a 
deep love and commitment to their children's welfare and that parents will have to deal with the 
consequences of whatever decisions are made. In making decisions for children who are 
incompetent the AAP recognises, in descending order of preference, 3 standards of decision 
making. First, the subjective standard relies on explicit statements made by the child before 
decisional capacity was lost. Second, if there is no clear evidence of what the child would have 
wanted, then the parent should apply the substituted judgement standard. This requires 
parents to apply the child's own values, religious beliefs, and preferences in arriving at a 
treatment decision. If this information is not available, or more commonly, if the child never 
attained the capacity to espouse such preferences, then the third option is the best interest 
standard. The best interest standard involves weighing the benefits and burdens of life-
sustaining medical treatment. The benefits may include prolonging life on the understanding 
that continuation of biological existence without consciousness may not be a benefit, or 
improved quality of life following the institution of treatment, which includes reduction of pain. 
The burdens of life-sustaining medical treatment may include intractable pain, emotional 
suffering, invasive or inhumane interventions or any other activities that severely detract from 
the patient's quality of life. Whilst the AAP stresses that 'quality of life' must be assessed in 
terms of the patient's perceptions, not those of the parents or health care providers, practically 
speaking this is not possible in infants and young children who have never been able to 
formulate a value system. It is noteworthy that the AAP rejects attempts to equate quality of life 
with the notion of social worth as judged by others. In short, the best interests of a child are 
usually presumed to be life preserving but in the face of irreversible illness this presumption 
requires careful exploration. Best interests may require a plan of care that focuses on the 
child's need for comfort and symptom relief, rather than the provision of life saving medical 
therapy, to ease the process of dying in a way that promotes the comfort and dignity of the 
child. 
If, in the physician's opinion, treatment no longer confers benefit and should be forgone, then 
the patient and parent should be informed. Patients and parents may not compel a physician 
to provide any treatment, which in the professional's judgement is unlikely to benefit the patient. 
In case of disputes between a patient or parent and the physician, the AAP recommends the 
parties seek consultative help from professionals skilled in behavioural assessment and 
counselling, an ethics committee, religious advisors if appropriate, and as a last resort, the 
courts. 
Finally, the AAP18 recommends explicit documentation in a patient's medical notes of any order 
to forgo life-sustaining treatment. Such an order should include information on the diagnosis, 
prognosis, patient or parent's wishes, the content of discussions with involved parties, any 
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disagreements or unresolved issues, and the recommendations of the health care team. 
Patients with no specified limits on therapy will receive all medically appropriate interventions 
including cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The AAP's recommendation that 1 physician be 
designated as the spokesperson for the health care team to discuss progress and treatment 
options with the family is a worthwhile addition to their 1995 position paper19 on forgoing life 
saving treatment for newborns. Appointment of a named key worker would facilitate 
communication between patients and parents and the health care team. 
In 1996,20 in response to increasing debate in clinical and public circles about the high costs in 
terms of money, time and psychosocial consequences, of neonatal and paediatric intensive 
care, the MP issued a further policy statement that specifically addressed the ethical use of 
advanced medical technology (ventilatory support for example). In line with earlier statements, 
the MP confirmed the primacy of patients' and parents' values as the basis for decisions. The 
statement noted that prognostication is an inexact science the results of which cannot tell 
clinicians which particular patient will live or die and with what residual problems. In this light 
the MP underscored the need for individualised decision making for newborns, infants and 
children requiring advanced medical technology. Significantly in its rejection of bedside 
rationing the MP went beyond previous policy statements. Whilst acknowledging that limited 
resources require equitable limits on medical treatment, the AAP stressed that resource 
allocation decisions about which children should receive intensive care resources should be 
made explicitly at a public policy level, not at the bedside. 
Subsequently in 1999, the MP and the Pediatric Section of the Society for Critical Care 
Medicine59 jointly published a set of flexible guidelines for developing admission and discharge 
policies for paediatric intensive care units (PICUs). Although the MP promoted the use of 
sound physiological criteria (wherever possible) as the basis of policies, the statement 
recognised the absence of benefit to the patient and futility as acceptable criteria for 
discontinuation of intensive care. The MP recommended that hospitals adapt these guidelines 
to develop institutionally appropriate policies. The MP noted that the absence of clear 
guidelines could result in substantially inconsistent decisions in similar kinds of cases. By 
adopting a comprehensive set of guidelines institutions could reduce the possibility of 
inconsistent decisions. 
In turn, the Society for Critical Care Medicine (SCCM)6D published a carefully researched 
statement detailing a principled and procedural approach to provision of treatments deemed 
futile or inadvisable. To this end, the SCCM classified interventions into 4 categories: 
treatments that have no beneficial physiological effect, treatments that are extremely unlikely to 
be beneficial, treatments that have a beneficial effect but are extremely costly, and treatments 
that are of uncertain or controversial benefit. Only treatments that offer no physiological benefit 
should be labeled futile. Futile treatment, so defined, is rare and seldom disputed. On the 
other hand, there are many treatments that have extremely unlikely, extremely costly or 
extremely marginal benefit that would best be considered inappropriate or inadvisable to offer. 
Given that individuals have different goals and values, any policy to limit non-futile treatment 
should be developed with the participation of all interested parties. As the SCCM reasoned, 
treatments that prolong the time until death may be viewed by some as useless or even 
harmful because the treatments prolong dying or suffering. For others, these treatments may 
be viewed as valuable since they allow family members to share the experience of death, 
provide an unlikely yet desired chance of survival, or are in keeping with religious beliefs. The 
SCCM proposed that any policies to limit inadvisable treatment should be on public record and 
widely distributed in the community where the hospital is located prior to implementation. 
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Moreover, they should reflect moral values acceptable to the community, not be based 
exclusively on prognostic scoring systems, detail the mechanisms by which the policy was 
developed and the signatories to its creation, articulate appellate mechanisms and procedures 
and be recognised by the courts. If followed, specific guidelines published in this consensus 
statement should ensure that resource allocation and treatment policies, in highly developed 
and less developed countries alike, are more explicit, rational, fair and democratic. 
In 1997, RCPCH 21 in the UK published a framework for practice in withholding and withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment. The Report's most valuable contribution lies in delineating 5 
categories in which withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment might be 
appropriate and in which the goals of care are redirected. First, in the case of the brain dead 
child (as defined in the Report) treatment would be futile and withdrawal of current medical 
treatment would be appropriate. Second, it might be appropriate to withdraw current therapy 
and withhold further curative treatment in a child who develops a permanent vegetative state 
following say trauma or hypoxia, is reliant on others for care and does not react or relate to the 
outside world. Third, in the 'no chance' situation in which the child has such severe disease 
that life-sustaining treatment merely delays death and quite possibly increases suffering, 
medical treatment may be considered inappropriate. Fourth, in the 'no purpose' situation 
although a child may survive medical treatment, residual physical and mental impairment may 
be so great as to render it unreasonable to expect a child to bear it. The Report gives the 
example of a newborn with profound neurological damage following severe asphyxia where 
microcephaly, extreme developmental delay, blindness and quadriplegia are inevitable. Fifth, 
is the 'unbearable situation', which allows consideration of withholding or withdrawing treatment 
when the child and/ or family " ... feel that in the face of progressive and irreversible illness 
further treatment is more than can be borne". (p. 7) Additionally, patients and parents can 
request a particular treatment be withdrawn irrespective of medical opinion on its potential 
benefit, for example a child with cancer who is offered further aggressive treatment. 
In line with AAP statements, the RCPCH Report supports decision making based on the 
patient's best interests, collaboration between the child, parents and the health care team, the 
primacy of parents as the best decision makers on behalf of their child, the equivalence of 
withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining therapies, and legal intervention in the face of 
irresolvable differences between the child, parents and the health care team. On the other 
hand, the Report downplays the role of ethics committees in decision making since it believes 
they are" ... too remote from the individual case to understand all aspects" (p. 23). Further, it is 
surprisingly non-committal and circumspect regarding the withdrawal of artificial feeding: 
"withdrawal of feeding" it contends " ... is often a source of considerable distress, although in 
certain circumstances such as permanent vegetative state its withdrawal can be accepted if it is 
well managed". (p. 21) However, this hesitation may be partially explained by the legal 
requirement in the UK to obtain the Court's authority before termination of artificial nutrition and 
hydration in all cases of permanent vegetative state.61 
Finally, legal and ethical guidelines relating to withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment in neonates in 7 European countries are briefly reported.22 The countries, which form 
part of the EURONIC Project (a European biomedical research initiative), include France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Unsurprisingly, all countries 
agree that whether or not life-prolonging treatment is continued, high quality compassionate 
care is non-negotiable for all patients. Similarly, there is widespread agreement that 
aggressive treatment should be withheld if a neonate has a high likelihood of dying, irrespective 
of medical intervention. By the same token, all countries condone the alleviation of suffering 
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even if death were hastened. In contrast, differences between countries are apparent in cases 
where neonates would be severely impaired if they were to survive - here decision making on 
the basis of future quality of life is necessary. In Italy, for example, non-treatment of newborns 
for conditions such as a severe congenital malformation or with a poor neurological prognosis 
is considered a form of discrimination, in violation of the Constitution and can result in criminal 
prosecution. Whilst uncertainty exists in the UK about what exactly constitutes an intolerable 
quality of life and who should define this, the official legal position is governed by the Bolam 
test which asserts that a doctor is not negligent if his actions would satisfy a body of reasonable 
and competent professional opinion. In other words, a responsible body of medical opinion 
would need to agree it is not in a child's best interests to continue treatment. Likewise, in the 
Netherlands ultimate responsibility for deciding the best course of action lies with the medical 
team caring for the child. In the Netherlands doctors are not obliged to provide medically futile 
treatment the definition of which depends on clinical judgement. In the absence of test cases, 
the position regarding cessation of treatment in neonates in France, Germany and Sweden 
remains unclear. Clinicians therefore operate in a legal vacuum. Active intentional intervention 
to end life is legally prohibited in all countries. Whilst, Dutch paediatricians do occasionally 
assist babies to die with parental consent, the legality of these actions remains unclear. In 
short, the range of policies described in this ambitious investigation confirms the influence of 
culture, religion and historical precedent on end of life practices across Europe, with a low 
likelihood of developing universally acceptable guidelines in the near future. The most 
contested area concerns the child who could be saved but whose future outlook is 
incontrovertibly bleak. 
In South Africa there are no published guidelines on end of life care for children. However, the 
Consensus Statement by the Bioethics Centre at Groote Schuur Hospital62 on withholding and 
withdrawing life-sustaining therapy, along with the South African Law Commission's (SALC)63 
proposals on regulating end of life decision making, are likely to have wide-ranging implications 
for the care of terminally ill children. The Consensus Statement62 recognises the central role of 
parents in making decisions about life-sustaining therapy according to the patient's best 
interest. Further, if a life-sustaining intervention is highly unlikely to promote a patient's 
meaningful survival, it can be considered futile. Physicians have no ethical obligation to 
provide futile treatment. The statement strongly recommends full documentation in hospital 
records of all decisions taken in respect of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining therapy. 
Justification for such decisions should also be recorded. Hospitals are encouraged to develop 
written policies regarding initiation and discontinuation of life-sustaining interventions. Whilst 
the statement indicates that artificial feeding is a form of medical treatment, it is mentioned only 
in relation to patients in a permanent vegetative state. Whether the statement sanctions 
withdrawing artificial feeding in other circumstances is unclear. 
By comparison, the proposed the SALC Bill on End of Life Decisions63 unequivocally holds that 
life-sustaining medical treatment includes the maintenance of artificial feeding. Inexplicably, 
artificial hydration is excluded from this definition. Additionally, the Bill proposes that 
competent children above the age of 14 years, with assistance from their parents, may refuse 
medical treatment, including life-sustaining treatment. This clause has been challenged for its 
ambiguity since it is unclear whether parents could overrule a child's decision to forgo further 
life-sustaining treatment.64 Whereas voluntary euthanasia is under consideration for adults, this 
is not an option for persons under 18 years of age. 
In summary, most countries at least in the industrialised world have developed ethical 
guidelines to enhance best practice and improve the quality of care for neonates and children 
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with life-limiting conditions. Furthermore, insofar as these guidelines reflect professional 
opinion, they are likely to carry legal standing and, in the UK, would satisfy the Bolam test. 
Still, despite these authoritative policies that propose reasonably consistent courses of action 
regarding decisions to forgo life-sustaining medical treatment, in practice, several positions 
remain ethically controversial and unsettled, in particular, withholding and withdrawing artificial 
feeding and hydration. 
Not surprisingly, any attempts to draft policies and guidelines on such sensitive issues are 
bound to attract criticism.24 Policies may be interpreted as imposing unnecessary constraints 
on clinical practice, as being too general to be useful, as discriminating against some 
individuals and groups, as striking the wrong balance between law and morality, or as being 
patently immoral. Nevertheless Doyal and Larcher24 argue it would be unwise to leave these 
decisions entirely to the moral values and biases of individual clinicians and their possibly 
mistaken interpretation of the law. To avoid potential conflict concerning the validity of ethico-
legal guidelines, Doyal and Larcher recommend involvement, from the outset, of a wide-range 
of multidisciplinary decision makers in both their construction and implementation as well as re-
evaluation and audit (as mortality and morbidity improve and case law alters). 
2.3 Ethical Considerations in Forgoing Life-sustaining Treatment in Children 
In the past 10 to 20 years a clear legal and ethical consensus has evolved in many countries 
that supports the right of a patient with decisional capacity or the patient's surrogate to refuse 
or remove unwanted medical treatment. This includes the right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment. As already noted, in paediatrics parents are the primary decision makers and only 
in exceptional circumstances are physicians able to supersede their authority. Yet, forgoing 
life-sustaining treatment in infants and children raises many contentious issues. Among them 
are the place of do not resuscitate orders, distinctions between withholding and withdrawing 
treatment, ordinary and extraordinary (or heroic) interventions, and whether artificial nutrition or 
hydration may ever be forgone. 
2.3.1 Do Not Resuscitate Orders 
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) consists of a set of techniques designed to restore 
circulation in the event of acute cardiac or cardiopulmonary arrest.65, 66 In hospitals, advanced 
CPR is undertaken in response to an urgent call. Advanced CPR techniques may include 
closed chest compression, ambubagging, intubation with assisted ventilation, use of 
vasopressor drugs, and intubation for support on ventilation.66 
Non-resuscitation is acceptable in several situations. Competent patients can give informed 
refusal after being told that, unless resuscitated, patients who suffer cardiac arrest will almost 
certainly die. In the case of infants and young children, parents assume the right of consent.65 
Parents may consent to a DNR order if it is in their child's best interests. The problem for a 
parent is deciding what circumstances warrant the judgement that death is better than 
continued life. Morally it is argued that non-resuscitation is compatible with respect for human 
dignity if a patient would be so severely and permanently impaired that he or she could not 
flourish in even minimal ways. Clinically, the best interest standard requires that a patient be 
irreversibly close to death in the short term or that resuscitation presents an unacceptably high 
probability of death or brain damage if the procedure were successful.65 
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Futility is a further justification for withholding resuscitation.65, 66 If the clinical condition of the 
patient is such that the probability of successful resuscitation approaches zero, CPR is futile as 
it will not benefit the patient. In fact it may harm the patient if it is 'successful' but the patient 
survives with a poor quality of life. If these patients can be identified in advance, this is 
justification for issuing a DNR order. It is not part of a doctor's duty to administer useless or 
harmful treatment. A futility justification requires a high burden of proof and if there is 
significant uncertainty about the likely outcome, resuscitation must be attempted unless a 
parent has indicated it would not be in a child's best interests. Some argue that if CPR is not 
medically indicated, it need not be offered as an option to a patient or parent and thus consent 
is not required. Those who reject this position claim it violates the standard of informed 
consent, that a patient or surrogate should always have the right to refuse or choose CPR 
because the quality of the patient's surviving life is a judgement the patient or surrogate alone 
should make.66 Doctors traditionally see complex situations from a uniquely medical 
perspective, and may ignore important factors related to parents' values and preferences. 
Rarely is the question of whether or not to perform CPR a purely medical one. Additionally, 
those who support consent argue there is a lack of consensus on what probability of survival 
constitutes futility. Furthermore clinicians apply a concept of futility inconsistently. Finally, 
unilateral decisions may be biased against vulnerable populations.66 
A DNR policy should follow acceptable moral and legal dictates, whilst optimising clinical 
discretion.65 As a rule, a policy will require that CPR be a standing order, that is, it must be 
performed on any patient who suffers a cardiac or respiratory arrest.66 Only when a specific 
order is issued that CPR is not indicated may it be omitted. A DNR order implies that if a 
patient suffers a cardiac arrest, the crash team will not be called and neither basic nor 
advanced CPR will be given. It has no implications for any other clinical decisions concerning 
a patient's management.66 In other words, a DNR order does not mean that treatment and/or 
care should be terminated. DNR orders should be clearly and prominently documented in a 
patient's medical and nursing notes.65 A DNR order should include the medical facts and 
clinical justification for the order, the date of issuing the order, and a summary of the discussion 
with the family, including informed consent. The status of the DNR order should be reviewed at 
regular intervals. DNR policies developed by hospitals should be open to public scrutiny.65 
Patients with a DNR order are generally very ill and often experience a variety of medical 
needs that are not covered by the DNR order yet ought to be addressed. For example, being 
attentive to the analgesic needs of dying patients or decisions regarding continued use of 
antibiotics have immediate relevance to clinical care.67 Decisions to withhold, withdraw or 
initiate interventions other than resuscitation should be noted in specific orders. To this end, 
procedure-specific DNR orders have recently been introduced as alternatives to traditional 
DNR orders.68-72 By focusing on procedures, the form addresses in very concrete terms 
exactly what will or will not be done if a patient arrests. Mittleberger and colleagues68 found, for 
example, that the number of ambiguous DNR orders decreased from 88% to 7% after 
implementation of a procedure-specific DNR order form. This approach to DNR orders 
appears particularly well suited for communication and management of patients cared for on 
busy hospital wards, by many different caregivers. 
2.3.2 Withholding and Withdrawing Life-sustaining Treatment: A Moral Distinction 
In discussions about life-sustaining interventions, physicians and parents may draw distinctions 
that seem intuitively plausible but prove problematic on closer analysis. Commonly drawn 
distinctions between withholding and withdrawing life saving therapies are examined in this 
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section. Most ethicists73 and courts74 recognise that withholding and withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment are morally equivalent. Yet many clinicians are less comfortable 
withdrawing than withholding life-sustaining treatment, largely because the former can be 
characterised as an omission whereas the latter is seen as a deliberate act. Despite the 
psychological differences between these situations,73 one can be ethically and legally 
responsible for an omission, for example, when one has a duty to perform an act that has been 
left undone (a railway official who fails to warn a passenger of an oncoming train); and, a 
deliberate action that contributes to or makes possible death may be ethically and legally 
permissible (action in self-defence, highly risky/ experimental surgery). Caregivers should not 
rely solely on their medical biases or their moral instincts in making end of life decisions, since 
these can lead to inappropriate care for dying children. 
Despite this moral equivalence, surveys repeatedly show health care professionals believe 
there is a morally significant difference between stopping and not starting life-saving treatment. 
In a convenience sample of health care professionals attending a conference of the Critical 
Care Society, a minority (43%) of respondents believed withholding treatment was ethically 
more acceptable than withdrawing treatment, and 26% of respondents were more disturbed by 
withdrawing than withholding therapies.75 In another attitudinal survey, 66% of hospital-based 
doctors and nurses felt there was an ethical distinction between withholding and withdrawing 
life-sustaining.76 Further research77 using case vignettes to assess attitudes to end of life care 
found that almost three quarters of physicians and medical students thought withholding and 
withdrawing treatment were different. Recent survey data confirm these earlier findings. Only 
1 in 5 hospital and hospice nurses surveyed in the UK thought withholding and withdrawing life-
supportive care were equivalent. 78 Comparative figures from the USA found only one third of 
doctors and nurses considered stopping and starting treatment similar. Less than half of 
European physicians surveyed felt there was no ethical distinction between withholding and 
withdrawing intensive care from a neonate.79 Rates of agreement were country-dependent: 
Lithuania (54%), Sweden (48%), Netherlands and Estonia (35%), France and Italy (33%), 
Spain (32%), Germany (31%) and Hungary (21%). Together these studies suggest health care 
professionals are more comfortable withholding than withdrawing life-sustaining interventions. 
Professionals' beliefs appear to differ substantially from the recommendations of professional 
bodies and from majority opinion in bioethics. Several reasons contribute to this view. 
First there are psychological reasons.16 Sometimes initiating a treatment creates expectations 
in the minds of the health care professionals, parents and patients that the treatment will be 
continued 'indefinitely' or until the patient is cured. When the treatment does not work as 
expected or hoped, a decision to stop the treatment can contribute to feelings of 
disappointment, guilt and failure on the part of doctors and nurses. Furthermore, should a child 
die following the withdrawal of treatment, some doctors and nurses feel they are responsible for 
bringing about the death, more so than if treatment had never been started in the first place. 
Moreover, withdrawing life support can be an emotionally devastating experience. Against this 
it is argued that, as with all promises, doctors and nurses must take care when initiating a 
treatment to explain the indications for its discontinuation. They could also modify 
preconceptions with continuing reevaluation and education during treatment. Second, health 
care professionals are trained to treat diseases and cure patients.so This bias to treat may lead 
health care professionals to believe that anything less than 'going all out' to prolong lives is 
tantamount to abandoning patients. The technological imperative gains increased 
psychological and moral weight in cases where treatment has been continued for sometime, 
but without expected success. Third, there are legal concerns.74 Practitioners feel vulnerable 
to scrutiny, potentially leading to criminal or professional proceedings.s1 Withdrawing a 
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treatment seems to be a deliberate action which, when it is likely to end in death, may seem 
more serious than an omission that ends in death. For example, discontinuing the ventilator 
requires a positive action, whereas not starting the ventilator seems more passive and may 
therefore be considered less reprehensible.16 
However, in clinical medicine, accepting the distinction between withholding and withdrawing 
medical treatment as morally significant may have unintended consequences. Health care 
professionals may become unduly reluctant to begin some treatments precisely because they 
fear they will be locked into continuing treatments that no longer benefit the patient.16 Yet 
additional information may become known only once treatment has started. Typically, 
decisions to initiate life-sustaining treatment are made when a patient's prognosis is uncertain. 
For example, a time-limited trial of mechanical ventilation may be appropriate for a critically ill 
child. If a treatment proves ineffective after several days, then it becomes pointless to 
continue. However, if physicians could not stop a treatment once it has begun, they might be 
reluctant to attempt treatments that might be beneficial. Even if a subsequent decision is to 
withdraw the treatment, and in so doing possibly hasten a child's death, the withdrawal of a life-
sustaining treatment that proves futile or contrary to a patient's best interest is morally 
preferable to not having tried the treatment at all.16 
2.3.3 Ordinary versus Extraordinary Treatment 
Some clinicians76.7B believe the distinction between extraordinary and ordinary interventions is 
helpful in making decisions. Interventions that are highly technological, invasive, complicated 
and expensive are generally considered extraordinary or heroic. Examples include mechanical 
ventilation and renal dialysis. In contrast, ordinary care, which includes antibiotics, intravenous 
fluids and tube feedings, is considered basic care or a standard nursing measure. The 
presumption is that providing treatments classified as ordinary is mandatory whereas it is 
morally permissible to forgo heroic measures.89 But this is essentially a circular argument, 
since it claims that ordinary treatments are morally required because they are ordinary, and 
extraordinary treatments are morally optional because they are extraordinary.16 Rather than 
focusing on the nature of the technology, it is preferable to balance the benefits versus the 
burdens of a particular intervention in a particular patient. If the burdens outweigh the benefits 
then the treatment is not obligatory.73 The benefits and burdens of an intervention will vary 
depending on a patient's condition. Whereas mechanical ventilation is highly beneficial for a 
child after cardiac surgery, it may be less beneficial and burdensome in an infant with chronic 
lung disease.16 
2.3.4 Artificial Nutrition and Hydration 
Decisions about artificial feeding and hydration are more controversial than decisions about 
other life-sustaining treatments. Many physicians, treating adults and children alike, believe 
basic humane care requires that patients always be given food and water.15, so However, 
nutrition and hydration may be provided with varying degrees of invasiveness. Artificial 
feeding, for instance, encompasses the administration of nutrients by peripheral or central 
intravenous lines, nasogastric tubes or gastrostomies. Stopping technologically supplied 
nutrition and hydration is contentious in adult and paediatric medicine. Forty two percent of 
physicians and nurses who cared for adult patients felt strongly that food and water should 
never be discontinued, even if ventilatory support and dialysis were withdrawn.76 Despite this 
reported reluctance to stop nutrition and hydration, almost half the respondents believed the 
burdens of continuing nutrition and hydration to a terminally ill patient could outweigh the 
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benefits of prolonging life. About one third of clinical nurse managers of ICUs in the Yorkshire 
region of the UK report policies that approve withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration.81 
Findings suggest this issue is even more difficult for paediatricians. A survey of members of 
the Child Neurology Society found that 75% of respondents 'never' withhold fluid and nutrition 
from infants and children in a permanent vegetative state.17 A 1990 unpublished survey1s of 
the Pediatric Section of the SCCM found that 58% of the sample would not withdraw tube 
feedings from a 4-month-old infant who was comatose, unresponsive and ventilator-dependent 
1 month after an unexplained cardiorespiratory arrest even when the parents insisted that all 
treatment be terminated, and when all clinicians agreed the child would not make a 
neurological recovery. When parents were described as not insisting that the child be allowed 
to die immediately the percentage of respondents who would not withdraw food and water 
increased to 65 percent. In comparison, using the same case study, only 14% and 2% 
respectively of respondents would oppose forgoing ventilation or CPR. Likewise, another 
study36 of Jrd year paediatric residents' attitudes towards life support of patients in a permanent 
vegetative state, revealed that all respondents would withhold vasoactive drugs, 97% would 
withdraw ventilation, but only 45% were prepared to withdraw IV nutrition and fluids. In a 
PICU-based prospective survey44 of caregivers' attitudes towards limitation of aggressive care, 
only 1 in 4 respondents would consider forgoing total parenteral nutrition (TPN) from patients 
identified as requiring some form of treatment restriction. In contrast, 94% and 83% 
respectively would limit CPR and haemodialysis. The authors' explanation that physicians 
seem to prefer to forgo interventions that would most likely not be successful or were highly 
invasive is unconvincing since TPN is both invasive and carries a high risk of infection. 
Several reasons are proffered as to why paediatric patients are perceived and treated 
differently from adults with respect to medically provided nutrition.1s Foremost there is the 
symbolic importance of feeding dependent children, in particular infants. Many would argue that 
depriving a healthy child of food and water is cruel and inhumane. Feeding is the first response 
of the community to the needs of the newborn and remains a central mode of nurture and 
comfort. Indeed, food and water are not only goods that preserve life and provide comfort, they 
are symbols of care and compassion. Furthermore, even low levels of hunger and thirst 
experienced by most people are remembered as decidedly unpleasant. However, Nelson and 
co-authors1s reject attempts to move from customary practice and emotional reaction to a 
moral conclusion that it is always wrong to forgo medically provided nutrition and hydration in 
children. It is morally incorrect, they argue, to confuse beneficial provision of food and water to 
otherwise healthy children with provision of medical nutrition and hydration to children with 
profoundly diminished life prospects and who are unlikely to benefit from its provision. Nor is 
being dependent on others for nutrition necessarily a morally decisive factor. If it were, it would 
be just as wrong to deprive a critically ill or demented adult of nutrition as it would be to deprive 
a child. Additionally, medical provision of nutrition and hydration cannot be equated with 
providing otherwise healthy children with food and water. Artificial feeding and hydration 
generally requires skilled medical and nursing care, involves some medical risks and 
complications, and is used to combat or cope with a disease process that inhibits a child's 
ability to swallow or tolerate normal feeds. Further, it is primarily intended to supplement 
nutritional intake or support nutritional and fluid needs for a limited period of time until a 
patient's underlying condition improves. Accordingly, artificial nutrition and hydration is more 
similar to medical treatment than to basic care and ought to be evaluated as such.so 
Still, because food and water are so central to life and survival, it becomes very difficult to 
consider them with the same emotional detachment as one might feel toward a ventilator or 
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dialysis machine. As one mother,82 with full understanding of the bioethical and legal 
arguments, recalls when she and her husband had to decide whether artificial nutrition and 
hydration should be withdrawn from their brain damaged, comatose infant son: " ... although we 
had decided that death was Michael's best option, we were reluctant to let it happen by 
withholding nutrition. We fed him not because we expected his life to be improved but because 
we could not bear to see him 'go hungry' ... the nasogastric tube was placed and feeding was 
done, probably more to assuage our feelings than to help him." (p.264) 
Other reasons that might explain clinicians' reluctance to forgo medical nutrition and hydration 
are similar to those against withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining interventions generally. 
These include diagnostic uncertainty, children's lack of independent decision making capacity 
(thus their values or wishes about treatment are unknown), and the widespread belief that 
children are not supposed to die.15 Although, on balance, the provision of technological 
nutrition and hydration is beneficial for most children, the circumstances in at least some cases 
(for instance permanent vegetative state and anencephaly) are such that this form of treatment 
is contrary to the child's best interests. 
Interestingly, Childressao sees some value in the symbolic connection between care and 
nutrition or hydration. If decision makers worry over withholding or withdrawing medical 
nutrition and hydration, they may think more deeply about circumstances that putatively justify 
their decisions. Ultimately, this critical inquiry may yield the sad but justified conclusion that a 
patient will be best served by not using medical procedures to provide food and fluids. By the 
same token, these same commentators remind us that providing nutrition and hydration may 
sometimes be necessary to keep patients comfortable while they are dying though it may 
temporarily prolong dying. In such cases, artificial nutrition and hydration constitute warranted 
palliative care. In short, medical nutrition and hydration do not seem to be distinguishable in 
any morally relevant way from other life-sustaining medical treatments, which may sometimes 
be withheld or withdrawn from children. 
In summary, decisions to use, to forgo, or to discontinue treatment should be taken as a 
function of and not in isolation from the clinical goals of a patient's total treatment plan. Thus 
the most widely accepted and satisfactory framework for thinking about whether an intervention 
may be withheld or withdrawn including artificial nutrition and hydration is to inquire about the 
balance of benefits versus burdens for a particular intervention in a particular patient. 
However, judgements regarding benefit and harm are themselves inherently evaluative. A 
decision that the burdens of a life-sustaining treatment are disproportionate to the benefits 
includes clinical judgement and a non-medical determination of how valuable it is to continue 
living. Clearly, doctors ought not to make these judgements alone, since they may be strongly 
influenced by their own religious, professional, and sociological backgrounds. Accordingly, 
public policy, in the form of the law and professional norms, recognises parents as central 
decision makers in determining whether a life-sustaining treatment will benefit or harm a child. 
Parents are expected to base their decisions on the best interest standard. Derived from the 
ethical principle of beneficence, the best interests of a child are usually presumed to be life 
preserving, but in the face of irreversible illness, this presumption requires careful exploration. 
Best interests may require a plan of care that focuses on the child's need for comfort and 
symptom relief, rather than the provision of life-saving medical therapy, to ease the process of 
dying in a way that promotes the comfort and dignity of the child. 
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2.4 Empirical Studies of End of Life Decision Making among Children Dying in Acute 
Hospitals 
Knowledge of the process of dying in acute hospitals, including why and how life-sustaining 
interventions are withheld and withdrawn, comes mainly from descriptive studies of actual end 
of life practices. In the absence of internationally agreed standards on end of life care, this 
review of empirical studies serves simply to highlight worldwide differences in practice. 
Variations include, among others, where in hospital children died (for instance, a general ward 
or the PICU), treatments commonly restricted, rationales for DNR orders, and whether parents 
were involved in decision making. A few studies that examine end of life care for children with 
chronic diseases are presented first, followed by empirical reports of end of life care for 
hospitalised neonates and children. Noticeably missing is published research on end of life 
care for children with HIV/AIDS. 
2.4.1 End of Life Decision Making in Children with Chronic Diseases 
Several studies have examined terminal care for children with specific chronic diseases. In 
1997 Robinson and co-workers9 reviewed the medical records of 44 children with cystic fibrosis 
who died over a 10-year period in the Children's Hospital in Boston, USA Final hospitalisations 
ranged between <24 hours and >30 days. All patients had a documented DNR order and most 
(98%) died in hospital in a general ward (89%) and most (98%) had family members at the 
bedside at the time of death. The authors describe their model of terminal care as a mixture of 
preventive, therapeutic and palliative care. In the last 12 hours, for example, 72% of children 
received oral vitamin preparations to prevent future complications of CF, 75% and 36% of 
children respectively received IV antibiotics and chest physiotherapy to reverse or forestall 
current lung disease, and 86% of patients received palliative care, particularly opiates for chest 
pain and dyspnoea. The writers justify this approach on several grounds. Therapeutic 
interventions, such as IV antibiotics, have a relatively low morbidity and thus the health care 
team is willing to continue these therapies. Furthermore, they may actually be useful in 
reducing respiratory symptoms. And since these children have received similar treatment 
regimens most of their lives, continuation is not such a burden and may even provide physical 
and psychological support, at least according to the researchers. As a methodology, chart 
review can only reveal the documented practices of the doctors and nurses, thus it is not 
possible from this study to determine patients' or parents' points of view. Conceivably, they 
could have reached opposite conclusions. They could reasonably have preferred to forgo all 
tubes and invasive procedures especially since the patients were dying. 
In another study83 that examined all CF deaths in Canada in 1996, the authors confirm how 
difficult it is for clinicians to know when to change the goals of therapy. Patients may have 
several admissions to hospital for treatable chest infections in their last few months of life. 
Thus to control symptoms caused by underlying infection, it may be argued that patients should 
be actively treated even in the terminal phase. A high proportion (78%) of patients died in 
hospital, 16% of whom died in the intensive care unit. Seventy six percent of patients received 
palliative care, which included morphine (34%). In keeping with the previous study, the needs 
of CF patients and their families were not evaluated. 
In contrast, parental perceptions regarding end of life care for children who died of cancer were 
examined.8 Based on interviews with 103 parents of children who died of cancer, Wolfe and 
her team found that 89% of the children suffered 'a lot' or 'a great deal' from at least one 
symptom in their last month of life, most commonly pain, fatigue and shortness of breath. 
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Compared to data extracted from medical charts, parents were significantly more likely than 
doctors to report symptoms of suffering. Palliation was far less successful among children who 
died of treatment-related complications rather than progressive disease. As long as the 
primary goal of treatment was cure, concerns about quality of life received little attention. This 
led researchers to conclude that even when aggressive treatment directed at cure is 
undertaken in children with a low likelihood of long-term survival (66% of children had a DNR 
order), concurrent attention to palliation is essential. The researchers acknowledge that 
parental perceptions may not accurately reflect the actual experience of their child. Still, in 
paediatrics, parental perceptions command attention. 
An important theme common to these studies, with direct relevance to end of life care for 
children with HIV/AIDS, is the impact of uncertainty on end of life decision making. Faced with 
prognostic uncertainty, doctors adopted a mixed management strategy, which combined 
aggressive management of underlying disease with palliative management of current 
symptoms. Whereas doctors seemed satisfied with this approach, parents of children who died 
of cancer reported considerable suffering at the end of life. 
2.4.2 End of Life Decision Making in Neonates 
An extensive literature exists on end of life decision making in the newborn and neonatal 
period. Treatment dilemmas arise mainly around the complications of prematurity and 
treatment of severe congenital anomalies14 and are therefore beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Still, it bears mentioning that the proportion of neonates dying in neonatal intensive care units 
(NICUs) following a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment is steadily climbing. Whereas 
rates ranged between 10% and 30% in the 1970s and 1980s, recent data show that as many 
as 87% of deaths in the N ICU are preceded by a decision to withhold or withdraw treatment. 26 
Other relevant data come from a European multicentre study of physicians' self-reported 
attitudes79 and end of life practices2s in NICUs. The EURONIC Project provides the first 
reliable evidence of the role that different cultures and legal and religious contexts play in end 
of life decision making. Stringent statistical analysis confirmed a physician's 'country' as the 
strongest predictor of differences in attitudes to end of life care and actual end of life practices, 
followed by physicians' religion, which was generally linked to country.79 For instance, 
clinicians, from predominantly Catholic countries, who assessed religion as extremely or fairly 
important in their lives, were significantly less likely ever to have withheld intensive care or 
withdrawn mechanical ventilation. The role of 'country' is illustrated in other examples. In the 
case of an infant in pain with little chance of recovery, most respondents in every country 
(France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) except Italy were 
prepared to accept the risk of death as a side effect of analgesia. In contrast, only respondents 
from France and the Netherlands reported having made a decision to administer drugs 
intended to end a patient's life. On the other hand, most physicians in every country 
considered mental disability to be an outcome worse than death, and all agreed the burden on 
the family is relevant when making end of life decisions for a child. About one third of 
physicians in the Netherlands, France and Estonia saw no ethical difference between treatment 
withdrawal and administering drugs with the intention of ending a patient's life, that is, active 
euthanasia. 
An attitude scale comprising physicians' responses from each country was constructed.79 
Physicians with the most pro-life attitudes came from the Balkans, Hungary and Italy, whilst 
physicians from the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden held the most pro-quality of life views. 
Consistent with these differences, physicians in Italy and Hungary were significantly less likely 
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to recommend limiting intensive care in patients who were neurologically devastated. Fear of 
legal consequences affects decision making. For example, Italian law, which protects children 
to the extent that it is mandatory to resuscitate a birth that results from a late abortion, severely 
constrains decisions to forgo life-sustaining interventions. That only one third of physicians in 
Italy supported a statement favouring sanctity of life regardless of prognosis seems to confirm a 
strong legal influence, which overrides personal attitudes. 
In sum, although based on self-reported attitudes and practices of physicians in NICUs, the 
impact of culture on end of life decision making is likely to cross all age levels. Moreover, 
depending on the physician's culture, critically ill neonates and children could face markedly 
different attitudes about restriction of life saving interventions. Widespread variation in the 
rates and nature of end of life decision making across countries should stimulate international 
multicentre studies to determine whether differences lead to mainly over-treatment, under-
treatment or acceptable standards of end of life care. Such data, which could include ethical 
analysis, could help standardise and improve end of life care for newborns and children. These 
findings point to the importance of parents as primary decision makers for their children. If 
doctors make crucial end of life decisions, these decisions may be strongly influenced by 
doctors' biases, which may stem from, among others, religion or the doctor's country of origin. 
2.4.3 End of Life Decision Making in Children 
Descriptive studies of end of life decision making in children dying in hospital are presented in 
chronological order of publication. 
A prospective chart and interview based study of 50 consecutive deaths in the PICU of the 
Children's National Medical Center in Washington, D.C. revealed that 32% of deaths were 
preceded by a decision to withhold or withdraw therapy.27 Mechanical ventilation was the most 
common therapy that was discontinued, followed by inotropic support or both. In line with 
hospital policy, all patients in whom treatment was withdrawn had a DNR order. All DNR 
orders were discussed with parents or legal guardians before documentation. 
In 1993 Lantos and colleagues28 reviewed 54 medical records of patients who had died in a 
Chicago Children's Hospital to determine the frequency and describe the circumstances in 
which DNR orders were written. At least 4 in 5 deaths occurred in the PICU. One third of 
patients had a written DNR order at the time of death. Most (91%) DNR orders were charted 
after discussion with the family. At least 1 intervention, mainly mechanical ventilation, 
chemotherapy, inotropes or blood transfusion, was forgone in 44% of patients with a DNR 
order. 
Likewise, Ryan and colleagues29 examined modes of death in a PICU in Alberta, Canada over 
a 2-year period. Approximately half the deaths occurred as a result of withdrawing treatment 
(34%) or after a no-CPR decision (15%). Significantly, no decisions were taken on the basis of 
resource allocation or parental financial constraints. 
In a prospective study Leveton and co-workers3o examined the types of treatment limitations 
placed on patients admitted to 16 PICUs. Limitations were evenly distributed between DNR 
orders (39%), additional limitations beyond DNR orders (27%), and withdrawal of medical 
interventions such as mechanical ventilation and inotropes (34%). Following Mink and 
Pollack,27 the most common justification for the restriction was imminent death of the patient. 
Physicians' disinclination to use quality of life justifications puzzled the research team, since 
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half their sample comprised children with serious underlying chronic or lethal disease. They 
postulated that physicians might have been uncomfortable predicting future quality of life for 
young children, or that physicians may have reported what they perceived as the least 
controversial justification, even when other justifications may have been more accurate. 
A retrospective chart review31 over a 24 month period of all deaths in the PICU of Great 
Ormond Street Hospital for Children, London revealed that 65% of all deaths resulted from 
decisions to withhold (15%) and withdraw (50%) life-sustaining interventions. Mechanical 
ventilation was most commonly withdrawn. One third of patients had a DNR order in place 
prior to treatment limitation. Fifty four percent of deaths in a study of 9 PICUs in France 
resulted from treatment limitation.32 
Goh and fellow researchers33 provide rare evidence of end of life decision making in a PICU in 
a developing country. Data were collected using retrospective chart review of all admissions to 
a Malaysian PICU over 2 time intervals (1995 and 1997-8). Surprisingly in the light of previous 
data, decisions to withhold treatment (no-CPR or no intensification of current management) 
were far more common than decisions to withdraw mechanical ventilation (46% versus 5%). 
The 'no chance' situation or imminent death was cited as the reason for withholding care in 
95% of decisions. Two thirds of parents who were offered the option declined extubation and 
opted for other forms of treatment limitation. Paediatricians initiated end of life discussions with 
parents in 95% of cases. Whilst the extended family was generally always present, nurses 
participated in less than one quarter of discussions. That said, self determination has less 
value in Malaysia than most Western countries. Parents and extended family trust doctors to 
make decisions for them in their child's best interests, an arrangement, which the authors 
describe as 'paternalism with permission'. The researchers attribute the slightly lower rates of 
withholding treatment and hence continuation of aggressive interventions, to diagnostic 
uncertainty, presence of iatrogenic complications and, to a lesser extent, fear of litigation. On 
the other hand religious factors accounted for the very low proportion of patients from whom 
treatment was withdrawn. The authors point out that treatment withdrawal is very difficult for 
families to accept even if life is being maintained by artificial means only. For these families 
death is an inevitable point not an option. Whilst these clinician-researchers seem less 
affected personally by local religious beliefs, their findings confirm reports from European 
NICUs where religion similarly affected end of life decision making. 
In 1999 van der Wal and co-workers34 retrospectively investigated deaths, covering a 4-year 
period, in a tertiary children's hospital in the Netherlands. Twenty two percent of patients in this 
series died in a general ward. In fifty three percent of deaths some form of life-sustaining 
intervention was limited. Respectively 14% and 39% of patients had a DNR order (as a single 
restrictive order) and treatment withheld or withdrawn. In line with previous reports,30, 33 
imminent death was the most common justification for forgoing life-sustaining treatment, 
followed by excessive burden due to a chronic disease (41% and 30% respectively). The most 
common modes of forgoing treatment were withdrawal of mechanical ventilation and inotropes. 
Broadly speaking, palliative care services for children are rare even in well-resourced countries. 
Therefore Mccallum and co-researchers35 examined the course of terminal illness and 
symptomatology in children who potentially might have benefited from such a service. The 
sample was drawn from all children who died in hospitals in Edmonton, Canada between 
January 1996 and June 1998. Children known to be terminally or chronically ill and who were 
hospitalised for at least 24 hours prior to death were included. Children who died after an 
acute event and who were hopsitalised for at least 7 days prior to death were also included. 
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Data were abstracted by chart review. Most (87%) died in intensive care units. Sixty six 
percent of patients had a DNR order. Consistent with earlier research,30, 33, 34 imminent death 
or futility was typically given as a reason for withholding or withdrawing treatment. Treatment 
was withdrawn in 43% of patients. 
Failure to include parental perspectives is often identified as a shortcoming in studies of end of 
life practices. With this in mind, Meert and colleagues84 sought the views of 78 parents whose 
child had died in the PICU of the Children's Hospital, Michigan, USA. Forty one (52.5%) of 78 
parents recalled discussing treatment restrictions with their child's physicians. Physicians 
initiated most (90%) discussions and many (66%) parents were very satisfied with proceedings, 
especially where physicians were skilled communicators. When faced with an option to limit 
treatment in their terminally ill child, parents identified the physician's recommendations, the 
diagnosis, expected neurological recovery, and degree of pain and suffering as extremely 
important factors in decision making. 
In summary, these empirical studies reflect a wide range of end of life practices across an 
equally broad spectrum of countries. The dearth of data from developing countries is striking, 
though not necessarily surprising since interventions are, broadly speaking, less likely to 
involve high technology medicine on a large scale. Moreover, many developing countries 
cannot afford to undertake and publish research that examines end of life practices. 
Retrospective chart reviews, small sample sizes, absence of consultation with parents, and 
differences in case mix and interpretations of resuscitation are among the methodological 
shortcomings in many studies. Still, the combined data suggest that withholding and 
withdrawing life-sustaining therapies is becoming more common, with rates ranging between 
32% and 60%. DNR orders occur frequently, with imminent death a common justification for 
limiting life-sustaining medical support. However, in retrospective surveys, ethical reasoning 
concerning treatment restrictions is difficult to assess or often is not documented at all. Quality 
of life assessments in particular may not be recorded because they are too subjective or 
physicians fear medical and legal liability. Concerns about cost or distributive justice did not 
appear to explicitly affect decisions to limit treatment. Despite methodological flaws such as 
selection bias and reliance on recall, 2 studiesB, 84 shed some light on parental perspectives 
regarding end of life practices. Generally, parents want to share in end of life decision making, 
although the degree is an individual matter, and they certainly want to be kept well informed. 
Indeed, paediatric oncologists from the US, Canada and the UK report the second most 
important reason they shifted from curative to palliative care was parental or patient insistence 
they stop treatment.85 Similarly, Meert et af34 report only 1 parent who did not want any 
decision making authority. Yet these findings, admittedly from a culture that values self-
determination, do not square with those of Goh et af.38 In a developing world context, where 
parents are often poorly informed about medical matters and where religious convictions are 
important, these researchers38 encountered a tendency towards 'paternalism with permission', 
where decision making powers are returned to paediatricians. Considering the scale of the 
epidemic worldwide, it is striking no empirical studies have yet examined end of life among 
terminally ill children with HIV/AIDS. 
2.5 Palliative Care and Pain Management in Infants and Children 
2.5.1 Policies on Palliative Care and Pain Management in Infants and Children 
Interest in the quality of care at the end of life has come from numerous quarters in organised 
medicine and the lay community. In particular, the hospice movement, by defining and 
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providing care for dying patients, has stimulated the development of the discipline of palliative 
care. Interest in palliative careBG-89 and pain management9D-93 in children is now also firmly 
established and guidelines for the provision of paediatric palliative care services and pain 
management have recently been published by the American Academy of Pediatrics47 and a 
Joint Party of the Association for Children with Life-Threatening or Terminal Conditions and 
their Families and the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health.45 A related development 
directed towards improving standards of health care in hospitals, including better pain 
management, in less well-developed countries is welcome testament to a global concern aimed 
at relief of pain and suffering among all children.94 
Published guidelines45-47 on palliative care have much in common. Directed towards children 
who are not predicted to survive into adulthood, palliation is an approach to care that is 
foremost child-centred and addresses patients' needs within the context of the family and the 
community. The goal of care is the best quality of life for the child and family in line with their 
values, preferences and beliefs. Palliative care places a high priority on the control of pain and 
other symptoms and addresses psychological, psychosocial and spiritual problems facing dying 
children and their families. Palliative care should be accessible to children and families in 
several suitable settings such as the home, hospice or intensive care unit. Paediatric palliative 
care is optimally delivered by an interdisciplinary team including paediatricians, nurses, social 
workers, pastoral caregivers and trained volunteers. It should include an identified, accessible 
and accountable key worker to assure that children and parents receive seamless, continuous 
care, which includes regular and consistent communication. Palliative care should be available 
to the patient and family 24 hours a day, 365 days of the year. Palliative care is emotionally 
draining and direct caregivers should have access to psychological support and supervision. 
Finally, it may include respite care, telephone support, grief counselling following a child's 
death, and referral to community resources. 
Importantly, guidelines reject rigid distinctions between curative, life-prolonging and palliative 
interventions as these may hinder the timely and appropriate provision of palliative care to 
children with a terminal condition. If the nearness of death is used to determine if children 
receive palliative care then some children may die without the benefits of this approach. An 
assumption that there is no place for palliative care until all curative options have been 
exhausted may deter an early discussion of palliation, including limitations of unduly 
burdensome interventions at the end of life. If parents (and patients) infer that discussion of, 
say comfort care, is equivalent to 'giving up' they might be inhibited from raising concerns and 
fears about the burdens of life-prolonging interventions and the dying process.47 Therefore, 
components of palliative care should be offered at diagnosis and continued throughout the 
course of illness whether the outcome ends in cure or death. The AAP47 and RCPCH45 also 
recommend that certification boards and fellowship training programmes place greater 
emphasis on, among others, palliative medicine, communication skills, managing prognostic 
uncertainty, grief and the spiritual dimensions of life and illness. 
A combined statement by the American and Canadian Pediatric Societies46 and a Consensus 
Statement by the International Evidence-Based Group for Neonatal Pain4B specifically address 
pain management in neonates. These statements emphasise that neonates do feel pain, 
which can be accurately assessed using reliable and validated measuring tools. Exceptions 
include very low birth weight babies and neonates receiving mechanical ventilation for which no 
satisfactory measuring instruments are as yet available. The statements support the use of 
opioids to control moderate and severe pain in neonates provided personnel are skilled in 
neonatal airway management and necessary equipment is available for continuous monitoring. 
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Led by Anand,48 a world-renowned expert on pain management, the international panel has 
produced guidelines for management of pain based on the best available scientific evidence. 
These guidelines can be adapted for individualised care plans and analgesic protocols for 
specific clinical situations, patients and health care settings. 
Although modern technology and treatment regimens in well-resourced countries have 
improved survival of sick children, most children in the rest of the world lack access to 
adequate health care of any kind. Many hospitals in developing countries do not have basic 
water, sanitation, an electricity supply or even minimal security. In this light, recent publication 
of the Child-Friendly Healthcare Initiative is pleasing.94 Developed in consultation with local 
health care professionals and international bodies, including the Department of Child and 
Adolescent Health and Development of the World Health Organisation and the United Nations 
Children's Fund, the Initiative aims to develop globally applicable standards that will help 
ensure that practices in hospitals respect children's rights not only to survival but also to 
protection from unnecessary suffering. Currently the scheme is being piloted in Uganda, 
Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Bosnia. The Working Party of CFHI, under the auspices of Child 
Advocacy International, has developed 12 provisional standards to improve health care 
delivery. Standards No.6 and No.7 pertain directly to improved pain management. Standard 
No.6 provides guidelines for assessment and control of pain and discomfort, using 
pharmacological and non-pharmacological measures, safe storage of opiates, palliative care, 
and individual pain control developed with the child and parents. Standard No.7 stipulates that 
all invasive procedures must be accompanied by adequate analgesia and when systemic 
analgesia or sedation is used, personnel experienced in resuscitation should be immediately 
available. Hospitals should also have written guidelines for pain relief for specific procedures. 
Ultimately, the success of the CFHI in developing countries will depend on political will and 
availability of resources. 
2.5.2 Ethical Considerations in Pain Management in Infants and Children 
Statements by the AAP47 and the RCPCH45 support the use of pain medication and other 
treatments, which may incidentally hasten death even if their primary aim is to relieve suffering. 
On this view, giving a medicine to relieve suffering which as a side effect may hasten death is 
ethically and legally justified and can be appropriate. In turn, these professional bodies reject 
voluntary euthanasia where the primary goal of giving medication is to hasten a child's death. 
Still, many physicians fear that because medications needed to provide adequate pain relief to 
terminally ill patients carry a risk of indirectly or accidentally ending the patient's life by 
depressing the patient's respiration, this will result in possible criminal prosecution. Health care 
workers believe hastening death is wrong because it is killing the patient.74 Indeed, over 40% 
of sampled doctors and nurses indicated they would give inadequate levels of pain medication 
through fear of hastening a patient's death.76 Thirty one percent of nurse managers of adult 
ICUs in the UK saw no difference between active euthanasia and administration of analgesia 
and sedation in dosages that might heighten death even if these drugs were given primarily to 
ensure patient comfort during or after mechanical ventilation.B1 In response to the question: 
'Does concern about respiratory distress limit the amount of narcotics you prescribe?' 63% of 
paediatricians, family practitioners and surgeons indicated that it somewhat (42%) or always 
(21%) limited their use of opioids.95 In comparison, Wolfe96 found that 93% of parents 
approved the use of morphine in a hypothetical case involving a child with terminal cancer who 
was in unremitting pain, even if premature death was a likely consequence. Moreover, after 
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experiencing the death of a child through cancer, most parents favour very aggressive pain 
control for a terminally ill child in pain, even at the expense of further life extension. 
These fears are not justified factually or ethically. Indeed, continued philosophical debate 
about this doctrine inadvertently highlights the adverse effects of opiates when in fact these 
consequences are rare. Survival was not noticeably shortened in a hospice unit-based study of 
238 patients who received opioid increases at the end of life compared to patients who 
received no increases.97 From an ethical standpoint, doses of analgesics sufficient to relieve 
pain, which might hasten death as an unintended effect, are permissible if the conditions of the 
doctrine of double effect are observed.98 This doctrine is often invoked to explain why certain 
forms of care at the end of life that result in death are morally permissible and others are not. 
Broadly speaking, the doctrine holds that when an intervention (high doses of analgesic 
medication) is used for a legitimate purpose (pain relieD but has an unintended effect that 
would be illegitimate if it were intended (the death of a patient), the physician is not morally 
responsible for the unintended effect (hastening death). For this doctrine, which stems from 
Roman Catholic moral theology, to be ethically permissible it must fulfil 4 conditions. First, the 
action itself must be morally good or at least morally neutral. Second, only the good effect 
must be intended, even though the bad or secondary effect is foreseen. Third, the good effect 
must not be achieved by way of the bad effect. Fourth, the good effect must outweigh the bad 
result. In short, the good effect (pain relieD is intended, whereas the bad or secondary effect 
(hastening death) is foreseen but not intended. The doctrine of double effect has been 
criticised for its questionable account of intention.99, 100 Whilst the doctrine requires that 
primary intentions be explicit and clear, in reality they may be muddled. Put differently, some 
argue that it is implausible to believe that agents are psychologically disciplined enough never 
to wish for death to come about as a result of their action, especially in the face of a patient's 
intractable pain and suffering. 
These criticisms notwithstanding, the doctrine of double effect has practical value and 
underpins policy guidelines for end of life care provided by the AAP47 and the RCPCH _45 In 
similar vein, the SALC63 has made a legislative proposal that rests explicitly on the doctrine of 
double effect: if a terminally ill patient's pain and distress cannot be satisfactorily alleviated by 
ordinary palliative treatment, then a physician (a) with the object to provide relief of severe pain 
or distress, and (b) with no intention to kill shall (sic) increase the dosage of medication given to 
the patient even if the secondary effect of this action may be to shorten the life of the patient. If 
the Bill becomes law, South African physicians should be reassured that as long as they act 
with the intention of relieving a patient's pain and suffering, the risk of legal liability would be 
exceedingly small. 
Philosophical and legal arguments aside, proponents of the doctrine of double effect remain 
convinced it offers reassurance to physicians who are then more likely to provide optimal care 
for dying patients.98 Wolfe96 recommends senior physicians directly address emotional 
discomfort or objections, arising from administering high doses of narcotics, through individual 
discussions or team meetings to help nurses and junior doctors understand the medical 
situation and the reasons for the decision. Such discussions also provide an opportunity to 
voice concerns, values and beliefs that may underlie disagreements. In summary, caregivers 
need to recognise administration of high doses of narcotics to relieve symptoms in patients with 
terminal illness may be ethically justified. 
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2.5.3 Empirical Studies of Pain Management in Children 
A great paradox in pain management is that although the relief of pain and suffering is widely 
acknowledged to be a central responsibility of physicans96, 101. 102 pain associated with many 
life-threatening paediatric illnesses, most notably cancer7, a and HIV/AIDS,6, 39 remains seriously 
undertreated. In comparison, chest pain, dyspnoea and headaches among children with cystic 
fibrosis have been successfully treated.9, 103 However, since both sets of findings among 
patients with cystic fibrosis are based on retrospective record reviews by clinicians, it is 
conceivable that patients and parents may have reported lower levels of satisfaction with 
symptom relief. Indeed, discordant views between physicians and parents regarding presence 
of pain were noted by Wolfe and co-workersB in their study of children who died of cancer. 
According to parents, 9 out of 10 children experienced substantial suffering from at least one 
symptom in their last month of life, most commonly pain, fatigue and dyspnoea. Moreover, 
treatment of pain and dyspnoea was successful in less than one third of children (27% and 
16% respectively). 
In comparison to cancer pain in children, examination of the pain experience among children 
with HIV/AIDS has received minimal attention in the literature. In a retrospective chart review 
of 149 inpatient children (mean age: 62 months) treated in the Children's Hospital of New 
Jersey AIDS Program, Czarniecki and colleagues104 gauged that 88% had 1 or more medical 
problems that could reasonably be expected to cause acute pain, (for example, otitis media, 
herpes lesions, skin lesions) or chronic pain (for example, oral thrush and oesophagitis). Yet of 
the 149 records reviewed, only 24% contained any notation of pain. Abdominal and extremity 
pain was most likely to be documented. Seven infants and toddlers were described as very 
irritable, with pain the presumed cause. These children were usually termed 'miserable 
babies'. Of the 57 documented episodes of pain in 36 patients, 35% were treated with pain 
medication, typically paracetamol. The authors note that although medication was charted on 
the medicine sheet, often it was never administered. In view of methodological problems 
inherent in the design of retrospective studies, it is possible these findings underestimate the 
extent of pain. 
In a questionnaire survey6 of 61 outpatients with HIV/AIDS (4 years to 13+ years) and their 
families, the reported prevalence of pain approaches 60 percent. In this group, common sites 
of pain were the gastrointestinal tract or limbs. Paracetamol and non-steroidal anti-
inflammatories were the treatments of choice. Approximately 1 in 5 children reported that pain 
interfered with daily activities and sleep. Surprisingly, the incidence and impact of pain were 
not significantly associated with disease progression as determined by surrogate markers such 
as CD4 counts. 
In a case report of an 18-month-old child with AIDS, Anand and co-researchers10s express 
concern over doctors' reluctance to consider pain as a source of discomfort in the evaluation 
and management of an irritable child. In this case report, the patient had a history of oral and 
oesophageal Candida, Candida tracheitis and pneumonia. The child was sensitive to touch 
and cried constantly. Mild analgesia (paracetamol) was instituted only 10 days after admission 
and then on an 'as needed' (PRN) basis. Anand and his team of pain management specialists 
were not consulted until 3 weeks into the hospital course. They report that within 2 days of 
initiating oral morphine, restlessness improved, and the patient enjoyed quiet, undisturbed 
sleep. After 1 week of morphine therapy, there was no further abnormal crying or whimpering, 
tone was more relaxed and the patient's appetite improved. The authors conclude that 
clinicians may falsely attribute irritability in sick children to the effects of prolonged illness. 
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They contend that pain should be presumed to be a component of the complex clinical picture 
of children with AIDS, and empirical trials of analgesic therapy should be a critical part of any 
management plan. 
Likewise, in a review article of pain syndromes in children with AIDS, Wishnie and Weisman39 
claim an empirical approach, which includes observing a patient's response to a trial of pain 
medication, is currently the best means available to judge presence of pain, especially in 
infants and young children. This requires careful use of analgesia in uncertain situations, 
followed by close observation for induced changes in physiological and behavioural states. 
2.5.4 Attitudes and Beliefs about Pain Management in Children 
Although many infants and children with life-threatening disease need analgesia for pain relief, 
these medications are often used inadequately due to misconceptions held by professionals, 
parents and children. 10s. 101 Professional biases and false beliefs account for inadequate use of 
opioid medication.1os.101 Previously it was felt that very young children's nervous systems were 
too immature to feel pain, that children do not remember pain, that pain produces no harmful 
effects in children, and may even be character-building. Further, self-reports or behavioural 
manifestations of pain may be attributed to separation anxiety or attempts to gain secondary 
benefit. Infants and younger children are at greater risk of undertreatment because they are 
unable to report pain or may exhibit pain non-verbally. For caregivers unschooled in pain 
assessment, if a child cannot describe pain or localise pain then he does not have any, and if 
children do not show signs of pain then they are not in pain. 
Alternately, in advance of painful procedures, health care professionals may minimise the pain 
a patient will experience, for instance they may say: 'this may sting a bit', or 'you may have a 
slight headache after the lumbar puncture'. Discounting pain in this way serves 2 purposes.1oa 
It provides doctors with a clinical rationale to reduce a child's fear and resistance. It also helps 
clinicians to distance themselves from the pain they continually encounter and often produce in 
the course of diagnosis and treatment. Ruddick1oa further contends that medical training 
exacerbates physicians' undertreatment of pain. Students, he argues, are trained to regard 
pain as a useful symptom for diagnosing disease. Instead of relieving it, students are taught to 
observe and explore pain even if that involves enhancing it through palpation of soft tissues 
and manipulation of joints. Similarly, students learn how useful pain can be in following the 
course of a disease, stages of healing, or the efficacy of drug therapy. More cynically, Ruddick 
suggests students learn the many ways in which analgesics, especially opioids, complicate 
therapeutic interventions. For example, they may cause vomiting, constipation or suppress 
vital functions such as respiration, already compromised by severe disease. To avoid these 
complications, young and inexperienced clinicians may be inclined not to prescribe opioids at 
all. 
Few of these misconceptions withstand scientific scrutiny. There is mounting evidence46, 48 that 
newborns have the necessary pathophysiology to transmit painful sensations, that children at 
least from age 5 are accurate reporters of their own pain and with few exceptions (for example, 
pain associated with mechanical ventilation) reliable and valid measures of neonatal pain are 
now available. In light of this evidence, Walco and colleagues109 describe doctors' failure to 
relieve pain as an unjustified harm. Similarly, they reject justifications that pain is useful to 
monitor illness or that masking pain could obscure physical signs and actually harm patients. 
Instead, they assert the risks and benefits of immediate relief must at all times be weighed 
against the burden of unrelieved pain and the prospects of long term recovery. In their opinion, 
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any attempt to justify withholding pain relief on grounds that pain promotes character 
development is ethically questionable in a child already encumbered by sickness. If it is not 
possible to completely eradicate pain then strengthening a child's capacity to cope is beneficial, 
for instance by cognitive interventions such as relaxation and use of mental imagery. 
Withholding analgesia from a suffering child in the hope of strengthening character ignores the 
child's need for immediate pain relief. And, say Walco et al, doctors have an ethical 
responsibility to fully relieve pain unless otherwise justified by defined therapeutic benefits.109 
Lack of knowledge about pain management110 is partly responsible for undertreatment of pain. 
Yet, even where doctors and nurses believe infants experience as much procedure-related 
pain as adults, these beliefs do not lead to adequate pain relief.95, 111 This is illustrated by 
respondents' self-described pain management behaviours, which were well below optimal 
levels.111 In stark comparison, 91.5% of paediatric oncologists considered themselves highly 
competent pain managers, with one third of survey respondents confidently reporting that none 
of their patients died in pain, although one half conceded 10% of cancer patients may have 
died in pain.85 Despite this self-rated competence, almost 50% of clinicians admitted feeling 
anxious about having to deal with difficult symptoms, of whom 13.5% felt very strong anxiety. 
Wolfe and colleaguess found that relief of pain and suffering in children who died of cancer was 
superior when physicians were actively involved in the children's management. This included 
open communication about goals of treatment and benefits of palliation. Because pain 
management and symptom control are undisputed goals of medicine, they must be taught. 
Physicians who care for children with life-threatening illnesses have an obligation to be well 
informed and trained in palliative care.96, 101 According to 90% of sampled paediatric 
oncologists,as trial and error learning from colleagues in clinical practice, and role models in 
fellowship and residency training were the most common sources of knowledge about palliation 
(91.9%, 85.4%, 81.8% and 64.5% respectively). What is more, trial and error was the most 
useful, if 'costly' from the patient's point of view, means of learning to care for dying cancer 
patients. Role models in subspecialty training, and learning from colleagues in clinical practice 
were the next most highly rated sources of learning. Only 1 in 10 paediatric oncologists had 
attended a formal course in palliative care.as Rotation through a palliative care service or 
hospice formed part of the training of only 2% of respondents. In general, attendees at formal 
courses found them less helpful than on-the-job training. 
If doctors lack the skills to adequately treat pain, they have an obligation to refer the patient to a 
physician with specialist knowledge in pain relief and symptom control.96 Likewise, senior 
physicians and health care administrators have particular obligations to ensure that trainees 
are educated in matters of palliation, and that suitable structures exist for provision of high 
quality palliative care services to patients.96 Even in well-resourced countries such as the US, 
Canada and the UK, lack of a readily available and easy-to-use palliative care team or pain 
service was identified by more than one third of paediatric oncologists as a significant 
institutional barrier to optimal end of life care.as Still, in some countries, despite doctors' efforts, 
lack of access to opioids may lead to undertreatment of pain.94 As already discussed, global 
initiatives to increase the priority of pain management in hospitals in less developed countries 
are underway. 
Doctors and parents may fear addiction if children receive morphine for pain.95, 104 Survey 
data95 show that almost 2 in 5 physicians worry about the risk of addiction from the use of 
narcotic analgesia in children. Since intravenous drug abuse is an important cause of HIV 
transmission in some countries, doctors in these countries are especially hesitant to prescribe 
opioids for fear that parents will abuse their children's medication.110 In a review article of pain 
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management in children, McGrath106 found no evidence of abuse associated with use of 
narcotic medication. On the other hand, Llungman et afl found no evidence that opioids were 
withheld from children with cancer because parents feared addiction. Overall, addiction is 
probably rare in children receiving narcotics for medical indications, and if a patient is terminally 
ill then fear of creating addiction is misguided. Rather, an overestimation of the risk of 
analgesic induced addiction leads to an underestimation of the harm of untreated pain.109 If 
analgesics are administered properly, the risk of addiction is minimal. 
Significantly, a recent review of adverse sedation events,112 such as death and drug abuse, 
found no relationship between outcome of drug use and drug class (for instance, opioids). 
Instead adverse events were associated with overdosing, drug combinations and 
administration by non-medically trained personnel. Rather than restrict use of opioids for pain 
relief, physicians must ensure they understand the pharmacology of a particular drug and how 
to manage expected drug-related complications. By the same token, research data88 suggest 
that with adequate monitoring and adherence to published guidelines for dosages, side effects 
such as respiratory distress from opioid overuse are rare. Moreover, research shows that long-
term use of opioids for chest pain in children with cystic fibrosis does not lead to dose 
escalation or respiratory distress.103 If respiratory distress does occur, then potent agents are 
available to reverse adverse effects of opioids. If a parent indicates that the reason for refusing 
to use narcotics is fear of addiction, the doctor must dispel irrational beliefs and strongly 
recommend the child receive such therapy.96 
Finally, pain may be denied or understated by parents who fear that pain represents a 
recurrence of an underlying disease, for example cancer.106 Conversely, unrealistic physician 
and/or parental prognostic expectations may lead to inappropriate treatment goals that focus 
on curative treatment instead of treatment that lessens suffering.113 In a study of children who 
had died of cancer, parents' understanding that their child no longer had a realistic chance of 
cure lagged behind oncologists' explicit documentation of end stage disease by 3 months. 
When both physician and parent recognised there was no realistic chance of cure, pain and 
symptom control was vastly improved.113 
In summary, fundamental biases, limited knowledge and expertise in the use of opioids, 
misplaced beliefs that pain is character-building and pain medication causes addiction, held by 
health care professionals, parents and children, mitigate against appropriate use of narcotics in 
children. Professional and parental education directed towards dispelling myths and 
misconceptions, and improving pain relief strategies and institutional policies that make pain 
relief a priority should result in better pain management. 
2.6 Medical Education for End of Life Care for Children 
If patients are able 'to live until they die' through provision of exemplary end of life care, they 
may be fortunate enough to experience a good death. However, if doctors are inadequately 
trained to provide palliative care, patients may well endure a bad death. Thus education to 
improve clinicians' knowledge and skills in, among others, ethics, communication and palliation 
is a necessary foundation for delivering quality terminal care. Attempts to address gaps in 
palliative care education include publication of a status report114 of palliative medicine in 
undergraduate medical curricula and recommendations on how to improve teaching about 
palliation in acute hospital settings,115 including intensive care units.116 The final section of this 
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literature review focuses specifically on medical education about end of life care in paediatric 
settings. 
Khanya and Milrod117 assessed the perceived educational needs of 74 paediatricians at 1 
university hospital in New York City, one third of whom belonged to subspecialties that 
commonly encountered dying children, for instance oncology, critical care medicine and 
infectious diseases. Whilst a reasonable proportion (71 % ) of attending physicians (consultant 
paediatricians) felt adequately prepared to deal with end of life issues, little over half (56%) the 
fellows and only 13% of residents (registrars) felt equipped to handle death and dying. Not 
surprisingly, most (95%) residents and fellows and two thirds of attending physicians believed 
further instruction in end of life care would be useful. Moreover, all residents and 9 out of 10 
attending physicians expressed a need for further emotional support in dealing with death and 
dying. Only 1 in 10 residents and 1 in 4 attending physicians felt there were adequate existing 
support structures in the department. Whilst about 3 in 5 respondents would have liked to 
attend funeral or memorial services, clinical responsibilities proved major obstacles for many. 
Almost three quarters of attending physicians working in subspecialties with higher death rates 
reported that they sometimes viewed a patient's death as a personal failure. In contrast, about 
two thirds of residents said this was rarely or never the case. The authors speculated that 
attending physicians' overall responsibility for patient management might have reinforced 
feelings of failure. This finding is worrying for if death represents failure, clinicians, especially 
those in charge, may be tempted to pursue aggressive therapies in hope of a 'cure' for longer 
than benefits their patients. Admittedly, these findings reflect 1 institution and the response 
rate was low (56%). Based on their findings, the authors recommend systematic teaching on 
caring for dying children, including hospice and palliative care rotations through out residency 
training. However, for most developing countries and for that matter many developed 
countries, their recommendation that, after a child's death, each involved health care 
professional should be counselled by a liaison psychiatrist, is to say the least utopian. 
Another survey11s in the Department of Paediatrics in Los Angeles examined changes in self-
reported attitudes of trainee physicians during their 4-year paediatric residency. Whilst 
paediatric house staff are uneasy with issues of death and dying in their first 2 years, by their 
3rd and 41h year of training they feel somewhat more comfortable handling these issues. 
Interestingly, findings show that formal educational methods such as lectures and seminars 
with other members of the health care team are far less helpful than clinical teaching at the 
bedside, for instance participation in meetings with families of children who have died or were 
dying. Somewhat counter-intuitively, as residents progress through their training, they become 
less comfortable with administering pain medication to a dying child fearing the pain medication 
may hasten death. The authors postulate that in the early years residents may have an 
intellectual grasp of pain control, but with time, having to assume more direct responsibility for 
pain relief may raise concerns about hastening death. This important, though worrying finding, 
with its potential for undertreatment of pain, underscores the urgency of addressing factual and 
ethical concerns relating to use of analgesia and sedation in dying children. The longitudinal 
nature of this study adds useful insights into the socialisation of young paediatricians as they 
learn to master stressful issues around end of life care. 
Although surveyed paediatric oncologistsss were inclined to dismiss formal training in end of life 
care, the research team nonetheless concluded that respondents had minimal actual 
experience of such programmes, which should encompass current palliative care and hospice 
rotations during specialty training and on continuing medical education classes. 
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In light of these surveys, a timely article119 presents recommendations for improving education 
of physicians about end of life care in paediatric settings. The authors, from a variety of 
professional backgrounds and institutional settings, constituted a Working Group on End of Life 
Care in Pediatric Settings. This was 1 of 8 working groups convened at the National 
Consensus Conference on Medical Education for Care Near the End of Life that met in 
Washington, D.C. in 1997. The authors identified key educational issues in children's end of 
life care and offered instructional strategies tailored to address each issue. These include 
effective communication, management of pain and other symptoms, unique ethical problems in 
paediatric end of life care, and personal and professional challenges faced by providers of end 
of life care. Consistent with residents' self-reports118 that they learn more through direct 
interaction with families of dying children, the working group stress that effective teaching about 
death and dying does not require the invention of a new curriculum. Instead, they suggest 
systematic and explicit instruction, which capitalises on teachable moments occurring around 
students' daily activities. According to the working group, the ultimate goals of instruction in 
end of life care are more humane care for very sick children, better bereavement outcomes for 
survivors and development of more confident clinicians. Notably, the Working Group contends 
that most of these issues transcend patient age, and can be used to inform medical education 
about the care of any terminally ill patient. 
In summary, there is a growing body of data describing end of life care for neonates and 
children who die in acute hospital settings. With the development of new technologies, 
medicine is now able to keep terminally ill patients alive for longer periods without curing or 
ameliorating the underlying condition. If life-sustaining therapies such as ventilation and 
artificial nutrition and hydration are used to prolong dying, these interventions become a 
double-edged sword. Medical treatment that extends life may result in patients spending their 
final days and weeks unable to eat, drink or breathe without the assistance of feeding tubes, IV 
lines or ventilators. Empirical studies show that at the end of life terminally ill children, confined 
to hospitals and intensive care units, often die in considerable pain and discomfort. Whilst 
studies show that the practice of withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining therapies occurs 
commonly in hospitals, many issues remain unresolved, such as whether it is ever appropriate 
to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from dying children. When a terminally ill infant with 
HIV/AIDS is admitted to hospital with an acute episode of pneumonia or diarrhoea, should 
treatment aim to cure the underlying opportunistic infection or should the goal of treatment be 
palliation? Studies of children with cancer and CF show clinicians rarely opt for full palliation, 
instead they choose mixed management strategies which include aggressive care as well as 
relief of pain and suffering. 
In SA, the number of children with HIV/AIDS dying in hospitals is increasing rapidly. Given 
scarce human and physical resources, doctors face agonising decisions regarding the kind of 
treatment these children ought to receive. Currently there are no empirical data on end of life 
practices for HIV-infected children to inform practice. The present study examined end of life 
decision making in a sample of HIV-infected children who died in hospital to gather baseline 
data for recommendations for appropriate terminal care. Its results are described in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Results 
3.1 Sample Characteristics 
One hundred and sixty five (99%) out of 167 eligible patients were included in the final sample. 
Two patients were excluded because 1 folder could not be traced and 1 set of medical notes 
was missing. Seventy nine percent and 21% respectively of patients died in general wards and 
the paediatric intensive care unit (PICU). Demographic and clinical characteristics of the 
sample are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Frequency and Percentage Distribution of Patients' Demographic and Clinical Characteristics (N=165) 
N % Mean SD Range 25%ile Median 75%ile 
Gender 
Male 83 50% 
Female 82 50% 
Race* 
Black 156 95% 
Coloured 9 5% 
Age (months) 165 10 16.35 1-111 3 4 9 
0-6 111 67% 3 3 
7-12 22 13% 9 9 
13-24 17 10% 18 17 
25+ 15 9% 51 3S 
Length of Stay (days) 165 11 12.94 1-88 3 6 13 
0--3 42 26% 2 2 
4-6 45 27% 5 5 
7-15 40 24% 10 9 
16+ 38 23% 28.5 25.5 
Severity 
Category A 1 1% 
Category B 50 30% 
Category C 114 69% 
*Proxy measure for language 
The sample was equally divided between male and female patients, most (95%) of whom were 
black. The overall average and median age of patients was 10 and 4 months respectively. 
Eighty percent of patients were under 1 year of age. Less than 10% of patients were older than 
2 years (age category 25+ months). The mean and median age of this latter group of patients 
was 51 and 36 months respectively. This was decidedly higher than both the overall mean and 
median age, and the mean and median age of the nearest age category (13-24 months). Over 
two thirds of patients fell into Category C, the severest disease category. Only 1 patient fell in 
Category A (age: 1 month, length of stay: 5 days). 
The mean and median length of terminal hospitalisation for all patients was 11 and 6 days 
respectively. The length of stay for 75% of patients was less than 2 weeks. One quarter of 
patients survived on average only 2 days. In contrast, 23% of patients had average lengths of 
stay of almost 1 month. The median length of stay (25.5 days) for these patients was more 
than four-fold longer than the overall median length of stay. Included in this group were 2 
patients with terminal hospitalisations of well over 2 months (2.6 months and 2.9 months). 
Patients with shorter mean and median lengths of stay were significantly more likely to fall into 
Category B. (Table 3) Moreover, the average length of stay of patients in Category C was twice 
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that of patients in Category B, respectively 13 and 6 days {P=0.0000). Sixty eight percent 
(34/50) of patients in Category B compared with 46% (53/114) of patients in Category C had 
lengths of stay less than 1 week. Only 4 {11%) patients in Category B compared to 33 {89%) 
patients in Category C fell in the longest length of stay quartile {~16 days). Indeed this inverse 
trend was repeated in all length of stay quartiles classified according to disease severity: 
whereas the proportion of patients in Category B decreased with increasing length of stay, 
correspondingly the proportion of patients in Category C increased with longer length of stay 
{P=0.0056). 
Table3 
Associations between Severity, Length of Stay and Agea 
Severity and Length of Stay 
Severityb Length of Stay (days) 
0-3 4-6 7-15 16+ 
N=42 N=45 N=40 N=37 
N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) x2 P-value 
Category B 20 (48%) 14(31%) 12(30%) 4(11%) 12.59 0.0056 
N=SO 
Category C 22 (52%) 31 (68%) 28 (70%) 33(89%) 
N=114 
Mean Length of Stay (days) according to Disease Severity 
Severity N Mean SD Median x2< P-value 
Category B 50 6 5.71 4 13.84 0.0000 
CategoryC 114 13 4.53 7 
Severity and Age 
Severity Age (months) 
0-6 7-12 13-24 25+ 
N=110 N=22 N=17 N=15 
N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) x2 P-value 
Category B 42 (38%) 5 (23%) 3 (18%) 0 (0%) 11.17 0.0180 
Category C 68 (62%) 17(77%) 14 (12%) 15(100%) 
Mean Age (months) according to Disease Severity 
N Mean SD Median x2• P-value 
Category B 50 4 2.97 3 20.18 0.0000 
CategoryC 114 12.5 19.50 5 
Length of Stay and Age 
Mean Age (months) according to Length of Stay Category 
Length of Stay N Mean so Median x2• P-value 
0-3 42 9 11.53 4.5 4.55 0.2078 
4-6 45 13 21.85 4 
7-15 40 7 8.02 4 
16+ 38 12 19.44 6 
Mean Length of Stay (days) according to Age Category 
Age N Mean SD Median x2• P-value 
0-6 111 10 9.69 6 1.484 0.6858 
7-12 22 11 17.23 5 
13-24 17 17 22.57 7 
25+ 9.2 9 10.53 6 
• In this Table length of stay and age are treated as categorical and ordinal variables. 
b Analyses exclude 1 patient from Category A 
c Kruskall-Wallis H (equivalent chi square). 
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On average, patients in Category C were also significantly older than patients in Category B, 
12.5 and 4 months respectively (P=0.0000). In comparison, age was not statistically 
associated with length of stay. (Table 3) In 3 length of stay categories, the median age was 
approximately 4 months, in keeping with the overall median age. Similarly, mean and median 
lengths of stay were not significantly different for any age group and in 2 age groups the 
median length of stay resembled the overall median length of stay of 6 days. 
3.2 End of Life Decisions and Life-sustaining Interventions 
3.2.1 Do Not Resuscitate Orders 
Most (84%) patients had a DNR order. (Table 4) 
Table4 
DNR Orders: Frequency, Percentage Distribution and General Characteristics 
Do Not Resuscitate Orders 138 84% 
Location of DNR Order 
Medical and Nursing Notes 57 41% 
Medical Notes only 77 56% 
Nursing Notes only 4 3% 
Location in Doctors' Notes: 
In medical notes 115 83% 
In front of medical notes 78 57% 
Documented Rationale for DNR orders 85 61% 
DNR order discussed with: 
Mother 36 26% 
Mother & Father 14 10% 
Aunt 1 0.7% 
No record 87 63% 
"Not for IPPV'' was the most common instruction in DNR orders, either as a sole directive 
(N=56, 42%) or in combination with other do not resuscitate measures, comfort care plans or 
orders to withhold life-sustaining interventions (N=48, 36%). (Table 5 - following page) Not for 
active resuscitation, CPR or Red Box was the first line of instruction in 20% Of DNR orders. A 
comprehensive, non-specific order to withhold active treatment, intervention or management 
was uncommon, constituting only 2% of DNR orders. Less than two thirds of DNR orders had 
a documented rationale. (Table 4) Advanced, progressive disease, and end stage, terminal or 
Category C disease were the most common reasons for writing a DNR order. (Table 6) Futility 
Table 6 
Thematic Categorisation of Rationales for DNR orders (Frequency Distribution N=BS)) 
Severe disease with progressive symptomatology: 
Advanced AIDS with progressive disease despite full treatment 
HIV-tVe with progressive disease 
RVD with pneumonia 
Clinical AIDS 
No improvement and deterioration 
Terminal illness 
Poor Prognosis 
End stage 
Category C disease 
Futility 
Moribund 
Brain death 
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No. 
41 
11 
10 
8 
6 
5 
2 
1 
1 
Table 5 
Frequency Distribution of Verbatim DNR Ordersa (N=134) 
No. 
56 
15 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
8 
8 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
Verbatim DNR Order 
Not for IPPV 
Not for IPPV or active resuscitation 
Not for IPPV or Red Box 
Not for IPPV. Full ward treatment. 
Not for ICU. 
Not for re-intubation if arrests. 
Not for IPPV. Not a good candidate for ICU. Not for Red Box. 
Not for IPPV, ICU or intubation 
Not for IPPV. No heroics. 
Not for IPPV, ventilation or bagging. 
Not for assisted ventilation. 
Not for assisted ventilation. Keep comfortable. 
Not for IPPV. Continue supportive care. 
Not for IPPV, on maximal therapy. 
Not for IPPV. Continue Bactrim and HB02. 
Not for IPPV. Continue antibiotics, no invasive investigations. 
Not for IPPV. Continue full ward treatment. 
Not for IPPV. Continue with fluids and IV antibiotics. 
Not for IPPV. No invasive investigations or IV medications. 
Not for IPPV. Not for ICU or dopamine. 
Not for IPPV. Not for active resuscitation. No procedures or IVs. 
Not for IPPV. Not for invasive investigations or IV therapy. 
Not for IPPV. Not for repeat bloods. 
Not for IPPV. Full conservative care. 
Not for IPPV. Supportive care only. No drips. 
Not for IPPV. Continue TPN. No blood products. 
Not for IPPV or active resuscitation. Only give platelets if bleeds. 
Not for IPPV or dopamine if deterioration. 
Not for IPPV, CPR or ICU admission. Full supportive care. 
Maximum support short of IPPV. 
Not for active resuscitation. 
Not for CPR in event of arrest. 
Not for Red Box. 
Not for CPR or prolonged bagging or adrenaline. 
Not for active resuscitation or ICU. 
Not for extraordinary resuscitation measures. 
Not for persistent resuscitation. 
Not for CPR or drugs. 
Not for CPR or adrenaline. 
Not for CPR. Continue IPPVb. 
Not for CPR or bagging. 
Not for active treatment. 
Not for active intervention if patient has a cardiac arrest. 
Not for active management. 
a Categorised according to nature of first intervention noted in DNR to be withheld: 
respectively ICU-based interventions, resuscitation and 'active" treatment. 
'Patient in PICU. 
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was offered as justification for the DNR order in only 2 patients. Verbatim rationales for DNR 
orders are fully reported in Appendix 2. 
The DNR order appeared simultaneously in medical and nursing notes in approximately 40% of 
folders. (Table 4) In turn DNR orders were recorded in medical notes only, in 56% of folders 
and in nursing notes only, in 3% of folders. Doctors documented DNR orders in their clinical 
notes (83%), on the front page of the clinical notes (57%) or in both locations. (Table 4) About 
half (54%) the DNR orders appearing synchronously in medical and nursing notes were 
identical or equivalent. (Table 7) 
Table 7 
Matched Verbatim DNR Orders in Medical and Nursing Notes (N=57) 
Medical Notes Nursing Notes Frequency 
Not for IPPV 
Not for CPR 
Identical or Equivalent DNR Orders 
Not for IPPV 
Not for ICU or re-intubation 
Not for IPPV or resuscitation 
Not for active resuscitation 
Not for ambubagging or CPR 
Not for assisted ventilation 
Not for IPPV or Red Box 
Not for Red Box 
Not for CPR 
Not for ICU or ventilation 
Not for IPPV or resuscitation 
Not for active resuscitation 
Not for ambubagging or CPR 
Not for assisted ventilation 
Not for IPPV or Red Box 
Not for Red Box 
Sub Total 
Discrepant DNR Orders 
Not for IPPV 
Not for active resuscitation 
Not for IPPV or active resuscitation 
Not for CPRa 
Not for IPPV, ICU or CPR 
Not for IPPV or active resuscitation 
Not for IPPV 
Not for Red Box a 
Not for active resuscitation or Red Box a 
Not for CPR, prolonged bagging or adrenaline 
Not for persistent resuscitation a 
Not for adrenaline, inotropes or resuscitation 
Not for IPPV, bagging or ventilation 
Not for active management 
Not for active resuscitation 
Not for IPPV 
Not for IPPV 
Not for active resuscitation 
Not for IPPV 
Not for active management 
Not for active resuscitation or ICU 
Not for resuscitation 
Not for Red Box 
Not for active treatment 
Not to continue ambubagging 
Not for active treatment 
Not for Red Box 
Not for Red Box 
Sub Total 
16 
4 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
31 
9 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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a If Not for Red Box, CPR, ambubagging, and active resuscitation are equivalent instructions then these DNR orders 
are similar in intent. if not language. 
In contrast, discrepant orders for the same patient occurred in over 2 in 5 folders. Typically, 
directives such as "Not for active resuscitation", "Not for CPR" and "Not for Red Box" were used 
interchangeably and inconsistently in medical and nursing notes. 
In almost two thirds of folders there was no record of whether the DNR order had been 
discussed with parents or a caretaker. (Table 4) DNR-related shortcomings with the potential 
to lead to miscommunication and misunderstanding within the health team and between 
parents and the health team are summarised in Table 8. Of note, this Table is based on some 
findings still to be presented in the following sections. 
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Table 8 
Summary Distribution of Actual and Potential DNR-related Miscommunication and Misunderstanding 
Communication Problems 
DNR orders with no documented discussion with parents or caretakers 
DNR orders with no comfort care plans 
DNR orders with no documented rationale 
Doctors referred to DNR from previous admission as a standing order 
Date missing from DNR order in front of folder (and no DNR inside medical notes) 
Junior doctors plead for clarification of DNR status of dying patient 
Documented evidence of dying but no DNR order 
Documented CCP but no DNR order 
DNR orders in medical notes only 
DNR orders in nursing notes only 
Discrepant DNR orders in medical and nursing notesa 
CPR despite DNR orders 
' Interchangeable and inconsistent use of DNR instructions, in particular terminology. 
3.2.2 Evidence of Dying and Comfort Care Plans 
Frequency % 
87/ 138 63% 
69/ 138 50% 
53/ 138 38% 
8/ 138 6% 
2/ 138 1% 
2/ 165 1% 
5/ 83 6% 
4/73 5% 
77/ 138 56% 
4/ 138 3% 
26/ 57 46% 
7/ 41 17% 
One in 2 patients was identified as dying and 2 in 5 patients had a documented comfort care 
plan. (Table 9) 
Table 9 
Frequency and Percentage Distribution of Selected End of Life Decisions 
Identified as Dying 83 50% 
Comfort Care Plan 73 44% 
Comfort care plan discussed with: 
Mother 31 43% 
Mother and Father 9 12% 
Aunt 1 1% 
No record 32 44% 
Withdrawing Treatment 21 13% 
Withholding Treatment 19 11.5% 
One third of patients (N=52) had both evidence of dying and a comfort care plan in their 
folders. Most patients with evidence of dying or with a comfort care plan had a DNR order 
(N=77, 93% and N=69, 94% respectively). Comfort care plans were discussed with 56% of 
parents or caretakers. (Table 9). It is noteworthy that doctors were significantly more likely to 
discuss comfort care plans than DNR orders with guardians (56% versus 36%; P=0.0083). 
Verbatim evidence of dying and verbatim comfort care plans are fully outlined in Appendices 3 
and 4. 
Among patients identified as dying, approximately 2 in every 3 were noted to be terminally ill or 
end stage, 1 in 3 was said to have a poor prognosis and the condition of 1 in 20 patients was 
felt to be rapidly deteriorating, with a low likelihood of improvement. (Table 10) 
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Table 10 
Thematic Categorisation of Evidence of Dying (N=83) 
Categorisation 
Terminal illness/ dying 
Poor prognosis 
End Stage/ In extremis 
Deterioration/ no improvement 
Frequency 
36 
29 
14 
4 
Comfort care plans were roughly categorised according to their main directives. (Table 11) 
Table 11 
Thematic Categorisation of Verbatim Comfort Care 
Plans (N=73) 
Categorisation 
TLC 
Keep comfortable 
Supportive care 
Palliation and analgesia 
Terminal care 
Not for aggressive investigation or 
painful procedures 
Conservative management 
Withdraw curative care 
Frequency 
30 
15 
14 
8 
2 
2 
1 
1 
Tender Loving Care (TLC) formed the basis of 2 in every 5 plans and keeping patients 
comfortable and providing supportive care respectively underlined a further 1 in 5 plans. 
Palliation and analgesia were the stimulus for 1 in 10 plans and a general directive to manage 
conservatively and forgo further aggressive interventions and painful procedures underpinned 
the remaining 5% of plans. However, there was much overlap between these categories, for 
example 'palliation' might have included TLC+++ or, conversely, TLC might have included 
palliation. In addition to these general instructions, two thirds of comfort care plans 
incorporated specific directives to either withhold or withdraw selected interventions, such as 
invasive procedures, blood products or intravenous (IV) therapies, or to add therapies, for 
example, morphine, sedation or headbox oxygen (HB02), to current treatment regimens. Four 
(5%) comfort care plans recommended transfer to a side cubicle. A further 4 plans specified 
the withdrawal of curative care of which only 1 plan included the directive to change goals of 
treatment. 
3.2.3 Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment 
Treatment was withdrawn or withheld from 13% and 11.5% of patients respectively. (Table 9) 
As already mentioned, doctors' orders to withdraw or withhold an intervention generally 
accompanied a DNR order or comfort care plan. (Table 5 and Appendix 4) 
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The most frequent interventions to be withdrawn and withheld were ventilation, blood products 
and IV antibiotics. (Table 12) 
Table 12 
Frequency Distribution of Decisions to 
Withdraw and Withhold Interventions 
Interventions 
Ventilation 
Blood products 
IV antibiotics 
IV fluids 
HB02 
Oral antibiotics 
All curative care 
Oral feeds 
NP02 
Surgery 
TPN 
Renal dialysis 
Frequency 
13 
7 
5 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
In 3 instances, drips for IV antibiotic therapy tissued and were not re-sited. Likewise, a chest 
drain was not re-inserted when it disconnected from the patient. Major invasive interventions, 
namely TPN, renal dialysis and surgery, were withheld from 3 patients. In 1 case a mother 
insisted that HB02 be withdrawn from her 4-month-old son. According to the final entry in the 
nursing notes, the infant died quickly with no documented respiratory distress. Prior to 
treatment withdrawal, the paediatric consultant-on-call insisted the mother sign informed 
consent for the withdrawal, although the doctor's assessment indicated that 'death is inevitable 
in the short-term'. The patient died in his mother's arms. The average length of survival 
following treatment withdrawal was 0.7 days, with 86% (N=18) of patients dying almost 
immediately. In contrast, patients lived on average 5 days (median 4 days) after a decision to 
withhold treatment. 
3.2.4 Paediatric Intensive Care and Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation 
Thirty eight patients (23%) were admitted to the paediatric intensive care unit (PICU) during 
their terminal hospitalisation of whom almost half (N=18) were transferred from general wards 
in RXH. Severe respiratory disease accounted for 76% (29/38) of admissions to the PICU. 
The HIV status of 10 (26%) patients was known prior to admission to the PICU. Thirty four 
patients died in the PICU. Six patients were transferred out of the PICU and died in the general 
wards. Compared to patients in the general wards, patients in the PICU were significantly less 
likely to have a documented DNR order (68% versus 89%; x2 = 9.11, P=0.0025) and comfort 
care plan (29% versus 49%; x2 = 4.56, P=0.0359). Fifty percent of patients in the PICU were 
identified as dying. 
Treatment was significantly more likely to be withdrawn in the PICU compared with the general 
wards (38% versus 6%; x2 = 23.7, P=0.0000). Approximately 1 in 3 (N=13) patients was 
extubated and removed from the ventilator prior to death. Consensus regarding extubation 
was reached between all parents (mothers and fathers where possible) and the health care 
team. 
One in 4 patients received cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) during his or her terminal 
hospitalisation of whom half were resuscitated in a general ward. (Table 13) When 
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administered in patients' last 24 hours of life, CPR was significantly more likely to be performed 
in the PICU (38% versus 8%; rJ = 21.4, P=0.0000). 
Table 13 
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation: Frequency and Percentage Distribution and General Characteristics 
N % 
CPR 41 25% 
Ward administered: 
emergency 3 7% 
general 21 51% 
PICU 17 41% 
HIV status confirmed prior to CPR 
yes 13 32% 
no 28 68% 
CPR in presence of: 
Evidence of dying 
yes 5/83 6% x2 = 9.70 P-value = 0.0018 
no 19 /82 23% 
Comfort Care Plan 
yes 10 /73 14% x2 = 8.66 P-value = 0.0032 
no 31 /92 34% 
No specified orders 
yes 10 /20 50% x2 = 22.88 P-value = 0.0000 
no 14 /145 10% 
CPR in last 24 hours 
general ward 11 /131 8% x2 = 19.32 P-value = 0.0000 
PICU 13 /34 38% 
Outcome of CPR 
failed 20/41 49% (6 patients survived < 1 day} 
CPR to death (days) Mean SD Median Range 
1.5 4.4 0 0-27 
The HIV status of 1 in 3 patients was known prior to CPR. CPR was unsuccessful in almost 
50% of patients, with median survival less than 1 day. Average length of survival following 
CPR was less than 2 days. CPR was performed on 7 patients despite their having a DNR 
order. Patients identified as dying and patients with a comfort care plan, were significantly less 
likely to have CPR (P=0.0018 and P=0.0032 respectively) . (Table 13) Still, 5 patients with 
evidence of dying and 10 patients with a comfort care plan received CPR following an arrest. 
One in 2 patients (10/20) with no DNR, evidence of dying or comfort care plan, compared with 
1 in 10 patients with some end of life decision, received CPR (P=0.0000). (Table 13) 
3.2.5 Morphine Administration 
The frequency and general characteristics of morphine administration are shown in Table 14. 
Two in 5 patients, including those in the PICU, received morphine during their terminal 
admission. Slightly fewer patients (38%) received morphine in their last 24 hours of life. 
Patients who died in the PICU had a 2-fold better chance of receiving morphine shortly before 
death than patients who died in general wards (68% versus 300/o, P=0.0000). Forty one 
percent of patients were given oral morphine, of whom almost half received only 1 dose during 
their hospitalisation. Of patients on oral morphine, only 5 (13%) received 10 or more doses of 
morphine during their terminal stay in hospital. On average, patients in a general ward were 
hospitalised for more than 2 weeks before they received their first dose of morphine. This was 
3 times longer than patients admitted to the PICU (P=0.0004). Moreover, the duration of 
morphine administration was markedly shorter in general wards. On average, these patients 
received morphine for 2 days, with a median length of administration of 1 day or less. 
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Table 14 
Morphine Administration: Frequency and Percentage Distribution and General Characteristics 
Morphine 68 41% 
In last 24 hours 63 38% 
Ward 
General 40 /131 30% x215.66 P = 0.0000 
PICU 23/34 68% 
Dosage 
Continuous 30 44% 
6 hourly 15 22% 
4 hourly 12 18% 
Boll.IS 7 10% 
12 hourly 2 3% 
PRN 2 3% 
Frequency of Oral Doses (per patient) 
Number of Doses N=37 
1 17 
2 2 
3 2 
4 1 
5 2 
6 6 
9 2 
10 1 
11 1 
15 1 
16 1 
28 1 
Admission to Morphine Administration (days) 
Ward N Mean SD Range Median 
General 45 15 18.70 0-80 6 x.212 .38 P = 0.0004 
PICU 23 5 7.97 0-28 0 
Morphine Administration to Death (days) 
Ward N Mean SD Range Median 
General 45 2 3.10 0-19 1 x217.24 P = 0.0000 
PICU 23 6 5.56 0-20 4 
3.2.6 Social Work and Spiritual Intervention 
Social work intervention took place in approximately 2 in every 5 families. (Table 15) 
Table 15 
Social Work Intervention: Frequency and Percentage Distribution and General Characteristics 
Social Work Intervention 63 38% 
Number of Visits (per patient) 
1 44 7CY'!Q 
2 13 21% 
>3 6 9% 
Reason for Social Work Intervention 
Supportive counseRing 18 29"A, 
Post-test counselling 14 22% 
Grief counselling 14 22% 
Pre & post test counselling 9 14% 
Pre-test counselling 8 13% 
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Families typically received 1 visit during a patient's terminal hospitalisation, with less than 10% 
seen by a social worker on more than 3 occasions. Supportive counselling was the most 
common reason for social work involvement in about one third of families, followed by grief 
counselling and post-test counselling. It is noteworthy that some form of pre- or post- test 
counselling accounted for about half the social work interventions. The only 2 documented 
referrals to community services included the Red Cross Society and the South African Police 
Service (where a patient had suffered non-accidental injury prior to admission to RXH). 
On parental request, clergy were present at the death of 3 patients. In 1 instance, the priest 
baptised the dying infant in the PICU, shortly before extubation. 
3.2.7 Associations between End of Life Decisions and Length of Stay, Age and 
Severity 
Significant and non-significant associations between DNR orders, evidence of dying, comfort 
care plans, withdrawing and withholding treatment and the independent variables of length of 
stay, age and severity are shown in Table 16. Age as a categorical variable was not 
significantly associated with end of life decision making. As a categorical variable, length of 
stay was significantly associated with comfort care plans (P=0.0081), and withdrawing and 
withholding treatment (P=0.0323 and P=0.0093 respectively). Almost twice as many patients in 
the longest length of stay quartile ( 16+ days) had comfort care plans compared to patients with 
lengths of stay less than 1 week. Similarly, patients with lengths of stay ~ 16 days had a 1 in 4 
chance of having treatment withheld compared to a less than 1 in 10 chance for the remaining 
patients, regardless of their length of stay. In contrast, patients with lengths of stay between 4 
and 15 days were at least 3 times more likely to have treatment withdrawn than patients with 
lengths of stay less than 3 days or greater than 16 days. Severity was significantly associated 
with evidence of dying (P=0.0049) and having a comfort care plan (P=0.0135). Approximately 
60% of patients who were identified as dying fell in Category C compared to 34% of patients in 
Category B. By the same token, 1 in 2 patients with a comfort care plan fell in Category C 
compared to less than 1 in 3 patients in Category B. Surprisingly, severity was not significantly 
associated with issuing a DNR order or administering CPR. Seventeen (34%) patients in 
Category Band 24 (21%) patients in Category Chad CPR during their terminal hospitalisation 
(x2 = 0.94, P=0.3331). Nor was severity significantly associated with admission to the PICU. 
Twenty eight percent of patients in Category B and 21% of patients in Category C were 
admitted to the PICU (x2 = 0.94; P=0.3331). 
Statistical relationships were also examined between end of life decisions and age and length 
of stay as continuous variables. (Table 17) Whereas age as a categorical variable showed no 
statistically significant association with key end of life decisions, highly significant differences 
were found between mean age and documentation of a comfort care plan (P=0.0052) and 
documentation of both evidence of dying and a comfort care plan (P=0.0004). In both sets of 
associations, the mean age of patients with these decisions (14 months and 16 months 
respectively) was at least twice that of patients with no comfort care plan and evidence of dying 
(7 months). Likewise, the median ages differed by at least 2 months (6 months and 6.5 months 
versus 4 months). In contrast, patients who were admitted to the PICU or who received CPR 
were on average significantly younger than patients who did not receive these interventions 
(P=0.0101 and P=0.0179 respectively). There was no statistically significant relationship 
between age and patients with no documented end of life decisions. Both sets of patients had 
median lengths of stay of 4 days (x2 = 0.000, P=0.9939). 
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Table 16 
End of Life Decisions According_ to Categories of Length of Stay, Age and Severity 
Do Not Resuscitate Orders 
Length of Stay Age Severity 
Days N % Total Months N % Total Severity N % Total 
0-3 32 76% 42 0-3 94 85% 110 CatB 41 82% 50 
4-6 35 78% 45 4-6 19 83% 23 Cate m: 85% 114 
7-15 37 93% 40 12-24 14 82% 17 138 
16+ M 89% 38 25+ 11 73% 15 
138 138 
x.2 = 6.07 x.2 = 1.47 x.2 = 0.25 
P = 0.1081 P = 0.6898 P = 0.7900 
Evidence of Dying 
Length of Stay Age Severity 
Days N % Total Months N % Total Severity N % Total 
0.3 17 40% 42 D-6 52 47% 110 CatB 17 34% 50 
4-6 21 47% 45 7-12 13 56% 23 CatC §2 58% 114 
7-17 21 52% 40 13-24 10 59% 17 83 
16+ 21 63% 38 25+ § 53% 15 
83 83 
x.2 =4.5 x.2 = 1.31 x.2 = 7.94 
P = 0.2168 P = 0.7270 P=0.0049 
Comfort Care Plans 
Length of Stay Age Severity 
Days N % Total Months N % Total Severity N % Total 
0.3 14 33% 42 0-6 41 37% 110 CatB 15 30% 50 
4-6 14 31% 45 7-12 13 56% 23 CatC §§ 51% 114 
7-15 21 52% 40 13-24 9 53% 17 73 
16+ 21 63% 38 25+ 1Q 67% 15 
73 73 
x.2 = 11.79 x.2 = 7.15 x.2 = 6.13 
P = 0.0081 P = 0.0672 P = 0.0135 
Withdrawing Treatment 
Length of Stay Age Severity 
Days N % Total Months N % Total Severity N % Total 
0.3 2 5% 42 0-6 18 16% 110 Cat B 5 10% 50 
4-6 8 18% 45 7-12 2 9% 23 Cate 1§ 14% 114 
7-15 9 22% 40 13-24 0 0% 17 21 
16+ 2 5% 38 25+ 1 7% 15 
21 21 
x.2 = 8.78 x.2 =4.62 x.2 = 0.50 
P= 0.0323 P-= 0.2017 P = 0.4778 
Withholding Treatment 
Length of Stay Age Severity 
Days N % Total Months N % Total Severity N % Total 
0-3 2 5% 42 0-6 12 11% 110 Cat B 5 10% 50 
4-6 4 9% 45 7-12 3 13% 23 Cate 11 12% 114 
7-15 3 7% 40 13-24 2 12% 17 19 
16+ 1Q 26% 38 25+ 2 13% 15 
19 19 
x.2 =11 .49 x.2 = 0.30 x.2=0.18 
P=0.0093 P = 0.9863 P = 0.6753 
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Table 17 
End of Life Decisions and L~sustaining Interventions According to Mean and Median Age and Length of Stay 
Mean so Median !2 P-value 
AGE (months) 
Study Sample (N = 165) 10 16.55 4 
ONRorder 
Yes(N = 138) 10 17.02 4 0.018 0.8940 
No(N = 27) 11 12.59 4 
Evidence 
Yes (N =83) 12 20.29 5 2.896 0.0887 
No (N = 82) 8 10.88 4 
Comfort Care Plan 
Yes (N = 73) 14 22.12 6 8.538 0.0052 
No (N = 92) 7 8.47 4 
Evidence and Comfort Care Plan 
Yes (N = 52) 16 24.58 6.5 12.30 0.0004 
No (N = 113) 7 9.66 4 
Withdrawing Treatment 
Yes (N = 21) 5 6.27 4 2.057 0.1514 
No (N = 144) 11 13.54 4 
Withholding Treatment 
Yes (N = 19) 11 14.30 5 1.028 0.3106 
No (N = 146) 10 16.64 4 
PICU 
Yes (N=38) 7 11 .05 4 5.599 0.0170 
No (N=127) 11 17.56 5 
CPR 
Yes (N=41) 8 12.61 3 6.603 0.0101 
No (N=124) 11 17.40 5 
LENGTH of ~TAY (days) 
Study Sample (N=165) 11 12.94 6 
ONR order 
Yes (N = 138) 12 13.67 7 3.845 0.0499 
No(N= 27) 7 7.33 5 
Evidence 
Yes (N = 83) 13 15.35 7 5.017 0.0250 
No(N =82) 9 9.54 5 
Comfort Care Plan 
Yes (N = 73) 14 14.35 9 11 .54 0.0006 
No(N = 92) 8 11 .13 5 
Evidence and Comfort Care Plan 
Yes (N = 52) 14 14.47 8.5 6.802 0.0091 
No (N = 113) 9 11.87 5 
Withdrawing Treatment 
Yes (N = 21) 9 7.75 6 0.139 0.7094 
No(N= 144) 11 13.54 7 
Withholding Treatment 
Yes (N = 19) 24 25.31 16 8.171 0.0042 
No (N = 146) 9 9.13 6 
PICU 
Yes (N=38) 8.5 8.39 6 0.842 0.3586 
No (N=127) 11.5 13.90 6.5 
CPR 
Yes (N=41) 7 7.95 5 6.96 0.0083 
No (N=125) 12 13.94 6 
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As a continuous variable, length of stay was significantly associated with having a DNR order 
(P=0.0499), evidence of dying (P=0.0250), having a comfort care plan (P=0.0006), evidence of 
dying and having a comfort care plan (P=0.0091) and withholding treatment (P=0.0043). On 
average patients with these end of life decisions had lengths of stay at least 5 to 6 days longer 
than patients without an end of life decision. The median length of stay of patients with these 
decisions was at least 1 week. Patients from whom treatment was withheld had a median 
length of stay of over 2 weeks (16 days) compared with a median length of stay of less than 1 
week for patients who did not have treatment withheld. Whilst the mean and median length of 
stay were not significantly different for patients admitted to the PICU, patients who were 
resuscitated had significantly shorter (on average 5 days) terminal hospitalisations (P=0.0083). 
Although there was a tendency for patients with no end of life decisions to have shorter lengths 
of stay (mean lengths of stay of 6 versus 13 days and median lengths of stay of 4.5 versus 6 
days), this association was not statistically significant (x2 = 3.27, P=0.0818). 
3.2.8 Timing of End of Life Decisions 
As indicated by the median length of time from admission to end of life decision points shown in 
Table 18, there is a progression from DNR orders (4 days) to identifying a patient as dying (5 
days) to documenting a comfort care plan (7 days). 
Table 18 
Timing and Sequence of End of Life Decisions (days) 
Mean SD Range Median 
Admission to DNR a 7 10.78 0-71 4 
Admission to 9 12.38 0-83 5 
identified as dying b 
Admission to 10 12.09 0-61 7 
comfort care plan c 
Identified as dying to 2.5 9.39 0-64 0 
comfort care plan d 
DNR to death a 5 6.74 0-34 2 
Identified as dying 4 8.88 0-65 2 
to death b 
Comfort care plan 4 5.29 0-33 2 
to death c 
a N=136 (dates missing for 2 DNR orders), b N=83, c N=73, d N=49 
Once an end of life decision has been taken the median length of time to death was 2 days. 
For patients with evidence of dying and a comfort care plan, the median time between these 
decisions points was O days, suggesting that for at least half these patients the decisions were 
made simultaneously. 
Table 19 confirms this sequence of end of life decisions for each length of stay category. 
However, for patients in the longest length of stay quartile(~ 16 days), the average and median 
time between admission and writing a DNR order, evidence of dying and a comfort care plan 
increased almost 3 fold compared to patients with lengths of stay between 7 and 15 days. 
Average differences were in the order of 6 days versus 19 days for DNR orders, 8 days versus 
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26 days for identifying a patient as dying and 8 days versus 5 days for completing comfort care 
plans. In the shortest length of stay category (0-3 days), the mean and median time interval 
between writing a DNR order, identifying a patient as dying and documenting a comfort care 
plan was less than 1 day. 
Table 19 
Timing of End of Ufe Decisions According to Length of Stay (days) 
Admission to DNR Admission to identified Admission to 
as dying Comfort Care Plan 
Length 
of stay N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Med 
0-3 32 0.8 0 17 0.6 0 14 0.7 0.5 
4-6 35 4 3 21 3 3 14 3 4 
7-15 36 6 6 21 8 7 21 8 7 
16+ ~ 19 17 ~ 26 23 ~ 25 23.5 
136 83 73 
x2 = 56.84 x2 = 57.56 x2 = 46.70 
P = 0.0000 P = 0.0000 P = 0.0000 
All associations between length of stay categories and end of life decision points reached high 
levels of statistical significance (Table 19). 
Severity was not statistically associated with the timing and sequence of end of life decisions 
(Table 20). 
Table 20 
Timing of End of Ute Decisions According to Severity 
Admission to DNR Admission to identified Admission to 
as dying Comfort Care Plan 
Severity 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Med 
Cate 41 3.5 2 17 6 4 15 6 4 
CatC ~ 8 5 §§ 10 6 ~ 11.5 7 
136 83 73 
x2 = 2.837 x2 = o.358 x2 = 0.568 
P = 0.0921 P = 0.5498 P = 0.4511 
Since no statistically significant associations were found between age as a categorical variable 
and end of life decisions (Table 16), no further analyses were undertaken to examine end of life 
decision points and age categories. 
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3.3 Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Life 
The frequency of interventions in patients' last 24 hours of life is shown in Table 21. 
Table 21 
Frequency Distribution of Interventions 
in the Last 24 Hours of Life (N::165) 
N % 
IV fluids 133 81% 
IV antibiotics 122 75% 
N-G feeds 99 60% 
Nystatin 88 53% 
HB02 68 41% 
Morphine 63 38% 
Panado 51 31% 
Oral antibiotics 44 27% 
NP02 45 27% 
Venipuncture 40 24% 
Steroids 35 21% 
Nebulisation 31 19% 
Ventilation 29 18% 
Sedation 28 17% 
X-rays 27 16% 
CPR 24 14% 
Ringers lactate 24 14% 
lnotropes 21 13% 
Oral feeds 20 12% 
N-G drainage tube 19 11% 
Anticonvulsants 16 10% 
Transfusion 15 9% 
Physiotherapy 14 8% 
Extubation 12 7% 
A line 8 5% 
CV line 8 5% 
Intubation 7 4% 
Muscle relaxants 7 4% 
TPN 2 1% 
Lumbar Puncture 1 1% 
CT Scan 1 1% 
IV fluids and IV antibiotics were the most common interventions administered to at least three 
quarters of patients in the final 24 hours of life. Other interventions received by at least 40% of 
patients included N-G feeds (3 in every 5 patients), Nystatin (1 in every 2 patients) and HB02 
(2 in every 5 patients). Analgesia was the next most frequent end intervention with respectively 
38% and 31% of patients receiving morphine and Panado. Approximately 1 in 4 patients 
received oral antibiotics and NP02 or had blood drawn in their final 24 hours of life, with a 
further 1 in 5 receiving steroids and nebulisation. A sizeable minority of patients was on 
ventilation or received CPR before death (18% and 14% respectively). Likewise, less than 
15% of patients were treated with Ringers lactate and inotropes to sustain life (14% and 13% 
respectively). Only 1 in 10 patients was fed orally in the last 24 hours. Highly invasive 
procedures, shortly before death, such as intubation occurred in less than 5% of patients. On 
the other hand, almost twice as many patients were extubated. Similarly, the use of other 
intensive care-based interventions, such as A lines, CV lines and TPN, was uncommon. A CT 
scan was performed on 1 patient in the PICU to confirm brain death. 
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With the exception of TB medicines, administered to 7% of patients, additional interventions 
were used in less than 4% of patients. (Table 22) 
Table 22 
Frequency Distribution of Additional Interventions in Last 24 Hours of Life 
No. 
T B medications 12 
Betadine 7 
Ga~c 6 
Lasix 3 
Acyclovir 2 
Sucralfate 2 
Joules Solution 2 
Catheterisation 1 
Cimetidine 1 
Chest Drain Insertion 1 
Digoxin 1 
ECHO 1 
Effi 1 
Flumazine 1 
Lignocaine (for skin lesions) 1 
Lung Scan 1 
Maxalon 1 
Naloxone 
Stomach washout with charcoal 
Several of these interventions, for example Betadine, sucralfate and Lignocaine, were aimed at 
the relief of pain caused by extensive oral and perianal ulceration. Invasive procedures, such 
as the insertion of a chest drain, occurred extremely rarely. An ECHO was performed in 1 
patient who deteriorated rapidly and died soon after admission. A stomach washout was done 
in 1 patient with persistent vomiting, believed to have been caused by a toxic traditional 
medicine (the patient's HIV status was unconfirmed at the time). One patient received 
Naxolone to reverse an adverse reaction to morphine. A garlic derivative was prescribed for 6 
patients with resistant oral candidiasis. 
Mothers were present at the bedside in 30% (N=49) deaths. In 1 in 10 deaths both parents 
was present. Grandparents or other close relatives were present in less than 3% of deaths. As 
many as 75 ( 45%) patients died with no parents or relatives present. In 12% of deaths there 
was no record in the nursing or medical notes as to whether someone was present. According 
to entries in the nursing notes, mothers were at the bedside throughout the terminal 
hospitalisations of many patients (because these entries were erratic, accurate frequency data 
are not available). Breast-feeding was encouraged, and mothers were actively involved in the 
daily care of patients, which included washing, feeding and mouth and buttocks care. Nurses 
went to great lengths to contact parents immediately when patients showed signs of 
deterioration, often enlisting the assistance of the police service. 
3.3.1 Associations between Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Life and Age, 
Severity and Length of Stay 
Associations between age and end interventions are shown in Table 23. 
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Table 23 
Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Life According to Mean and Median Age (months) 
End Interventions N Mean• SD Median 1.,2 P-value 
IV fluids 133 9 (13) 16.45 4 (6) 4.264 0.0389 
IV antibiotics 122 8 (15) 14.15 4 (6) 9.142 0.0024 
N-Gfeeds 99 10 (10) 15.72 5 (4) 3.733 0.0533 
Nystatin 88 9 (12) 10.69 4 (4) 0.141 0.7073 
HB02 68 5.5 (13) 5.25 3 (5) 9.831 0.0017 
Morphine 63 10 (10) 17.93 4 (4.5) 0.282 0.5955 
Panado 51 10 (10) 12.45 4 (4) 0.194 0.6593 
Oral antibiotics 44 14.5 (8) 20.60 6 (4) 8.776 0.0030 
NP02 45 15 (8) 21.81 7 (4) 12.00 0.0005 
Venipuncture 40 8 (11) 8.14 4 (4) 0.151 0.6593 
Steroids 35 8 (11) 16.19 3 (5) 8.782 0.0034 
Nebulisation 32 8 (10.5) 7.53 4 (4) 0.104 0.7474 
Ventilation 29 5 (11) 6.80 3 (5) 10.18 0.0014 
Sedation 28 8 (10.5) 13.13 3 (5) 4.088 0.0431 
X-rays 27 7 (11) 7.02 4 (4) 0.059 0.8087 
CPR 24 7 (10.5) 11.38 3 (5) 5.043 0.0247 
Ringers lactate 24 10 (10) 12.4 4 (4) 0.019 0.8901 
lnotropes 21 6 (11) 8.09 3 (4.5) 3.762 0.0524 
Oral feeds 20 20 (7) 28.2 5.5 (4) 3.292 0.0696 
N-G tube 19 4 (11) 2.75 3 (4) 3.616 0.0572 
Anticonvulsants 16 14 (10) 21.70 4 (4) 0.000 1.0000 
Transfusion 15 5 (10.5) 4.89 3 (4) 3.45 0.0628 
Physiotherapy 14 13 (10) 29.25 4 (4) 1.674 0.1956 
Extubation 12 3.5 (10) 1.50 3.5 (4) 3.58 0.0581 
Aline 8 6 (10) 5.19 4 (4) 0.041 0.8393 
CV line 7 6 (10) 5.69 4 (4) 0.268 0.6047 
Intubation 7 4 (10) 5.77 2 (4) 7.588 0.0058 
Muscle relaxants 7 6 (10) 5.83 4 (4) 0.384 0.5356 
TPN 2 4 (10) 1.41 4 (4) 0.190 0.6633 
LP 1 6 (10) 0.00 6 (4) 
CT Scan 
• Mean and median age in brackets refers to patients nol having the end intervention. 
Mean and median age were significantly associated with use of IV fluids and IV antibiotics, 
HB02, and NP02, oral antibiotics, steroids, ventilation, sedation, CPR and intubation. On 
average, patients receiving IV therapies were between 6 and 7 months younger than patients 
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not receiving these therapies. The median age of patients on IV therapies was 4 months. 
Whereas patients receiving HB02 were on average more than half the age of patients not 
receiving the intervention (5.5 months versus 13 months; P=0.0017), patients who received 
NP02 were significantly older than patients not receiving this treatment (mean ages of 15 
months and 8 months; P=0.0005). Oral antibiotics were administered to patients who on 
average were 6 months older than their counterparts who were not given oral antibiotics. 
Patients who were ventilated, sedated, intubated or received CPR were significantly younger 
than patients not given these interventions. The median ages of patients receiving ventilation, 
sedation and CPR were 3 months (versus 5 months) and patients who were intubated had a 
median age of 2 months (versus 4 months). Moreover, 90% (26/29) of patients who were 
ventilated in the last 24 hours were under 6 months. Patients who were treated with steroids 
were also significantly younger (on average, 8 months versus 11 months; P=0.0034). 
Associations between interventions in the last 24 hours of life and length of stay are shown in 
Table 24. On average, patients who died whilst being treated with IV fluids and IV antibiotics 
had hospitalisations half the length of those not receiving IV therapies (respectively 9 days and 
18 days; P=0.0023 and 8 days versus 20 days; P=0.0000). In contrast, patients who received 
oral antibiotics and N-G feeds had terminal stays on average twice the length of those not 
receiving these interventions (respectively 19 days versus 8 days; P=0.0002 and 14 days 
versus 6 days; P=0.0000). Only 1 in 5 patients with a length of stay of 3 days or less received 
oral antibiotics compared to 3 in 5 patients with a length of stay of 16 days or longer. Patients 
who received analgesia in their last 24 hours had significantly longer terminal stays. On 
average patients who received morphine had been in hospital 4 days longer than patients not 
receiving morphine (P=0.0172). Patients receiving either Panado or morphine had average 
terminal hospitalisations lasting a fortnight. The median length of stay for a patient receiving 
morphine was 1 week (compared to 5 days for those not receiving morphine). Diagnostic 
procedures such as drawing blood and X-rays in the last 24 hours were undertaken among 
patients with an average length of stay of 1 week or less, the median length of stay being only 
3 days (P=0.0004 and P=0.0168 respectively). By the same token, life-sustaining interventions 
such as CPR, Ringers lactate and inotropes in the final 24 hours of life were significantly more 
likely to be administered to patients with average lengths of stay of 1 week or less (P=0.0380; 
P=0.0018 and P=0.0006 respectively). For example, two thirds of patients who received CPR 
in the last 24 hours had a length of stay 6 days or less. Blood transfusions at the end of life 
were also significantly more likely among patients with short terminal hospitalisations (a median 
length of stay of 2 days versus 6 days; P=0.0009). No patients with a length of stay greater 
than 16 days received a blood transfusion in their last 24 hours of life. Significant associations 
were also noted between length of stay and use of Nystatin and N-G tube drainage. Patients 
who received Nystatin had marginally longer lengths of stay ( on average 12 days versus 10 
days; P=0.0282), and those with N-G tube drainage had a shorter length of stay (on average 6 
days versus 11 days; P=0.0277. 
Significant associations between interventions in the last 24 hours and severity are highlighted 
in Table 25. IV antibiotics and N-G feeding were more likely in the last 24 hours among 
patients in Category B. Approximately 90% of patients in Category B compared to 68% of 
patients in Category C received IV antibiotics (P=0.0083). Conversely more than twice as 
many patients in Category C received oral antibiotics (31% versus 16%; P=0.0494). Likewise 
twice as many patients in Category C compared to Category B received morphine in the final 
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Table 24 
Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Life According to Mean and Median Length of Stay (days) 
End Interventions N Mean• SD Median x.2 P-value 
IV fluids 133 9 (18) 10.68 6 (14) 9.25 0.0023 
IV antibiotics 122 8 (20) 7.16 5.5 (16) 20.27 0.0000 
N-G feeds 99 14 (6) 14.68 8 (4) 28.65 0.0000 
Nystatin 88 12 (10) 12.76 7 (5) 4.816 0.0282 
HB02 68 10(11) 11 .3 6 (6) 0.251 0.6161 
Morphine 63 13 (9) 14.58 7 (5) 5.670 0.0172 
Panado 51 16 (9) 19.09 8 (6) 3.993 0.0455 
Oral antibiotics 44 19 (8) 19.58 13.5 (5) 13.73 0.0002 
NP02 45 10(11) 13.97 6 (6) 0.305 0.5808 
Venipuncture 40 6 (12) 6.69 3 (7) 12.27 0.0004 
Steroids 35 8 (11.5) 6.89 6 (6) 0.035 0.8509 
Nebulisation 32 13.5 (10) 16.6 7 (6) 1.264 0.2609 
Ventilation 29 7 (12) 5.58 5 (6) 3.144 0.0762 
Sedation 28 7 (12) 5.82 5 (6) 1.904 0.1676 
X-rays 27 7 (12) 7.56 3 (6) 5.784 0.0168 
CPR 24 7 (11.5) 6.35 5 (6) 4.302 0.0380 
Ringers lactate 24 6 (12) 6.97 3 (7) 9.715 0.0018 
lnotropes 21 5 (12) 5.57 3 (6.5) 11.74 0.0006 
Oral feeds 20 11 (11) 11 .82 7 (6) 0.217 0.6414 
N-G tube 19 6 (11) 5.44 5 (6.5) 4.84 0.0277 
Anticonvulsants 16 7 (11) 6.42 6 (6) 0.511 0.4745 
Transfusion 15 4 (11.5) 3.25 2 (6) 10.98 0.0009 
Physiotherapy 14 9 (11) 5.94 5.5 (6) 0.025 0.8786 
Extubation 12 9 (11) 5.015 9.5 (6) 0.604 0.437 
Aline 8 8.5 (11) 4.53 9 (6) 0.112 0.7378 
CV line 7 8 (11) 7.05 8 (6) 0.210 0.6469 
Intubation 7 6 (11) 6.87 1 (6) 2.071 0.1501 
Muscle relaxants 7 8 (11) 5.15 8 (6) 0.008 0.9289 
TPN 2 19 (11) 1.41 19 (6) 2.92 0.0873 
LP 30 (11) 0.00 30 (6) 2.172 0.1405 
CT Scan 1 
• Mean and median length of stay in brackets refer to patients not having the end intervention. 
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Table 25 
Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Life According to Severity of Disease 
End Interventions Severity 
Category sa Category C 
N=165 N=50 N=114 
N % N % N % x2 P-value 
IV fluids 133 81% 45 90% 88 77% 3.70 0.0545 
IV antibiotics 122 75% 44 88% 78 68% 6.95 0.0083 
N-G feeds 99 60% 22 44% 77 67% 8.00 0.0045 
Nystatin 88 53% 24 48% 64 56% 0.92 0.3373 
HB02 68 41% 23 46% 45 39% 0.61 0.4362 
Momhine 63 38% 11 22% 52 46% 8.14 0.0043 
Panado 51 31% 17 34% 34 30% 0.28 0.5959 
Oral antibiotics 44 27% 8 16% 35 31% 3.86 0.0494 
NP02 45 27% 13 26% 32 28% O.Q7 0.7850 
Venipuncture 40 24% 23 46% 17 15% 18.10 0.0000 
Steroids 35 21% 11 22% 24 21% 0.02 0.8918 
Nebulisation 31 19% 10 16% 21 18% 0.06 0.8126 
Ventilation 29 18% 11 22% 18 16% 0.92 0.3386 
Sedation 28 17% 8 16% 20 17% 0.06 0.8094 
X-rays 27 16% 17 34% 10 9% 15.99 0.0000 
CPR 24 15% 11 22% 13 11% 3.10 0.0780 
Ringers lactate 24 14% 16 32% 8 7% 17.26 0.0000 
lnotropes 21 13% 14 28% 7 6% 14.78 0.0001 
Oral feeds 20 12% 6 12% 13 11% 0.01 0.9127 
N-G tube 19 11% 9 18% 10 9% 2.87 0.0914 
Anticonvulsants 16 10% 6 12% 10 9% 0.41 0.5225 
Transfusion 15 9% 12 24% 3 3% 18.98 0.0000 
Physiotherapy 14 8% 3 6% 11 10% 0.59 0.4413 
Extubation 12 7% 2 4% 10 9% 1.16 0.3484 
Aline 8 5% 2 4% 6 5% 0.12 0.7303 
CV line 8 5% 2 4% 6 5% 0.61 0.5383 
Intubation 7 4% 6 12% 1 1% 10.46 0.0034 
Muscle relaxants 7 4% 3 6% 4 3% 0.52 0.4688 
TPN 2 1% 0 0% 2 2% 
Lumbar Puncture 1 1% 1 2% 0 0% 
CT Scan 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 
aCategory A (1 patient) is excluded from the Table. 
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24 hours (46% versus 22%; P=0.0043). Procedures such as venipunctures and X-rays were at 
least 3 times more likely among Category B than Category C patients (respectively 46% versus 
15%; P=0.0000 and 34% versus 9%; P=0.0000). In similar vein, resuscitative and life-
sustaining treatments such as Ringers lactate and inotropes in the last 24 hours were almost 5 
times more common in Category B than Category C patients (respectively 32% versus 7%; 
P=0.0000 and 28% versus 6%; P=0.0001). In line with these findings there was a non-
significant tendency for more patients in Category B than Category C to receive CPR (22% 
versus 11%; P=0.0780). By the same token a life saving intervention such as intubation in the 
final 24 hours was significantly more common in Category B than Category C patients (12% 
versus 1%; P=0.0034). Given that only 7 patients were intubated in their last 24 hours, this 
finding must be interpreted cautiously. 
3.3.2 Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Life and Location of Death 
Significant associations between interventions in the last 24 hours of life and location of death 
are highlighted in Table 26. As anticipated, certain interventions occurred exclusively within the 
intensive care setting: ventilation, A lines, CV lines, extubation and use of muscle relaxants. 
Two patients were intubated in a general ward prior to being transferred to the PICU. However, 
other treatments were offered significantly more frequently in the PICU. These included 
morphine (68% versus 30%; p=0.0000), steroids (38% versus 7%; P=0.0065), sedation (53% 
versus 8%; P=0.0000), inotropes (41% versus 5%; P=0.0000), CPR (38% versus 8%; 
P=0.0000), blood transfusions (26% versus 4%; P=0.0000) and physiotherapy (32% versus 
2%; P=0.0000). Procedures such as venipunctures and X-rays were also twice as likely to take 
place in the last 24 hours if patients died in the intensive care unit (respectively 41% versus 
20%; P=0.0099 and 29% versus 13%; P=0.0213). In contrast, the use of Nystatin, HB02, and 
oral antibiotics as final interventions was significantly more common in the general wards 
(respectively 53% versus 32%; P=0.0060, 49% versus 12%; P= 0.0000, and 31% versus 9%; 
P=0.0084). 
The 5 most common end interventions in the PICU included IV fluids (91%), IV antibiotics 
(88%), ventilation (85%), morphine (68%) and sedation (53%). In comparison, IV fluids (78%), 
IV antibiotics (70%), N-G feeds (62%), Nystatin (59%) and HB02 (49%) were the 5 main 
treatments offered to patients in the general wards. Morphine, administered to 30% of patients, 
ranked only eighth in the general wards. 
3.3.3 Association between Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Life and End of Life 
Decisions 
Associations were examined between interventions in the last 24 hours and documentation of 
DNR orders, evidence of dying and comfort care plans. Additionally, associations were 
examined between interventions in the last 24 hours and documentation of several end of life 
decisions in the same patient, namely a DNR order plus evidence of dying plus a comfort care 
plan. Finally the effect of having no end of life decisions on end interventions was determined. 
Findings from these analyses are reported in Tables and Appendices. Significant and non-
significant associations between end (i.e. in last 24 hours) interventions and presence of a 
DNR order, evidence of dying and a comfort care plan are detailed in Appendices 5 to 7. 
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Table 26 
Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Life According to Location of Death 
General Ward PICU 
N=165 N=131 N=34 
N % N % N % x2 P-value 
IV fluids 133 81% 102 78% 31 91% 3.04 0.1320 
IV antibiotics 122 75% 92 70% 30 88% 4.51 0.0336 
N-G feeds 99 60% 82 62% 18 53% 0.98 0.4253 
Nystatin 88 53% 77 59% 11 32% 7.53 0.0060 
HB02 68 41% 64 49% 4 12% 15.23 0.0000 
Morphine 63 38% 40 30% 23 68% 15.66 0.0000 
Panado 51 31% 45 34% 6 18% 3.51 0.0611 
Oral antibiotics 44 27% 41 31% 3 9% 6.97 0.0084 
NP02 45 27% 39 30% 6 18% 1.99 0.1585 
Venipuncture 40 24% 26 20% 14 41% 6.65 0.0099 
Steroids 35 21% 22 17% 13 38% 7.38 0.0065 
Nebulisation 31 19% 27 21% 4 12% 3.04 0.0811 
Ventilation 29 18% 0 0% 29 85% 29.89 0.0000 
Sedation 28 17% 10 8% 18 53% 39.09 0.0000 
X-rays 27 16% 17 13% 10 29% 5.30 0.0213 
CPR 24 14% 11 8% 13 38% 19.22 0.0000 
Ringers lactate 24 14% 17 13% 7 20% 1.25 0.2634 
lnotropes 21 13% 7 5% 14 41% 31.02 0.0000 
Oral feeds 20 12% 19 14% 1 3% 3.37 0.0664 
N-G tube 19 11% 15 11% 4 12% 0.00 0.9593 
Anticonvulsants 16 10% 13 10% 3 9% 0.04 0.8472 
Transfusion 15 9% 6 4% 9 26% 15.56 0.0000 
Physiotheral?Y 14 8% 3 2% 11 32% 31 .23 0.0000 
Extubation 12 7% 0 0% 12 35% 49.86 0.0000 
A line 8 5% 0 0% 8 23% 18.83 0.0000 
CV line 8 5% 0 0% 8 23% 18.83 0.0000 
Intubation 7 4% 2 1% 5 15% 11.47 0.0007 
Muscle relaxants 7 4% 0 0% 7 20% 18.83 0.0000 
TPN 2 1% 0 0% 2 6% 
Lumbar puncture 1% 1% 0 0% 
CT Scan 1% 0 0% 1 3% 
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Percentage distributions between end interventions and presence of a DNR order, evidence of 
dying and a comfort care plan are presented in Table 27. 
Table 27 
Percentage Distribution of Interventions in Last 24 Hours of Life According to Presence or Absence of a 
Do Not Resuscitate Order, Evidence of Dying and a Comfort Care Plan a 
Total Interventions DNR Evidence Comfort Care Plan 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
N N N N N N N 
165 138 27 83 82 73 92 
IV fluids 81% 80% 81% 80% 82% 73% 87% 
IV antibiotics 75% 75% 70% 70% 78% 62% 84% 
N-G feeds 60% 67% 26% 61% 58% 66% 55% 
Nystatin 53% 57% 37% 53% 54% 56% 51% 
HB02 41% 47% 18% 41% 41% 38% 42% 
Morphine 38% 40% 26% 53% 23% 47% 31% 
Panado 31% 34% 15% 31% 41% 27% 34% 
Oral antibiotics 27% 28% 22% 28% 23% 33% 22% 
NP02 27% 28% 26% 29% 30% 26% 28% 
Venipuncture 24% 22% 37% 19% 26% 15% 31% 
Steroids 21% 21% 22% 25% 26% 12% 28% 
Nebulisation 19% 20% 15% 27% 29% 19% 18% 
Ventilation 18% 13% 41% 17% 17% 9% 24% 
Sedation 17% 17% 18% 20% 13% 14% 19% 
X-rays 16% 13% 33% 13% 19% 12% 19% 
CPR 14% 9% 44% 6% 23% 4% 23% 
Ringers lactate 14% 12% 30% 8% 20% 11% 17% 
lnotropes 13% 7% 41% % 18% 7% 17% 
Oral feeds 12% 13% 7% 16% 9% 16% 17% 
N-G tube 11% 9% 22% 13% 10% 7% 15% 
Anticonvulsants 10% 9% 11% 13% 6% 14% 6% 
Transfusion 9% 7% 18% 5% 13% 4% 13% 
Physiotherapy 8% 7% 15% 11% 6% 4% 10% 
Extubation 7% 7% 11% 12% 2% 7% 8% 
Aline 5% 6% 0% 7% 2% 4% 5% 
CV line 5% 4% 7% 7% 2% 4% 5% 
Intubation 4% 2% 15% 1% 7% 3% 5% 
Muscle relaxants 4% 4% 4% 5% 4% 1% 6% 
TPN 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 
Lumbar Puncture 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 
CT Scan 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 
a Highlighted percentages indicate that there was a significant association between the end interventions and end of life decisions. 
Frequency distributions and significance levels of all associations are given in Appendices 5--7. 
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Patients with a DNR order were at least twice as likely compared to patients without an order to 
receive nasogastric feeds (67% versus 26%; P=0.0000), HB02 (47% versus 18%; P=0.0090) 
and Panado (34% versus 15%; P=0.0485). On the other hand, patients with a DNR order were 
significantly less likely to be resuscitated (9% versus 44%; P=0.0000), ventilated (13% versus 
41%; P=0.0005), intubated (2% versus 15%; P=0.0029), given Ringers lactate (12% versus 
30%; P=0.0153) or an X-ray (13% versus 33%; P=0.0093). (Table 27 and Appendix 5) 
Likewise, patients with documented evidence of dying compared to those with no evidence 
were significantly less likely to receive CPR (6% versus 23%; P=0.0018), Ringers lactate (8% 
versus 200/o; P=0.0255) and inotropes (7% versus 18%; P=0.0335). In turn, patients who were 
identified as dying were 5 times more likely to be extubated (12% versus 2%; P=0.0178) and 
twice as likely to receive morphine (53% versus 23%; P=0.0000). (Table 27 and Appendix 6). 
With the exception of morphine, patients with a comfort care plan were significantly less likely 
to receive several interventions in the last 24 hours. These interventions included resuscitation 
(4% versus 23%; P=0.0007), ventilation (9% versus 24%; P=0.0166), a blood transfusion (4% 
versus 13%; P=0.0442) or a venipuncture (15% versus 31%; P=0.0146). Although the 
proportions of patients receiving the following interventions remained relatively high, 
significantly fewer patients with comfort care plans received IV fluids (73% versus 87%; 
P=0.0209), IV antibiotics (62% versus 84%; P=0.0013), steroids (12% versus 28%; P=0.0131) 
and inotropes (7% versus 17%; P=0.0442). In contrast, almost 50% of patients with a comfort 
care plan compared to 31% without a plan received morphine in the last 24 hours (P=0.0487). 
(Table 27 and Appendix 7). Even though patients with comfort care plans were statistically less 
likely to receive certain invasive treatments, from a patient perspective, 11 patients had blood 
drawn, 5 received inotropes, 3 were resuscitated and 3 underwent blood transfusions in their 
last 24 hours of life (despite having comfort care plans). Moreover, approximately three 
quarters and two thirds of these patients respectively received IV fluids and IV antibiotics. 
Almost twice as many patients received IV antibiotics rather than oral antibiotics in their last 24 
hours, despite having comfort care plans (N=45, N=24 respectively). 
The frequency of end interventions for patients with a comfort care plan in the longest length of 
stay quartile (216 days) is shown in Table 28. In descending order of frequency the most 
common end interventions received by at least 30% of these patients were N-G feeds (79%), 
IV fluids, morphine and oral antibiotics (58% respectively), Nystatin (50%), Panado (46%), 
HB02 (42%) and IV antibiotics (37%). Approximately 1 in 3 patients was nebulised in the last 
24 hours. Of note, more patients received oral antibiotics than IV antibiotics (14 patients and 9 
patients respectively), and HB02 was 3 times more common than NP02 (10 patients and 3 
patients respectively). Moreover, only 1 instance of a venipuncture, X-ray and CPR are 
reported among these patients. However, only 4 patients were having oral feeds. No patient 
underwent a blood transfusion. Additional interventions in the last 24 hours included Betadine 
x3, garlic x3, Acyclovir x2, TB medicines x2, Dactarin gel x1, and Joules solution x1. The 
timing of morphine administration in these patients was instructive. On average, patients with 
lengths of stay 216 days waited 31 days before receiving their 1st dose of morphine, with a 
median waiting time of 28 days between admission and 1s1 dose of morphine. The mean and 
median length of time between the 1st dose of morphine and death was 2 days and O days 
respectively. One patient received morphine for 14 days, with the remaining 13 patients taking 
morphine for 3 or less days. Although cell numbers were small, it is noteworthy that there were 
no statistically significant differences between end interventions received by patients with a 
comfort care plan compared to patients without a comfort care plan in this length of stay 
category (216 days). 
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Table28 
Frequency of lnterventionsa in the Last 24 Hours of Life According to 
Presence of a Comfort Care Plan and Length of Stay ,?16 days (N=24) 
End Interventions No. 
N-G feeds 19 
IV fluids 14 
Oral antibiotics 14 
Morphine 14 
Nystatin 12 
Panado 11 
HBC}., 10 
IV antibiotics 9 
Nebulisation 7 
Oral feeds 4 
Steroids 3 
NP(}., 3 
Sedation 2 
Ringers lactate 2 
Venipuncture 1 
Ventilation 1 
X-rays 1 
CPR 1 
lnotropes 1 
N-G tube 1 
Anticonvulsants 1 
Physiotherapy 1 
Extubation 1 
CVP 1 
Patients (N=20) with no documented end of life decision (i.e. no DNR, no evidence of dying 
and no comfort care plan) had a 5-fold greater chance of being resuscitated in their last 24 
hours of life (50% versus 10%; P=0.0000). (Appendix 8) These patients were also significantly 
more likely to receive other life-sustaining interventions such as ventilation (40% versus 14%; 
P=0.0050), inotropes (45% versus 8%; P=0.0000), Ringers lactate (35% versus 12%; 
P=0.0057) and intubation (15% versus 3%; P=0.0111). Furthermore these patients were much 
more likely to have an N-G drainage tube (30% versus 9%; P=0.0058) and X-rays (35% versus 
14%; P=0.0165). Finally this small sub-set of patients was significantly less likely to receive N-
G feeds (20% versus 65%; P=0.0000) and morphine (15% versus 41%; P=0.0232) and HB02 
(15% versus 45%; P=0.0113) in their final 24 hours. 
Life-sustaining interventions, in particular, ventilation, inotropes, and CPR, and invasive 
procedures such as venipunctures, are among the top 5 interventions in the last 24 hours of life 
for patients without an a end of life decision. (Table 29) At least 40% of patients undergo these 
interventions. Moreover, morphine ranks among the bottom 2 interventions. Similarly, 
morphine receives a relatively low ranking among patients with a DNR order only. In contrast, 
morphine ranks among the top 5 interventions among patients with a DNR order plus evidence 
of dying plus a comfort care plan. Indeed these patients had a 2-fold better chance of receiving 
morphine in their last 24 hours than patients with a DNR order only (53% versus 25%; x2 = 
7.06, P=0.0078). Although IV fluids were the top ranked intervention for both groups of 
patients, patients with a DNR order only were significantly more likely than patients with 
comprehensive orders to receive this form of treatment (93% vs 74%; x2 = 4.87, P=0.0273). 
Additionally, patients with a DNR order only are significantly more likely to receive IV antibiotics 
than patients with a DNR order plus other end of life decisions (90% versus 64%; x2 = 7.99, 
P=0.0047). Nevertheless two thirds of patients with a DNR order, identified as dying and with 
comfort care plans, still received this intervention. Although less than 1 in 5 patients with a 
DNR order only received CPR in the last 24 hours, no patients with a DNR plus other decisions 
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were resuscitated (1"7% versus 0%; x2 = 6.74, P=0.0031). Twelve patients with a DNR order 
only, compared to 1 patient with a DNR order and other end of life decisions, had blood drawn, 
and a further 7 patients with a DNR order only compared to 1 patient with comprehensive 
orders had a blood transfusion (respectively x2 = 6.57, P=0.0103 and x2 = 4.41, P=0.0163). 
Table 29 
Percentage Distribution and Rank Ordering of Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Ufe According to Presence or 
Absence of End of Life Decisions 
All Interventions No Decision DNRonly• DNR + Evidence + CCpt, 
N= 165 N=20 N=40 N=47 
% Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank 
IV fluids• 81% 1 85% 1 93% 1 74% 1 
IV antibiotics 75% 2 80% 2 90% 2 64o/o 3 
N-G feeds 60% 3 20% 8 73% 3 68"/e 2 
Nystatin I 53% 4 50% 3 50% 5 57o/o 4 
HB<h 41% 5 15% 9 57% 4 40% 6 
Morphine 38% 6 15% 9 25% 8 53o/o 5 
Panaclo 31% 7 20% 8 37% 6 28% 8 
Oral antibiotics 27% 8 20% 8 15% 12 28% 8 
NP02 27% 8 35% 6 22% 9 30% 7 
Venl uncture 24% 9 40% 5 30% 7 8% 9 
Steroids 21% 10 15% 9 25% 8 15% 10 
Nebulisation 19% 11 10% 9 20% 10 21% 9 
Ventilation 18% 12 40% 5 17% 11 11% 11 
Sedation 17% 13 15% 9 17% 11 15% 10 
X-rays 16% 14 35% 6 12% 13 4% 12 
CPR 14% 15 50% 3 17% 11 0% 0 
Ringers lactate 14% 15 35% 6 15% 12 6% 13 
lnotropes 13% 16 45% 4 10% 14 2% 16 
Oral feeds 12°,{, 17 5% 10 10% 14 23% 8 
N-G tube 11% 18 30% 7 5% 15 11% 11 
Anticonvulsants 10% 19 5% 10 0% 17 11% 11 
Transfusion 9% 20 20% 8 17% 11 2°k 15 
Physiotherapy 8% 21 15% 9 5% 15 6% 13 
Extubation 7% 22 5% 10 2% 16 8% 12 
Aline 5% 23 CJ',{, 0 5% 15 6% 13 
CV line 5% 23 CJ'/o 0 5% 15 4% 14 
Intubation 4% 24 15% 9 5% 15 CJ',{, 0 
Muscle relaxants 4% 24 CJ'/o 0 2°/o 16 2°k 15 
TPN 1% 25 CJ'/o 0 2% 16 2°k 15 
Lumbar Puncture 1% 25 CJ'/o 0 2% 16 2°/o 15 
CT Scan 1% 25 (1% 0 2% 16 2% 15 
• Includes patients with a DNR order only, with no documentation of evidence of dying or a CCP. 
b Includes patients with documentation of a DNR and evidence of dying and a CCP. 
c 5 top rank ordered interventions are highlighted in each column. 
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3.4 Pain and Distress in the Last 48 Hours of Life 
Excluding patients (N=34) who died in the PICU, pain and distress were documented in 
medical and nursing entries of 72 (55%) patients of whom 38 (53%) had a documented comfort 
care plan. Documentation of pain and distress was more common in nursing than medical 
notes. Documentation occurred in both sets of entries in 29% (N=21) of folders, in 53% (N=38) 
of nursing notes only and in 18% (N=13) of medical notes only. 
Respiratory distress was the most common source of distress among patients with and without 
a comfort care plan, occurring respectively in 39% and 59% of patients. (Table 30) 
Table 30 
Pain and Distress in the Last 48 Hours of Life (N=72) • 
Symptomatologyb 
Respiratory distress 
Oral and oesophageal 
candidiasis 
Perianal ulceration and 
dermatitis 
Herpes, skin lesions and 
abscesses 
Abdominal distension 
Othel'° 
Comfort Care Plan 
N=38 
N % 
15 39 
11 29 
11 29 
9 24 
2 5 
4 10 
a Excludes patients who died in the PICU. 
b Multiple symptomatology in some patients. 
c Includes, for example, otitis, anxiety, self-reported pain. 
No Comfort Care Plan 
N=34 
N % 
20 59 
16 47 
2 6 
3 
9 26 
3 9 
Phrases such as 'battling to breathe', 'laboured breathing', 'extremely exhausted', 'still visibly 
distressed' and 'working very hard' indicate that shortness of breath created considerable 
distress in the last 48 hours of life in over 1 in 4 children (35/131) who died in the general 
wards. Painful skin manifestations of HIV disease were a further source of discomfort in almost 
2 in 5 patients. Vivid descriptions such as 'riddled with extensive candida', 'skin excoriated', 
'still looks horrible', 'abscess and distinct lesions - painful to touch', 'weak cry though in great 
pain', 'mouth and buttocks very sore', and 'dry bloody crusts on both lips' confirm the extent of 
morbidity. Though less common, abdominal distension, for example 'distended abdomen+++ 
(NEC)', was another cause of discomfort for 8% of patients. Verbatim entries of pain and 
distress are fully reported for patients with and without comfort care plans in Appendices 9 and 
10 respectively. 
Demographic and clinical characteristics of these patients are detailed in Appendices 11 and 
12. Differences in demographic and clinical characteristics were examined between patients 
suffering pain and distress according to the presence of a comfort care plan. The average and 
median age of patients with and without a comfort care plan ( respectively 12 months and 6 
months and 8 months and 4 months) was not significantly different (x2 = 2.285, P=0.1306). In 
line with a previously reported strong association between length of stay and presence of a 
comfort care plan, patients with a comfort care plan in this sub-group had on average longer 
terminal hospitalisations than patients without a comfort care plan ( 17 days versus 10 days; x..2 
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= 5.255, P=0.0218). Moreover, the median length of stay for patients with a comfort care plan 
was almost double that of patients without a comfort care plan (9 days versus 5 days). 
Furthermore, almost 2 in 5 patients (N=15) with documented pain and distress, even with a 
comfort care plan, fell in the longest length of stay quartile (16+ days). Severity was not 
statistically associated with the presence or absence of a comfort care plan among patients 
reported to be in pain and distress in the last 48 hours of life. Patients without a comfort care 
plan were also significantly less likely to have a DNR order and evidence of dying (79% versus 
100%; x2 = 8.55, P=0.0034 and 32% versus 68%; x2 = 9.22, P=0.0024). 
Use of mild analgesia was similar for both groups although 2 patients with a comfort care plan 
received Dolorol forte as an adjunct to Panado. However, in keeping with an earlier finding, 
patients with a comfort care plan were more than twice as likely to receive morphine in the last 
24 hours of life (52% versus 20%; x2 = 7.75, P=0.0053). Nonetheless, approximately 2 in 5 
(N=16) patients with a comfort care plan received no analgesia in the last 24 hours despite 
documented pain and distress. In comparison, almost 3 in 5 (N=20) patients without a comfort 
care plan received no analgesia in the face of pain and distress. It is noteworthy that with the 
exception of morphine, there were no statistically significant differences in the care given to 
patients with and without a comfort care plan in the last 24 hours. 
The timing of morphine administration amongst this sub-set of patients is informative. (Table 
31) 
Table 31 
Timing of Morphine Administration in Patients with Pain and Distress in the Last 48 Hours of Lifea 
Recordh Admission to morphine (d) Morphine to death (d) 
With a CCP (N=20} 
26 1 1 
32 49 2 
34 36 (Jc 
39 28 2 
41 23 2 
44 8 0 
48 5 2 
50 2 3 
54 1 2 
58 33 2 
69 28 0 
76 42 2 
89 26 0 
116 2 0 
121 12 4 
141 39 0 
147 3 0 
148 4 1 
158 7 2 
161 6 0 
Without a CCP (N=7} 
11 25 1 
36 6 0 
43 5 0 
74 1 0 
106 12 0 
144 80 8 
150 2 0 
a Excludes patients who died in the PICU. 
b See Appendices 9 and 10 respectively for detailed symptomatology. 
' Patient received morphine intermittently in 1,1 week of admission for trauma from a non-accidental injury. 
61 
Two in 5 (8/20) patients with a comfort care plan and 5 out of 7 without a plan received their 
first dose of morphine within hours of death. Despite verbatim reports of pain and distress over 
48 hours, only 3 patients received morphine for 3 days or more. Indeed, excluding 1 patient 
admitted to the PICU, 10 patients with lengths of stay ~ 23 days waited on average 37 days for 
their first dose of morphine (this represents a total of 373 hospital days). These patients 
received morphine for 2 or less days. 
Detailed summaries of patients with comfort care plans show that irrespective of instructions 
advocating 'TLC', 'Palliation' and 'Supportive Care', a sizeable proportion of patients was in 
pain and distress in their last 48 hours of life, caused largely by dyspnoea and oral, 
oesophageal and perianal pain (Appendix 9). What is more, in about 20% of patients, 
analgesia was recommended in the comfort care plan but these orders were never written in 
the medicine charts. Seven patients failed to receive morphine and 1 patient was never given 
Panado. Thus 1 in 5 patients with explicitly described pain and distress failed to receive 
analgesia recommended in their comfort care plans. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
4.1 Introduction 
South Africa is experiencing one of the fastest growing HIV/AIDS epidemics in the world. 
According to the most recent national seroprevalence survey in October 1999,120 22.4% of 
women attending antenatal clinics were infected with HIV, potentially translating into the birth of 
approximately 75 000 HIV-infected infants in 2000. Among children, gains in under 5 mortality 
rates are noticeably reversed and escalating hospital admission rates and death rates further 
signify the impact of the AIDS pandemic. Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital in Gauteng has 
seen a 7-fold increase in hospital admissions for children with HIV/AIDS, from a relatively low 
2.9% in 1992 to 20% in 1997.121 In rural KwaZulu-Natal, about one quarter (26%) of 
admissions to the paediatric hospital wards of a district hospital were children with HIV/AIDS.122 
In the Western Cape Metropole, which includes hospitals in Cape Town, Paarl and Worcester, 
a bed use census in March 1999 revealed that children with HIV/AIDS occupied 12% of acute 
beds in the region.123 In certain hospitals in the region, such as Stellenbosch and Victoria 
Hospitals, 1 in 5 paediatric admissions was HIV-related. A recent newspaper report found over 
half the paediatric admissions to Coronation Hospital in Gauteng were HIV-related.124 A 
prospective, case-controlled study found 14.5% of admissions to a PICU in Durban were HIV 
positive or had AIDs.125 Similarly, HIV/AIDS accounted for respectively over one half and one 
quarter of all ward deaths in Chris Hani Baragwanath121 and Red Cross Children's Hospitals.s3 
Despite growing numbers, many researchers believe these figures underestimate the 
prevalence of paediatric HIV/AIDS in acute care public hospitals, since screening for HIV 
infection is not routinely undertaken. 
In developing countries disease progression in children with HIV/AIDS occurs early and rapidly. 
In a retrospective record review (1990-1995)57 to determine survival patterns in HIV-infected 
children, ?'}!J/o of deaths occurred in children less than 12 months, with a median time from 
diagnosis to death of only 3 months. In similar vein, in a prospective hospital-based cohort of 
HIV-infected children in Durban,126 88% of deaths occurred in children under 1 year of age. 
Overall, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the probability of death by 12 months ranges from 0.23 to 
0.35,127 and HIV-infected children can expect, on average, at least 2 hospital admissions during 
their short life span.57, 121, 122, 123 Against a background of increasing hospital admissions and 
deaths due to HIV/AIDS, decreasing caregiver morale and a lack of data on end of life care 
among children dying of HIV/AIDS, the present study aimed to describe end of life decision 
making during the terminal hospitalisation of children with HIV-related deaths in one children's 
hospital and to identify opportunities for improving quality of terminal care. To this end, the 
medical records of 165 patients (99% coverage) who died of HIV-related causes between 
February 1998 and June 2000 in RXH were reviewed. 
Consistent with previous findingss?. 126 most (80%) patients who died were less than 12 months 
of age, of whom two thirds were 6 months or less. Although only 1 in 10 patients was older 
than 2 years, the mean length of survival (51 months) of this minority of patients was at least 5 
times greater than the overall sample average (10 months) and almost 3 times longer than 
patients aged between 1 and 2 years. Thus chances of longer survival seem to improve in 
patients who live beyond 2 years even though these patients fall in Category C. 
Although only 1 in 3 patients fell in Category B, these patients were younger, with shorter 
lengths of stay than patients in Category C (mean ages of 4 months and 12.5 months 
respectively, P=0.0000; and mean lengths of stay of 6 days and 13 days respectively, 
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P=0.0000). Counterintuitively, this implies patients in the moderate disease Category B are 
sicker than patients in the severe Category C. There are 2 possible explanations. First is the 
presence of undiagnosed and untreated pneumocystis carinii (PCP) pneumonia. PCP 
pneumonia is the most common life-threatening opportunistic infection in children with 
HIV/AIDS. PCP pneumonia can manifest at any age but 50% of reported cases with HIV 
infection occur in children less than 6 months of age. PCP pneumonia may be the first 
presentation of HIV-related disease and the first episode may be rapidly progressive and fatal. 
Untreated PCP pneumonia is invariably fatal in immunosuppressed patients.128 PCP is an 
AIDS-defining disease, which places a patient in Category C. If PCP pneumonia is not yet 
diagnosed patients may be classified as belonging to Category B. Second, is the poor 
predictive significance for Category B, which comprises indicator diseases with widely different 
prognostic importance.129 Based on a prospective follow-up study of 366 HIV-infected children, 
Galli and co-researchers129 recommend the inclusion of, among others, anaemia, candidiasis, 
diarrhoea and persistent fever, diseases with a proven shorter survival, in a high-risk sub-
Category B. The authors believe this would improve the predictivity of the classification system 
and bring it closer in line with clinical reality. In sum, very sick patients in Category B may 
either have had undiagnosed PCP pneumonia or have been unreliably classified as falling in 
Category B. 
Whilst the average length of terminal hospitalisation was 11 days, at least half the patients died 
within 1 week of admission and 1 in 4 patients died within 3 days of admission. These data 
imply doctors have to make crucial end of life decisions for patients who on average are under 
1 year of age and who die within 1 and a half weeks of admission. Put differently, at least 50% 
of end of life decision making is among patients who are 4 or less months of age, within 6 or 
less days of admission. One notable exception was about one quarter of patients who on 
average remained in hospital for almost 1 month (range 16 days to 88 days). Most (87%) of 
these patients, with average and median ages of 12 months and 5 months respectively, fell in 
Category C. 
The implications of complex decision making in the face of diagnostic and prognostic 
uncertainty are explored in following sections. The major end of life decisions are examined in 
terms of their positive and negative impact on the quality of terminal care received by 
hospitalised children who died of HIV/AIDS. Ethical implications of these decisions are also 
examined. 
4.2 End of Life Decisions: Positive Findings 
Improving end of life decision making depends in part on the ability of clinicians to recognise 
patients are dying, and their readiness to limit aggressive treatment and plan comprehensive 
palliative care. Where sick children are concerned this cannot be easy: most patients who died 
in this study were infants who had been in hospital for less than 2 weeks. In fact, over half the 
patients had been hospitalised for less than 1 week. Thus it is encouraging that more than 4 
out of 5 patients had a DNR order, 1 in 2 patients was identified as dying, and rather less 
pleasingly, only 2 in 5 had a documented comfort care plan. Only 12% of patients died with no 
specified limits on treatment. In about one quarter of patients the DNR order was the only end 
of life decision. Most patients with evidence of dying or with a comfort care plan had a DNR 
order (93% and 94% respectively). Less than one third of patients had a DNR order, evidence 
of dying and a comfort care plan. Despite the absence of formal policies on DNR orders or 
palliative care at RXH, doctors made key end of life decisions that benefited patients. 
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4.2.1 Do Not Resuscitate Orders 
DNR orders are directives in the medical and nursing record that preclude the use of 
resuscitative measures, including ventilation, in the event of cardiopulmonary arrest. An 
important goal of the DNR order is to ensure clinicians decide on the medical and ethical 
appropriateness of resuscitation attempts before they are needed on the assumption that a 
better decision will be made if it is made by the clinician most familiar with the patient, and if it 
is made without the stress induced by facing a sudden arrest.130 In this light, the high rate of 
DNR orders recorded in this study is gratifying. Since only 16% of patients who died did not 
have a DNR order, it is possible doctors are learning to withhold CPR and ventilation, highly 
invasive interventions, when they are unlikely to benefit the patient, and merely prolong dying. 
Furthermore, the finding that 84% of deaths in this study were preceded by a DNR order 
compares favourably with reported rates of 100% and 66% respectively among children who 
died of cystic fibrosis9 and cancers and neurological diseases.35 There are no comparable data 
for children who died of HIV/AIDS. 
Patients' age and severity of disease were not significantly associated with having a DNR 
order. That children with DNR orders had longer lengths of stay (on average 5 days) than 
patients without DNR orders may be due to treatment regimens that require at least a week 
before patients show a reasonable clinical response to treatment. Furthermore, many children 
with HIV/AIDS manifest a slower response to antibiotic treatment and some require prolonged 
antibiotic treatment. Accordingly, clinicians may be reluctant to issue a DNR order until certain 
that children are not benefiting from treatment. In other words, as the patient's prognosis 
becomes clearer with time, DNR orders are written in advance of impending death.139 
In this sense, a DNR order becomes a 'marker' of death.139 Indeed, imminent death, 
progressive, severe and unresponsive disease and even the terminology of dying (for instance, 
end stage AIDS, terminal, poor prognosis) were the most common reasons for writing DNR 
orders in this study. Imminent death or the 'no chance' situation, as a basis for forgoing life-
saving interventions is supported by the policies of official paediatric associations in the LJS18, 
the UK21 and Europe,22 as well as empirical findings.27, 30-35 Essentially imminent death implies 
a patient's condition is continuing to deteriorate despite aggressive intervention and the patient 
is likely to die in the near future, despite continued treatment. In the same vein, the 'no chance' 
situation refers to a patient with such severe disease that life-sustaining treatment merely 
delays death and may even increase suffering. Therefore in this situation life-prolonging 
medical treatment is considered inappropriate. Illustrative examples used in this study include 
the following verbatim rationales: 'Advanced AIDS. Septicaemia (staph) and progressive 
disease not responsive to treatment', 'Clinical AIDS. Poor response to treatment for 
pneumonia', 'Futile treatment not in the interests of the child. Not improving despite the best we 
can do'. Interestingly, futility, a controversial assessment, was only cited twice, both instances 
in the PICU, as a reason for not actively resuscitating patients who already on ventilatory 
support were showing no improvement. Arguably, in both these examples the use of futility 
accorded with guidelines provided by the Society for Critical Care Medicine.Go They 
recommend using futility as a reason for restricting interventions only in situations where 
treatment offers no physiological benefit to the patient. This seems to have been the case in 
this study. According to the Consensus Statement of the Bioethics Centre at Groote Schuur 
Hospital,62 if a life-sustaining intervention is highly unlikely to promote a patient's meaningful 
survival, it can be considered futile. At no stage were quality of life criteria or scarce resources 
invoked as reasons to withhold resuscitation or ventilation in this study. Quality of life 
assessments are controversial because they are inherently subjective. There is no objective 
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way to determine that death would be preferable to continued survival. This is even more 
problematic in children where professionals and parents, rather than patients, must decide 
what constitutes an unacceptably poor quality of life. 
Whilst it may seem self-explanatory that DNR simply means do not resuscitate or ventilate in 
the event of full cardiopulmonary arrest, the possibility that doctors might interpret DNR as do 
not treat represents a constant moral concern.131 Consistent with the purpose of a DNR order, 
patients with DNR orders were significantly less likely to be resuscitated (9% versus 44%, 
P=0.0000), ventilated (13% versus 41%, P=0.0005), intubated (2% versus 15%, P=0.0029) or 
to receive inotropes (7% versus 49%, P=0.0000) or Ringers lactate, a resuscitation fluid (12% 
versus 30%, P=0.0153). As importantly, DNR orders do not result in 'no treatment'. On the 
contrary, IV fluids and IV antibiotics were the top ranked interventions received respectively by 
93% and 91% of patients with DNR orders only. What is more, patients with a DNR order as 
the only specified order were relatively more likely than patients identified as dying and with 
comfort care plans to receive IV fluids (90% versus 74%, P=0.0273) and IV antibiotics (90% 
versus 64%, P=0.0047). 
Conversely, patients with no specified limits on therapy are expected to receive all medically 
indicated interventions, including CPR. Among the minority of patients with no DNR orders, 
life-saving interventions, in particular CPR, ventilation and inotropes as well as invasive 
procedures such as venipunctures, were among the top 5 ranked interventions received in the 
last 24 hours. In the absence of a DNR order there is a presumption that favours treatment 
and patients should receive all medically indicated treatment. All patients are assumed to fall in 
this category unless it is otherwise noted in patients' records. Findings among this sub-set of 
patients supported this presumption. 
In short, decisions not to initiate life-saving resuscitation, including mechanical ventilation, were 
common. Importantly, DNR decisions successfully targeted specific interventions such as CPR 
and ventilation, which were withheld. In comparison, patients with no DNR orders received 
these highly invasive interventions. Patients with DNR orders continued to receive other life-
sustaining interventions, short of resuscitation. 
4.2.2 Evidence of Dying and Comfort Care Plans 
Theoretically at least, patients who are labelled as imminently dying ought to receive only 
interventions appropriate for dying patients. One in 2 patients in this study was explicitly 
described as terminally ill (43%), as having a poor prognosis (35%), end stage (17%) or as 
deteriorating with no improvement (5%). The only comparable findings come from an adult 
study in which 72.% of patients were classed as dying during their terminal hospitalisation.54 
Patients categorised as dying in the present study were almost twice as likely to fall in Category 
C (P=0.0049) and were hospitalised on average at least 4 days longer than patients with no 
documentation of dying (P=0.0250). It seems plausible that as hospitalisation proceeds, 
doctors are able to gather more information, which allows them to refine their prognoses about 
individual patients. For example, a confirmatory diagnosis of PCP pneumonia, which places a 
patient in Category C, as well as clinical evidence of failure to respond to different treatment 
regimens may take at least a fortnight. Without reliable evidence, which takes time to collect, a 
clinician may be reluctant to document patients as dying. Appropriately, patients classified as 
dying were less likely to receive life-prolonging interventions such as CPR (P=0.0018), 
inotropes (P=0.0335) or Ringers lactate (P=0.0255). Fittingly, these patients were more than 
twice as likely to receive morphine in the last 24 hours of life. Interestingly, equal proportions 
( 17%) of patients, with and without evidence of dying, were ventilated in the last 24 hours of 
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life. Importantly, patients characterised as dying were significantly more likely to be extubated 
shortly before death (P=0.0178). Since extubated patients were removed from intrusive 
machinery shortly before dying, this was a positive effect of having been identified as dying in 
the PICU. 
Examination of verbatim DNR orders and verbatim evidence of dying reveals some 
redundancy, for instance the shared use of descriptions such as terminal illness, poor 
prognosis and progressive deterioration. This is not surprising since imminent death was the 
most commonly cited rationale for issuing a DNR order. 
If a terminally ill child's best interests are to be served the AAP18 recommends an individualised 
plan of care that focuses on the child's need for comfort and symptom relief to ease the 
process of dying rather than provision of life saving medical therapy. Less than half the 
patients in this study had a comfort care plan. Notably this finding is almost identical to that 
reported by Fin and co-researchers54 where only 46% of adult patients who died in an acute 
hospital had a comfort care plan. That patients with a comfort care plan were much older (on 
average 14 months versus 7 months, P=0.0052), more likely to fall in Category C (51% versus 
30%, P=0.0135), with significantly longer hospitalisations (on average 2 weeks versus about 1 
week, P=0.0006) confirms clinicians' need for certainty, which takes time, before 
recommending a change in focus from 'cure' to palliative care. Clinicians may first exhaust all 
curative options, aimed at treating reversible conditions, before they consider palliative care. 
Tender loving care, keeping patients comfortable and providing supportive care were the most 
common injunctions to redirect treatment towards palliation. Palliation and analgesia were 
specifically ordered in only 1 in 10 patients and only 1 plan included a directive to change the 
goals of treatment. In view of the vagueness of these directives, it was helpful that two thirds of 
comfort care plans included specific instructions to withhold or withdraw particular interventions 
(investigations, blood products, and IV antibiotics for instance) or, as importantly, to add 
comfort measures such as morphine, HB02, and sedation to current treatment regimens. 
In keeping with other end of life decisions, namely DNR orders and identification of patients as 
dying, patients with comfort care plans were less likely to receive aggressive life-saving 
interventions such as CPR (P=0.0001), ventilation (P=0.0166) and inotropes (P=0.0412). 
Further, comfort care plans appeared to moderate the use of invasive procedures such as 
venipunctures (P=0.0146), and transfusions (P=0.0480). Impressively, comfort care plans 
significantly reduced the proportion of patients receiving IV fluids and IV antibiotics by 14% 
(P=0.0209) and 220/o (P=0.0013) respectively. Even though about three quarters and two 
thirds of patients continued to receive IV fluids and IV antibiotics, these findings nonetheless 
confirm the usefulness of comfort care plans in reducing the scale of aggressive life-saving and 
life-prolonging interventions in patients' last 24 hours of life. At the same time comfort care 
plans significantly stimulated use of analgesia: almost half the patients with comfort care plans 
received morphine in their final 24 hours (P=0.0487). 
4.2.3 Paediatric Intensive Care 
The potential for discrimination against children with HIV/AIDS is a moral concern. For 
example, Levin et afJ? provide compelling evidence of discriminatory attitudes favouring 
withholding of medically needed treatment, for non-HIV-related conditions, from infants infected 
with HIV. Responding to hypothetical scenarios, 98% of neonatologists recommended life-
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saving cardiac surgery for a neonate with duodenal atresia with no risk of HIV, but only 50% 
recommended such surgery for newborns known to be HIV-infected. The corresponding 
figures for chronic renal dialysis and resuscitation following cardiac arrest were 91% and 26% 
and 85% and 22% respectively. In contrast, neonatologists recommended IV fluids for both 
sets of patients, 99% and 93% respectively. Most respondents cited diminished quality of life 
as their main reason for non-treatment of HIV-infected infants. The highest median expected 
quality of life for these infants was lower than that for a premature infant weighing 625 grams at 
birth. Additionally, the median highest expected quality of life for an infant born to an HIV 
positive mother was equivalent to that of an infant with Down syndrome, yet most infants born 
to HIV positive mothers will have no disease. 
In general, social factors such as stigmatisation and extreme poverty make an HIV-infected 
infant's life particularly vulnerable to devaluation. In SA, if children are known to be HIV 
positive, they may be refused admission to some PICUs, for example Chris Hani Baragwanath 
Hospita1.121 It is therefore encouraging that almost 1 in 4 HIV-infected children with reversible 
illness in this study was admitted to the PICU during the course of their terminal hospitalisation. 
Moreover, the unstable physiological condition that prompted admission to the PICU resolved 
in a sizeable minority ( 16%) of children who were returned to general wards, although they died 
later in the hospitalisation. Twenty one percent of all deaths in this study occurred in the PICU. 
Comparable data of deaths in PICUs of children with other chronic diseases show considerable 
variation, for example 45% of cancer deathsB and 11% of CF deaths.9 Importantly, these data 
reflect practices in well-resourced countries. Arguably in SA given scarce resources and a 
poor prognostic outcome, comfort care is more appropriate for critically ill HIV-infected infants. 
Patients who died in the PICU in this study were on average 6 months younger than patients 
who died in the general wards (P=0.0003). Survival rates in a Cape Town-based sample57 
show that HIV-infected children diagnosed under 6 months of age have a significantly shorter 
median survival (10 months) compared with 36 months for children diagnosed at 7 to 12 
months of age. Younger infants in this sample had over a 4-fold greater risk of death than 
older children. HIV-infected children less than 6 months of age in Category C generally died 
within 2 months of diagnosis. These findings led Hussey and co-researchers to recommend 
palliative care in a primary care setting for HIV-infected children less than 6 months old with 
severe disease. They specifically recommend these children not be subject to hospital 
admission, and particularly not intensive or high care interventions. 
In turn, Klein and Zar132 argue that current data from developing countries on the long-term 
outcomes in HIV-infected children who receive intensive care do not support the exclusion of 
these children from admission to intensive care units solely because they are HIV positive. 
They identify 2 categories of HIV-infected children who can potentially benefit from intensive 
care: children with life-threatening conditions not considered complications of HIV infection (for 
example, croup), and children with life-threatening pneumonia and no clinical stigmata of AIDS. 
However, in line with Hussey et af,57 they do reject as futile (and cruel) admission of children 
with advanced AIDS who are failing to thrive and have potentially lethal conditions associated 
with terminal disease. 
At the time of death, 56% of patients in the PICU were under 6 months of age and fell in 
disease Category C. The HIV status of one quarter of these children was known prior to 
admission to the PICU. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to argue these patients should 
not have been admitted to the PICU in the first place. Against this it can be said these were 
critically ill patients who presented as medical emergencies and whose AIDS-defining illnesses 
were only diagnosed post-admission as patients rapidly deteriorated or who failed to respond to 
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intensive treatment. Thus decisions to admit these children were based on incomplete 
information. Severe respiratory disease accounted for three quarters of admissions to the 
PICU. Steroids were administered significantly more often in the last 24 hours of life among 
patients who died in the PICU. This suggests PCP pneumonia, an AIDS-defining illness, was 
suspected or confirmed in at least some of these patients. In a context of uncertainty, doctors 
adopted an individualised prognostic decision making strategy.13 Patients are admitted to the 
PICU and constantly re-evaluated, using information accumulated in the course of treatment, 
as to whether continuing treatment is likely to benefit the patients. Compared to the statistical 
prognostic strategy where decisions to treat are based on statistical prediction of a patient's 
likelihood of benefiting from treatment, the individualised strategy is morally preferable because 
it focuses on the situation of the particular patient whose life is at stake and thus comports with 
the ethical precept that treatment decisions should be based on an individualised assessment 
of the patient's best interests. Practically speaking this entails ongoing assessment of whether 
provision or withdrawal of treatment is in the patient's best interests. Importantly, the 
individualised approach focuses on particular patients, which entails agonising deliberations 
that are commensurate with the moral weight of the decisions involved. 13 Still, some may 
argue that in terms of time and energy allocated to decision making and the resources 
allocated to the resulting treatment, an individualised prognostic strategy, while ethically 
preferable is practically unfeasible. 
Ultimately, the increasing burden of HIV on scarce hospital resources may compel the PICU at 
RXH to develop admission and discharge59 criteria for HIV-infected children based on the best 
available evidence and following acceptable procedural guidelines. Arguably, in the interests of 
fairness, such criteria ought to be developed for all children admitted to PICUs because 
intensive care is a costly and scarce resource. However, decisions about which categories of 
patients should receive or be denied intensive care, based on considerations of resource use, 
are social policy deliberations and should only be made after considerable public discussion, 
not ad hoc at the bedside.60 In SA, macro-level policies to limit children's access to expensive 
tertiary services must consider Constitutional guarantees of equal access to basic health care 
services which in the case of chronically ill children, may include services beyond the minimum 
requirements defined in a basic health care package.133 Additionally, at the micro-level, a 
recent Constitutional Court judgement suggests administrative and distributive justice requires 
explicit justificatory criteria if access to limited resources is to be fair and transparent. 134 
As to be expected, once admitted to the PICU, these children received significantly more 
invasive interventions such as CPR, intubation, ventilation, A lines, CV lines and blood 
transfusions until the time of death (P=0.0000, P=0.0007, P=0.00000, P=0.0000, 0.0000). 
Similarly, patients in the PICU underwent more diagnostic procedures such as venipunctures 
and X-rays in the last 24 hours of life (P=0.0099 and P=0.0213). Physiotherapy is a routine 
intervention in the PICU and would explain the higher proportion of children receiving this 
treatment compared to children in general wards (P=0.0000). Likewise, as already noted, 
steroids are an essential adjuvant therapy if PCP pneumonia is suspected or diagnosed. 
In comparison, the care of the child identified as dying in the PICU requires a dramatic shift 
from rescue mode to approaches that recognise death's inevitability and focus on patient and 
family comfort. 86 Some hospitals have palliative care units for patients whose life-sustaining 
treatment is withdrawn, for example, the Butterfly Room at the University of Texas Medical 
Branch at Galveston. Wall-papered with butterflies, this home-like suite is quite different from 
other hospital wards and can be used for PICU patients who are expected to die within minutes 
to days following extubation. Children transferred to the Butterfly Room undergo no laboratory 
or invasive investigations, routine monitoring is discontinued and they receive only medications 
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that contribute to their comfort. Young patients are extubated whilst sitting on their parents' 
laps. 
One in 2 patients was identified as dying in the PICU and less than one third had a comfort 
care plan. Defining a comfort care plan in an intensive care setting is difficult. In this study a 
comfort care plan reflected a decision to extubate and focus on palliation: for example, comfort 
care plans stated 'Palliative care. Extubation. Morphine and midazolam to prevent agonal 
breathing', 'Supportive care. Change goals. Withdraw curative care. Morphine infusion', Keep 
comfortable with morphine and Valium. Withdraw curative treatment on grounds of futility'. One 
in 3 patients was extubated and removed from the ventilator prior to death. A decision to 
extubate was taken only after full discussion with a patient's parents. Extubation permitted the 
removal of unwanted machinery and parents were able to hold their child as he or she died. 
Prior to extubation, patients received a bolus infusion of morphine to reduce suffering and 
facilitate a peaceful death. 
Finally, decisions to stop ventilation are morally justified on several grounds.135 First, 
ventilation is generally meant as a temporary bridge until a patient recovers sufficiently to 
survive without ventilation. If a patient's condition deteriorates and it is apparent the patient will 
not be successfully weaned then continued ventilatory support becomes pointless. If 
ventilation serves only to prolong dying, it should be stopped. Second, continued ventilator 
support may be unduly burdensome if a patient is imminently dying. Measurement of pain and 
suffering in mechanically ventilated infants is not possible and the presence of ventilation 
equipment prevents cuddling and holding in the terminal stage of disease. Thus ventilation 
impairs communication. Third, the economic cost of mechanical ventilation, coupled with 
intensive care, may be questioned when patients are imminently dying. 
In summary, well over 80% of patients had a DNR order, which prevented inappropriate 
resuscitation and ventilation. In turn, patients with no specified restriction on treatment 
received all medically indicated interventions, including CPR and ventilation. Fifty percent of 
patients were identified as dying and appropriately were less likely to receive life prolonging 
interventions such as CPR, whilst being more likely to receive morphine. Although only 2 in 5 
patients had a comfort care plan, these orders prevented patients from receiving aggressive 
life-saving interventions, reduced the scale of patients receiving IV therapies and increased the 
likelihood of morphine use. Almost one quarter of patients with reversible illness were admitted 
to the PICU during their terminal hospitalisation, suggesting that intensive care was not 
withheld from patients if it were felt they would benefit from intensive care-based interventions. 
Still, despite these positive findings, there is considerable room for improvement in terminal 
care as indicated by data presented in the following section. 
4.3 End of Life Decisions: Negative Findings 
4.3.1 Do Not Resuscitate Orders 
RXH does not have a formal DNR policy. Hence decisions not to resuscitate depend on the 
clinical judgement of those caring for the patient. If such discretion is to be justified, it must be 
against a background of acceptable moral principles and guidelines. To this end, general 
procedural requirements that should accompany these orders are provided by, among others, 
the AAP18 and the RCPCH.21 In South Africa the Consensus Statement by the Bioethics 
Centre at Groote Schuur Hospital62 recommends all decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment 
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be fully and clearly documented in the notes, together with the rationale for the decision, and 
procedures followed in reaching the decision. In addition, decision making at the end of life 
should result from joint consultation between health care professionals, patients and families 
who may hold a range of cultural and religious beliefs. 
The RCPCH21 advises that the consultant-in-charge and a senior colleague (a nurse or a social 
worker) discuss the decision with parents and the child (as far as he or she is able). 
Furthermore, if parents are to be fully involved they need adequate time and information to 
understand and assess the information and obtain alternative advice if they so choose. Whilst 
the final decision is made with parental consent, generally the clinical team takes main 
responsibility for the decision to alleviate any burden of guilt parents may feel. In the British 
context, Doyal and Wishler65 argue that consent could probably be waived in situations where 
the probability of successful resuscitation approaches zero. In such situations CPR can rightly 
be considered futile, and it is not part of a doctor's duty to administer useless or harmful 
treatment. 
Practically speaking, failure to document and communicate decisions adequately means 
decisions such as those not to resuscitate will be made by default and frequently by persons 
least familiar with the patient.135 Responsibility for participation in resuscitation decisions may 
change daily in teaching hospitals and potential misunderstanding increases with numbers of 
doctors, nurses and other allied professionals responsible for patient care.130, 135 For example, 
Uhlmann et a~ 35 compared the original treatment withholding intentions of physicians who 
wrote DNR orders with the subsequent interpretation of the orders by cross-covering 
physicians. The set of interventions to be withheld was unique in 91% of cases. Although CPR 
(100%), mechanical ventilation (93%), intensive care (86%) and inotropes (77%) were the most 
commonly intended interventions to be withheld, physicians also intended blood transfusions 
(45%), antibiotics (23%), oxygen (20%) and IV fluids (14%) to be withheld. Whereas 
concordance was generally good for CPR (93%), ventilation (98%), intensive care (82%) and 
inotropes (75%), cross-covering physicians were far less likely to withhold blood transfusions 
(20%), antibiotics and oxygen (2% respectively). Unsurprisingly, the authors concluded that 
specific interventions to be withheld be explicitly documented in a readily accessible format and 
location. 
In short, legal and ethical guidelines65 require that DNR orders be clear and explicit, that a 
basis for the decision be documented, that the DNR order not affect provision of other 
appropriate care and, in the case of children, the parents' consent is obtained. Findings in this 
study highlight serious shortcomings in the documentation of DNR orders, which therefore fail 
to meet the best practice standards. 
Compared with equivalent medical records, in over half the nursing records there was no 
documentation that a particular patient was not for resuscitation, and where DNR orders did 
appear contemporaneously, terminology was inconsistent in 45% of cases. For example, 16% 
of patients with DNR orders were described as 'Not for IPPV' by the clinicians and 'Not for 
active resuscitation' by the nurses. It can only be speculated whether it was intended that 
ambubagging, ventilation, or both be withheld. Likewise, 'Not for CPR', 'Not for active 
resuscitation', 'Not for Red Box' and 'Not for ambubagging' were used interchangeably. If 
these terms are equivalent instructions and understood as such by all clinical team members, 
then DNR orders using these terms are indeed similar in intent if not language. Yet, Uhlmann 
et a~ 35 report disagreement between physicians over the meaning of CPR, let alone 
substituting other terms which might or might not have equivalent meanings. DNR orders 
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instructing 'No heroics', 'No active management' or 'No active treatment' were so broad as to 
render them meaningless. Fortunately they occurred in only 2% of cases. 
That a DNR order appeared simultaneously in only 2 in 5 medical and nursing notes should not 
be surprising given an earlier finding that doctors at RXH sought nurses' opinions about 
resuscitation in only 39% of cases.s1 It seems reasonable to conclude that nothing has 
changed. Yet decisions on resuscitation should not be made unilaterally. Nurses, in daily 
contact with patients, are well placed to advise on a patient's medical condition. Moreover, in 
the absence of a written DNR order, not calling a "Red Box' could place a nurse in an 
indefensible medico-legal position. In addition to reducing communication errors, shared 
decision making is likely to lead to better end of life decision making generally. For example, 
the RCPCH21 proposes that all team members have an opportunity to voice their opinions 
about patient care although the consultant-in-charge of the case bears the final responsibility 
for decision making. Wisely, the College recognises that such discussions provide a valuable 
learning experience as senior team members interpret information that is shared in light of their 
previous experience whilst openly evaluating any new interpretations that are offered. 
Although over half the DNR orders appeared prominently in the front of the medical notes, in 
the remaining folders in the event of an arrest, a doctor, unfamiliar with a patient, who tries to 
establish the patient's resuscitation status would face a time-consuming search of a patient's 
entire medical record. Nor could the doctor confidently rely on a nurse's knowledge because in 
about 50% of cases they have no record at all. In 2 instances, doctors-in-training documented 
their plight trying to establish a patient's DNR status. Their concern is justified by the finding 
that 6% of patients identified as dying had no accompanying DNR order. Arguably in the 
absence of a specified order restricting treatment, these patients would have received full 
medical treatment despite their terminal status. Furthermore, patients' suitability for 
resuscitation should be reviewed on every consultant ward round taking account of the views of 
all staff caring for the patient. Yet, contrary to accepted practice, junior doctors relied on DNR 
orders from previous admissions in 6% of cases. Finally, decisions not to resuscitate require 
clinical and ethical justification, yet approximately 40% of DNR orders in this study had no 
documented rationale. This is contrary to best practice standards recommended by the AAP, 18 
RCPCH21 and the Consensus Statement of the Bioethics Centre at Groote Schuur Hospital.62 
These combined shortcomings may account for 7 ( 17%) resuscitation attempts despite 
standing DNR orders. Such communication errors needlessly submit terminally ill children to 
highly invasive and inappropriate interventions. To be sure, miscommunication in any other 
category of doctors' orders, such as drug prescriptions, would not as easily go unnoticed. 
Published data for children who died in hospital show uniformly high rates (>90%-100%) of 
documented discussion between clinicians and parents of treatment limitations.9, 27, 28, 33 In 
comparison, in this study, documentation of a discussion of a DNR order with parents or a 
guardian occurred in less than 40% of cases. There are several possible explanations for this 
finding. Doctors may indeed have discussed DNR decisions with parents and simply failed to 
record the fact. Parents, many of whom are poverty-stricken, may have visited infrequently and 
the decision not to resuscitate needed to be taken urgently. Language barriers may have 
impeded communication. No matter the probable reasons, decisions about children should be 
taken in consultation with parents with due regard for their values, beliefs and preferences. 
The presumption is that parents make end of life decisions according to the best interests of 
their child, and have crucial knowledge of non-medical factors affecting those interests. 
If DNR orders mean no resuscitation or ventilation if a patient arrests, then clinicians should 
also consider and clearly document what is to be done regarding patients' other concurrent 
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medical needs.67 Importantly, a DNR order can be compatible with either maximal therapy 
short of resuscitation if these measures benefit the patients, or alternatively a DNR order may 
imply a patient ought to be allowed to die peacefully without any further diagnostic tests or 
curative interventions. Writing a DNR order should prompt clinicians to rethink all the goals of 
therapy.54 Frequently the limitation of many other therapeutic interventions is appropriate and 
may even be preferred by the family.67 Other positive steps such as adjustment of analgesia 
may also be appropriate. Additionally, attention to other treatment issues at the time of writing 
a DNR order may allay parents' fears that a DNR order implies no care at all and that the child 
will not be abandoned. 
To this end, several studies have confirmed the usefulness of structured and procedure-
specific DNR orders to minimise problems of communication and misinterpretation,6B-72 and 
improve quality of end of life care.67 Whilst there is only 1 anecdotal report16 of a structured 
paediatric DNR order in use in the Children's Hospital in Boston, a specific treatment plan to 
accompany the DNR decision including interventions to be withheld, withdrawn or initiated 
constitutes sound clinical practice. Ideally the family and clinical team would mutually agree on 
this plan. In turn, the procedure-specific DNR form would promote accurate and consistent 
communication of these decisions once they have been made. To broaden the focus beyond 
the DNR order, Fins et al54 developed a structured treatment plan or Goal Assessment Tool. 
4.3.2 Evidence of Dying 
Doctors' prognostication is central to end of life decision making. If doctors are to administer 
appropriate care to a terminally ill child, they must first identify the child as dying. For example, 
a clinician's prognostic assessment that a child is terminal is necessary when deciding to 
withhold or withdraw life-saving interventions. Yet of the 165 patients who died in this study 
only 50% had documented evidence of dying. This was far fewer than the number of DNR 
orders prior to death (84% ). There are several possible reasons to account for this finding. 
Self-evidently, not all patients who die are terminally ill. On admission some patients who later 
die may require management that differs from terminal care. As previously mentioned, in the 
face of uncertainty much aggressive care will appear to have been non-beneficial only after 
death, when the perspective is quite different. With this in mind it is to clinicians' credit that 2 in 
5 patients who died within a mere 3 days of admission were identified as dying. Doctors took 
on average 8 days to identify as dying patients with lengths of stay between 1 and 2 weeks. 
Patients in the longest length of stay quartile ( 16+ days) were not labelled as terminal until well 
over 3 weeks post-admission. Thus at one end of the spectrum about 1 in 4 patients has a 
short period of rapid decline and dies within days of admission, at the other end long stay 
patients follow a slowly dwindling course to death. These different trajectories confirm the 
unpredictable course of HIV/AIDS and clinicians may find it difficult to know for certain if a 
patient has reached a terminal phase. Whether further aggressive therapy is warranted in a 
seriously ill patient is one of the most difficult decisions a clinician makes daily. Faced with 
clinical uncertainty, 91.7% of a randomly selected sample of internists in the US were reluctant 
to make predictions about a patient's illness.136 Thus it is not surprising that patients identified 
as dying in this study were more likely to fall in Category C (P=0.0049) and to have on average 
4 days longer in hospital than patients without evidence of dying (P=0.0250). These data 
suggest doctors wanted reassurance that patients had clinical AIDS. In turn, severity (i.e. 
Category C disease) was associated with longer hospital stays (P=0.0056) and ELISA positive 
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status at the time of admission (P=0.0005). Both these findings may have decreased 
prognostic uncertainty. 
Alternatively, doctors may have considered DNR orders as proxy measures of death. 
Therefore, evidence of dying may have been implicit in many patients with DNR orders but no 
documented evidence of dying. After all, most rationales underpinning DNR orders were 
premised on imminent death, and for at least half the patients, evidence of dying was 
documented within 1 day of issuing a DNR order. Indeed, Faber-Langendoen40 considers a 
DNR order a logical first step in the process of forgoing life-saving treatment: if a patient is 
recognised as dying despite full treatment of the underlying disease, the patient ought not to be 
rescued when death occurs. In short, doctors may have felt more psychologically comfortable 
issuing an abbreviated DNR order (for instance Not for IPPV) than explicitly labelling a child as 
terminally ill or dying. Clinicians may avoid applying an honest label to a situation if they think 
negative outcomes will result.137 Only 1 in 10 patients in this study was referred to as 'dying' 
per se. Moreover, survey findings from the US show most (85.6%) physicians feel it is more 
helpful to have an 'upbeat attitude' in discussions with patients and families, and only 5% would 
reinforce families' pessimistic perceptions.136 (p. 2391) 
Writing about their experiences trying to recruit subjects for a research pilot study in palliative 
care, Davis and Steele13B were struck by some clinicians' resistance to identifying children as 
terminal even though these children were receiving palliative care for advanced cancer. 
Clinicians' main concern was that mothers would lose hope if the possibility of the child's death 
were openly acknowledged. Clinicians feared involvement in research would focus parents' 
attention on the child's death to the detriment of the child's quality of life during the limited time 
remaining. However, these authors rejected the doctors' explanation on grounds that mothers 
were denied the opportunity to make their own choices, parents' ill-conceived notions of 
palliative care as 'hopeless' care would be reinforced, and open discussion of a sensitive topic 
such as dying would be inhibited. 
On the contrary, families can still be hopeful if goals of care are reoriented from a focus on cure 
to a focus on short-term achievements or any experiences that give meaning to the dying 
process. Importantly, in a culturally diverse society, identifying a dying child as dying 
acknowledges the situation and allows time for culturally dependent family rituals.139 In this 
study, knowledge that their child was dying may have ensured more parents were at the 
bedside at the time of death. Forty five percent of children died with no family present. 
Research shows parents may deeply regret not being present when their child dies and those 
who are present benefit from the experience.84 
Whilst it is commonly believed physicians know, or at least have the potential to know their 
patients are dying, evidence suggests doctors' prognostic assessments are often wrong and 
systematically overoptimistic. Indeed, Christakis and Lamont140 found doctors overestimated 
survival by a factor of 5.3. In other words, if all the predictions had been divided by 2 they 
would have been marginally more accurate. Moreover, only 1 in 5 predictions was accurate. 
Adult AIDS patients were the least likely to have correct predictions. In keeping with these 
findings, some doctors in the present study may have overoptimistically assessed patients' 
chances of survival and therefore not identified them as dying. Worryingly, excessive optimism 
may cause doctors to delay use of palliative care and analgesia, and to persist in aggressive 
and pointless interventions aimed prolonging life. 
Finally, data on doctors' self-reported attitudes show they dislike prognostication.136 It is 
stressful, difficult and some feel ill equipped. For instance, over 90% of internists found it far 
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harder to make an accurate prognosis of the course of a patient's disease than to make an 
accurate diagnosis. Whereas only a minority (7%) felt inadequately trained in diagnosis, over 
half (56.8%) felt inadequately trained in prognosis. To be expected, physicians respond by 
avoiding prognostication in the first place. Analogously, if prognostication is difficult and 
stressful for internists, it is surely as difficult and stressful, if not more so, for doctors caring for 
children. Over two thirds of paediatric oncologists reported anxiety at having to tell parents 
their child was likely to die soon.B5 Feelings of anxiety were described as 'very strong' in one 
third of these respondents. Furthermore, one quarter of paediatric oncologists rated dealing 
with dying children as the worst part of their job. Most patients in the present study were under 
12 months of age, so doctors may have been even more reluctant to 'give up', a reluctance 
fuelled by prognostic and in some cases diagnostic uncertainty. 
Although most research implies doctors are responsible for faulty and inaccurate 
communication at the end of life, recent data indicate doctors are only partially responsible. 
Wolfe and her team113 show parents reached an understanding that their child was dying and 
had no realistic chance of cure from cancer 3 months after explicit documentation of the fact by 
the primary oncologists. However, when both clinicians and parents recognised early on that a 
child had no hope of recovery, elements of palliative care were more likely to be integrated into 
the treatment plan. Paediatric oncologists also confirm families' unrealistic expectations and 
denial as causing the most difficulty in delivering appropriate end of life care.as Efforts to 
improve the quality of care at the end of life ought therefore to focus on facilitating earlier 
recognition and acknowledgement by both clinicians and parents that an illness is fatal and the 
prognosis uniformly poor. To this end, Wolfe and colleagues113 were cautiously optimistic to 
find that the presence of a social worker or psychologist was linked to greater concordance in 
the timing of clinicians' and parents' understanding that a child had no realistic chance of cure. 
They tentatively speculate that an interdisciplinary approach enhances communication of lethal 
outcomes and palliative options. Although still preliminary, this finding nonetheless suggests 
social workers may play a valuable mediating role in communicating painful prognostic 
information. Since most (95%) patients in the present study were Black, language may have 
constituted a formidable barrier to dialogue. Social workers, through interpreters if necessary, 
can assist doctors in delivering sensitive information. Yet there was documented social work 
involvement in less than 40% of records. That only one third of contacts focussed on supportive 
counselling, which presumably included discussion of prognosis, is of equal concern. 
In short, clinicians and parents need to acknowledge a child is dying, the sooner the better. 
Although some error in prognostication is unavoidable, excessive optimism may adversely 
affect patient care and may lead to inappropriate interventions to preserve a child's life even 
when the child is dying. For example, patients not identified as dying in this study were 
significantly more likely to be resuscitated (P=0.0018), to receive life-prolonging therapies such 
as Ringers lactate (P=0.0255) and inotropes (P=0.0335) and were significantly less likely to 
receive morphine (P=0.0000) in their last 24 hours of life. Transition to palliative care requires, 
among others, that clinicians confront the prognosis and their uncertainties about it, contend 
with possible parental denial or unrealistic expectations for cure (because aggressive treatment 
may have worked in the past), and weigh parents' distress at having their child labelled as 
dying. 
4.3.3 Comfort Care Plans and Interventions in the Last 24 Hours of Life 
Whilst it mirrors current practice in many acute care hospitals, it is unfortunate the medical 
model and the palliative model are portrayed as polar opposites. The medical model 
concentrates solely on the goal of cure and in the process neglects medicine's other goals such 
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as relief of suffering.141 Additionally, the curative model is characterised by a distinctly 
analytical and rationalistic set of assumptions. For instance, clinical concerns are approached 
as puzzles to be solved and clinical encounters are opportunities for scientific inquiry. 
According to this view, cure is conditional on accurate diagnosis and treatment, which in turn is 
directed more towards the underlying causes of illness than outward manifestations such as 
symptoms. Likewise, treatments considered successful improve objective disease-related 
outcomes such as infection-free survival, whereas treatments that improve subjective and non-
specific outcomes such as quality of life are deemed less important. If cure is the overriding 
goal of medical care, clinical investigation is seldom complete until the underlying 
pathophysiology is understood. According to the medical model, diagnosis and treatment are 
necessary and desired. Logically it follows that if a disease cannot be stopped or slowed down, 
a patient may be seen as 'untreatable' or 'beyond help'. As one comfort plan in this study 
disconsolately declared, 'TLC. Nothing more can be done for this baby'. Where cure is the 
overarching goal, death is the ultimate failure. Fifty percent of paediatric oncologists reported 
feelings of failure at the prospect of a patient dying within 6 months. 
In contrast, the palliative model is concerned with the total care of patients whose diseases 
cannot be cured. Among its primary goals are relief of suffering and symptom control. It is 
zealously concerned with pain management even though pain may not be definitively verified 
or explained. In comparison, in the medical model, the uncertainty and subjectivity of an 
infant's pain and suffering pose a substantial barrier to accessing analgesia. According to the 
palliative model, a specific treatment is appropriate only if it is worthwhile from the patient's 
perspective, in other words it must be in the patient's best interests. As death approaches, the 
focus of palliative care includes the physical, social, psychological and spiritual needs of 
patients and their families. Thus on the face of it the curative and the palliative model seem 
unconnected.141 
Eighty four percent of patients had a DNR order justified on grounds of imminent death. Purists 
in the palliative tradition might reasonably argue that if children were dying, which about half did 
within 2 days of issuing the DNR order, they should have received only palliative care. Yet 
examination of interventions in the last 24 hours of life shows impressive numbers of children 
continued to receive invasive diagnostic and therapeutic interventions even though they were 
imminently dying. Overall, for example, at least three quarters of patients received IV 
therapies, one quarter had blood drawn for diagnostic purposes and about one fifth received 
ventilatory support in their last 24 hours. Almost certainly this was harmful and contrary to 
these patients' best interests. 
Fox convincingly proposes that no one model is ideal for all patients in all clinical 
circumstances. Rather the most suitable model reflects individual patients' needs and goals. 
For most patients, neither a purely curative nor a purely palliative model is altogether suitable. 
Writes Fox, 'Between the curative model and the palliative model lies an unnamed approach 
that supports all legitimate goals of medicine ... and is willing to combine them in whatever 
manner best reflects the values of the individual patient'. (p. 763) 
For argument's sake, a mainly curative approach is properly applied to very sick patients with 
or without a confirmed diagnosis, who present with reversible components of disease. Patients 
in this study most likely to receive invasive diagnostic therapeutic and PICU-based 
interventions in their final 24 hours were significantly younger (IV fluids, P=0.0389; IV 
antibiotics, P=0.0024; ventilation, P=0.0014; intubation, P=0.0058 and steroids, P=0.0034), 
with shorter lengths of stay (IV fluids, P=0.0023; IV antibiotics, P=0.0009, Ringers lactate, 
P=0.0018, inotropes, P=0.0006; N-G tubes, P=0.0277; transfusions, P=0.0009, venipunctures, 
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P=0.0004 and X-rays, P=0.0168) and classified in disease Category B (IV antibiotics, 
P=0.0068; Ringers lactate, P=0.0000; inotropes, P=0.0001; intubation, P=0.0034; 
venipunctures, P=0.0000 and X-rays, P=0.0000). In general, median ages of patients who 
received these interventions were low (between 3 and 4 months) and median lengths of stay 
were short (2 to 6 days). On admission, HIV positivity of Category B patients was unlikely to be 
proven. Further, the terminal hospitalisation may have been the first hospital admission in 
many Category B patients. In sum, clinicians had to make crucial medical decisions about 
gravely ill infants in the presence of immense clinical uncertainty. 
Several clinical manifestations of HIV disease are associated with early age and determine the 
intensity of treatment regimens. PCP pneumonia, a common initial presentation of HIV/AIDS, 
peaks in incidence between 4 and 6 months. The first episode of PCP pneumonia may be 
fatal. Early diagnosis of PCP pneumonia can be difficult and often relies on empirical trials of 
therapy. If suspected, then IV antibiotics must be instituted immediately. Indeed, IV antibiotic 
therapy should be started as soon as a diagnosis of PCP pneumonia is considered and should 
not wait until a definitive diagnosis is made. In patients with PCP pneumonia and acute 
respiratory failure, there is a markedly improved survival rate associated with adjuvant 
corticosteroid therapy.132 Emergency evaluation of respiratory failure requires, among others, a 
complete blood count and differential, induced sputum for bacterial culture and a chest X-ray. 
Patients with suspected PCP pneumonia must be monitored closely. Deterioration in clinical 
status or a failure to improve within 24 to 72 hours should prompt reconsideration of the 
underlying diagnosis. Diarrhoea, acute or chronic, is another common problem in HIV-infected 
children. Acute diarrhoea can cause dehydration, especially if accompanied by vomiting and 
fever. Chronic diarrhoea and wasting may make an HIV-infected child more prone to 
dehydration from an intercurrent infection. Dehydration requires aggressive treatment with IV 
fluids, including bolus doses of resuscitation fluid such as Ringers lactate, and vasopressor 
support if necessary. An N-G tube may be needed to relieve abdominal distension. After fluid 
resuscitation, fluid and electrolyte deficits should be replaced intravenously over a period of 24 
to 48 hours, and over 48 to 72 hours if patients were hypernatremic. 
In short, the intensity of diagnostic and therapeutic interventions received by many infants in 
disease Category B within 1 week of admission is dictated and justified on grounds of clinical 
uncertainty, a high likelihood of PCP pneumonia and treatment regimens whose efficacy 
requires prompt intravenous administration of medications over a minimum of several days. 
The rapidity of deterioration, coupled with uncertainty, likely made a decision to stop curative 
care in favour of palliative care difficult despite the fact these children later died. 
That said, of patients who suffered pain and distress in their final 48 hours, 57% (N=41) were 
aged 5 or less months, 47% (N=34) had lengths of stay less than 1 week, and 36% (N=25) fell 
in disease Category B. (Appendices 11 and 12) If infants show severe symptoms of distress 
such as shortness of breath or oral or abdominal pain, analgesia ought to be added to their 
treatment regimen even though the primary goals of intervention at this early stage are aimed 
at reaching a diagnosis and management of intercurrent illness. Yet, findings show patients 
most likely to receive morphine and Panado had significantly longer lengths of stay (median >1 
week, P=0.0455) and fell in disease Category C (46% versus 22%, P=0.0052). Conversely, 
patients who died without a comfort care plan were significantly younger (median ages of 4 
months versus 6 months, P=0.0052) and had far shorter terminal hospitalisations (5 days 
versus 9 days, P= 0.0006). 
Because it is not possible consistently and accurately to p~edict the timing of death, it may be 
necessary to integrate palliative care early in a patient's course of illness, often in the face of 
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substantial clinical uncertainty. Importantly, parents may not have to fully acknowledge their 
child's poor prognosis to be willing to accept palliative treatments that lessen suffering. Wolfe 
et a~13 show that parents of children with advanced cancer concurrently accepted dual goals of 
cure and symptom relief to reduce suffering, and curative therapy to extend life. In similar vein, 
Robinson and colleagues9 offer a 'mixture' of preventive, therapeutic and palliative care to their 
dying CF patients, 86%, 75% and 72% of whom respectively received opiates, IV antibiotics 
and vitamin preparations in the last 12 hours of life. They viewed this multifaceted approach as 
'a viable alternative to the comfort care paradigm'. (p. 208) Likewise, Oleske and Czarniecki89 
advocate the early introduction of palliative care in tandem with antiretroviral therapies and 
treatment of opportunistic infections for HIV-infected children. They reject the view that 
palliative care should be reserved for end of life care when curative treatment is no longer 
possible. 
Whilst these views appear incompatible with the traditional model of palliative care that involves 
a definitive transition from curative to supportive care, there is a growing consensusB7, 89 that 
among patients with life-threatening illness, accompanied by prognostic uncertainty, palliative 
care should be integrated early and concomitantly with treatment of underlying disease. 
Theoretically there may be nothing wrong with focusing narrowly on a single goal of medicine, 
be it cure or palliation. In practice, as data from this study show, overreliance on a single, 
especially curative approach, can have unanticipated consequences such as unrelieved pain 
and distress at the time of death. 
However, the conclusion that some patients warranted a mixed management approach is a 
limited one. Many other patients, at least 44% according to instructions in doctors' notes, 
required comfort measures only. Doctors ordered these patients receive TLC, supportive care, 
conservative management and the like. If documentation of a comfort care plan signals a 
major shift in management goals from prolonging life to a primary concern for comfort, a 
complete reassessment of patients' care should follow: from diagnostic investigations, to 
medications, to discontinuing therapies that do not contribute to the goals of palliation. Yet of 
patients with comfort care plans, 73% continued to receive IV fluids, 15% and 13% respectively 
underwent venipunctures and X-rays for diagnostic purposes, and almost twice as many 
patients received IV rather than oral antibiotics in their final 24 hours of life (62% versus 33%). 
Patients with a comfort plan were as likely as those without to receive oral feeds only slightly 
more likely to receive morphine close to death. 
Although not examined in relation to presence of a comfort care plan, only 22% and 2% 
respectively of parents received bereavement counselling from social workers or spiritual 
intervention during their terminal hospitalisation. Arguably, the need for spiritual and 
bereavement support is an individual matter best decided by parents themselves. Meert et a/84 
found a minority of parents participated in a Bereavement Support Group held at the hospital 
where their child died. Reasons given for not attending included lack of transport, not wanting 
to return to the place where their child died, and no need to attend. Still, these services should 
be offered to parents who feel they can benefit from them. 
Overall, designating patients to receive comfort care did not always correspond well with the 
care subsequently given, indicating that this decision alone does not translate into a 
consistently palliative care plan. 
Of great concern, was the finding that the presence of a comfort care plan made no difference 
whatsoever to the end of life care received by patients in the longest length of stay quartile 
(16+ days). That said, decisions to withhold medical treatments such as IV antibiotics and IV 
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fluids, though taken infrequently, were most likely to occur in this category of patients. Still, 
these patients had to wait over 3 weeks on average before a decision to withhold a medical 
intervention was made. By the same token, doctors took over 3 weeks to identify these 
patients as dying and to issue comfort care plans. It can only be speculated why decision 
making was delayed in these patients, 87% of whom had clinical AIDS. The advanced stage of 
HIV disease in children is characterised by multiple complications from opportunistic infections 
and resistant organisms requiring aggressive treatment regimens with IV medications spanning 
weeks. 142 Several organ systems may be affected producing many symptoms. Children who 
appear terminal can rally and live for months, whereas others die suddenly and unexpectedly. 
Moreover, experience with HIV disease is relatively limited and clinicians may be more willing 
to accept a greater burden of treatment to provide patients an opportunity for a longer life, and 
the possibility of future beneficial treatments. Thus quality of life issues may conflict with 
treatment decisions as clinicians trouble over whether treating a current complication will 
extend life or merely prolong dying. Plus, after long hospitalisations, doctors may be even 
more reluctant to acknowledge that patients, they have come to know well, are close to death. 
However, as the burdens of treatment escalate, other important moral considerations must be 
brought to bear on decision making. Prolonging life cannot be the only goal. Comfort too must 
receive priority. 
Continued aggressive care and inadequate symptom control, particularly in long stay patients, 
where diagnostic and prognostic uncertainty is less problematic, raise several ethical dilemmas 
relating to restriction of life-sustaining treatment. As a rule, the best interest standard 
determines medical decision making for children. This entails providing treatment that 
preserves life and confers net benefit over harm.24 Because treatment choices must be 
considered in relation to patients' overall condition, even though some treatments offer a 
reasonable expectation of physiological benefit, they may be withheld or withdrawn from 
patients who are dying. It follows that in certain clinical circumstances, a child with multiple 
organ failure for example, many treatments may be more burdensome than beneficial, thus 
futile. Still, even if clinical conditions for non-treatment in paediatric HIV/AIDS were carefully 
defined, decisions about what constitute best interests, and benefits and burdens, involve 
normative judgements as well as scientific fact and may be controversial. A gravely ill child 
may be on several types of life-sustaining interventions, any of which might be withdrawn. 
Clinicians planning to withdraw support must therefore make choices and their decisions may 
influence the rapidity, painlessness and dignity of patients' deaths.40-44 Nor should parental 
costs of false hope, delayed anticipatory grieving and visual memories of their child invaded by 
technology be discounted. 
The use of antibiotics in the last few days or weeks of life is particularly complex. 
Approximately two thirds and one third of patients with a comfort care plan respectively 
received IV or oral antibiotics in their last 24 hours of life. Decisions are difficult because it is 
not possible to definitively predict whether antibiotics will cure an opportunistic infection or, 
conversely, whether withholding them will result in earlier death. Antibiotics do not fall neatly 
into the category of life-sustaining treatments such as mechanical ventilation or enteral feeding. 
Sometimes it is hard to draw the line between what is life prolonging and what is symptom 
management. For instance, antibiotics may be considered part of palliation if life-threatening 
infections produce uncomfortable symptoms such as dyspnoea and cough in respiratory 
disease.143 However, the rational use of antibiotics may lead to added burdens in the form of 
diagnostic tests and IV lines. Those (more often bioethicists than clinicians78) who feel there is 
no moral distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatment would likely recommend 
starting antibiotic therapy. If after several days treatment proves ineffective, it becomes 
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pointless to continue and may be withdrawn. Still, clinicians with a bias to treat may persevere 
since failure to treat, or a decision to stop treatment, is seen as abandonment. The distinction 
between not starting and stopping treatment is difficult to defend and may even be harmful if it 
leads to decisions not to begin treatments that may be useful, in order to reduce the risk of 
being locked into a treatment that cannot be terminated. Twenty-three out of 24 patients in the 
long stay quartile received IV or oral antibiotics, confirming the psychological and symbolic, if 
not philosophical, significance of this distinction. 
The findings that almost 80% and 66% of patients with comfort care plans received IV fluids 
and N-G feeding, compared to 16% who received oral feeds, suggests decisions regarding 
artificial nutrition and hydration may be even more controversial, given the strong emotional 
and cultural associations that attach to food and liquid. Although it is argued that artificial 
nutrition and hydration must be given because they represent humane care, this is not an 
accurate analogy. Unlike eating and drinking, medically provided nutrition and hydration lack 
the pleasurable oral sensations and interpersonal contact associated with food and fluid intake, 
especially in infants and young children.144 In addition, they are medical interventions that 
carry complications such as oedema, erosion of mucosa, increased respiratory secretions, and 
discomfort and risk of infection from IV lines. Indeed, the presence of an N-G feeding tube or 
passing a new tube would likely increase the burden of suffering among the almost 40% of 
children with painful oral and oesophageal candidiasis. The burden of technology was 
illustrated by an entry in the nurses' notes which indicated a 271h month old child had to be 
' ... restrained because she is pulling oxygen tube out of her nose' (Record 48). 
Artificial nutrition and hydration requires skilled nursing. Paradoxically, availability of skilled 
nursing and time pressures in acute hospitals may lead to overuse of artificial nutrition and 
hydration.144 If replacing an empty drip is less time consuming than hand feeding an irritable 
infant, then artificial feeding may do more to lessen the load of nursing staff than to provide 
humane care to dying children. According to nursing records, mothers were present during the 
greater part of terminal hospitalisations and would surely have benefited from the opportunity to 
hand feed their dying children. Feeding by hand is an act of nurturing. Likewise, during hand 
feeding the caregiver may be more attentive and affectionate, talking to and playing with the 
child. The psychological effects of feeding techniques are especially important when the goal 
of care is palliation.144 Similarly, mothers were well placed to manage adverse symptoms such 
as thirst and dry mouth through provision of sips of liquid and good mouth care. 
If artificial nutrition and hydration only prolong the dying process in an imminently dying child, 
which in turn prolongs any suffering to the patient, then treatment produces more harm than 
good. In such circumstances limiting artificial nutrition and hydration can be justified on 
grounds of beneficence. However, this is a qualified conclusion that must take account of 
consent.145 If parents are able to contribute to decision making, then the decision to withdraw 
treatment, in particular artificial nutrition and hydration, should be discussed with them. Such a 
decision should not ordinarily be implemented if there are strong parental objections. Because 
decisions to limit life-sustaining interventions are difficult, doctors should consider clinical 
review by an impartial senior clinician who is not part of the treatment team. 
4.3.4 Presence of Pain and Distress in Last 48 Hours of Life 
Consistent with previous reports of pain in children with HIV/AIDS,39 pain and distress in the 
last 48 hours of life, documented mainly in the nursing notes (53%), occurred in over half 
(72/131) the patients who died in the general wards. Respiratory symptomatology and oral and 
oesophageal candidiasis were the most common sources of suffering occurring in 
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approximately one half and two fifths of patients with documented pain and distress. Despite 
documentation of pain and suffering, 28% of long stay patients waited on average 31 days 
before receiving their 1st dose of morphine. Once again, of the 20 patients in this quartile with 
evidence of pain and distress in their last 48 hours, documentation of suffering mostly 
appeared in nurses' notes only (70% of cases) (Appendices 11 and 12). If procedural pain 
associated with venipunctures and insertion of IV lines had been measured, the prevalence of 
pain in patients in their last 48 hours of life would likely have been much higher. According to 1 
nursing entry, 12 hours before the patient died, 'Registrar and consultant tried all afternoon to 
resite the drip'. It also worth noting that in tertiary hospitals often the least experienced person 
has to perform diagnostic procedures such as drawing blood. 
About one half (38/72) of patients with pain and distress had a documented comfort care plan. 
Despite evidence of pain and distress, only 1 in 5 patients without a comfort care plan received 
morphine in the last 24 hours of life (Appendix 10). International guidelines on palliative care 
specifically reject rigid distinctions between curative, life-prolonging care and palliative care 
precisely because they hinder timely and appropriate provision of palliation to dying children. 
In the face of clinical uncertainty, a mixed management approach, which combines the goals of 
cure and palliation, was clinically and morally indicated in these patients with no comfort care 
plans. For example, in addition to prescribing Nystatin for candidiasis, and antibiotics, oxygen 
therapy and nebulisation for respiratory distress, administration of morphine may have reduced 
some of the suffering experienced by these patients, as well as the anguish of parents who 
accompanied them through the dying process. 
If achievement of the best quality of life and relief of pain and other symptoms are fundamental 
goals of palliative care, palliation failed in at least 2 in 5 patients with comfort care plans. 
Despite documented pain and distress, these patients received no analgesia whatsoever in 
their last 48 hours of life. Ironically, 1 comfort care plan instructed the clinical team ' ... to do 
nothing that will cause discomfort'. Staff did do nothing: morphine recommended in the comfort 
care plan was never administered to a 4-month old infant repeatedly noted by nursing staff to 
be 'recessing+++ (Record 22). Even when explicitly prescribed, instructions were ignored, and 
1 in 5 patients failed to receive morphine. Furthermore, 2 in 5 patients (8/20) with a comfort 
care plan received their 1st dose of morphine within hours of dying, yet pain and distress had 
been documented for at least 2 days. Even if it were argued that orders such as TLC, Keep 
Comfortable or Supportive Care are too vague to ensure specific palliative interventions, this 
cannot justify the extent of no treatment, undertreatment and late treatment of explicitly 
described suffering. 
Overall, 41 % of patients received morphine during their terminal hospitalisation. Not 
surprisingly, given the nature of interventions patients who died in the PICU were not only more 
likely to receive morphine (P=0.0000), but it was administered sooner (median of O days from 
admission to 1st dose, P=0.0004) and for a longer period from the 1st dose until death (median 
4 days, P=0.0000). In comparison, patients in general wards were hospitalised for a median of 
6 days before the 1st administration of morphine was given for an average of 2 days (median 
<1 day) before death. 
Available literature recommends that pain management in children with HIV/AIDS follow the 
WHO guidelines for pain management in children with cancer.39 This includes around-the-
clock rather than 'as needed' regimens and the use of potent analgesia according to the WHO 
analgesic pain ladder. In line with these guidelines, morphine was prescribed around the clock 
at 4 hourly, 6 hourly and 12 hourly intervals. That said, of patients for whom oral morphine was 
prescribed, almost one half received only 1 dose. Sixteen percent and 3% respectively of 
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patients received mild and moderate analgesia. Although the efficacy of the analgesia was not 
determined, case summaries indicate undertreatment of pain. For example, despite Panado (6 
hourly doses) and morphine (10 doses), nursing entries described a patient as 'Distressed+++. 
Still distressed+++. In HB02 but remains distressed' (Record 32). Use of mild and moderate 
analgesia failed to control the symptoms in a 31-month old child who according to the medical 
notes respectively was 'Flaring and recessing+++, visibly distressed' and 'Very distressed at 
night. Still very distressed'. (Record 46) These findings warrant an empirical approach to pain 
and symptom management in children with HIV/AIDS. Successful implementation of pain and 
symptom management depends on incorporating the assessment of pain into the overall care 
of each child during each contact.39 
Whilst doctors may (unconvincingly) plead ignorance of pain and distress that is documented in 
the nursing notes only, they personally documented pain and distress in 13 patients yet failed 
to prescribe analgesia. Surely, observed and reported suffering begs an appropriate response 
from the caregiver. Even though a doctor may not be able to restore the health of a child, 
according to the RCPCH,21 doctors have 'an absolute duty to comfort and to cherish the child 
and to prevent pain and suffering'. (p. 16) 
The symbolic implication of morphine as a sign of 'giving up' may have deterred some clinicians 
from prescribing morphine, the more so since most patients were infants. Still, the most 
significant barrier among clinicians to administering adequate pain medication, especially 
morphine, is the fear of hastening death through respiratory depression, excess sedation or 
both. Alarmingly, Vazirani et a111a found that as residents progress through their training they 
become less comfortable with administering pain medication to a dying child through fear of 
hastening death. Yet according to expert opinion146 morphine, the most extensively studied, 
widely used and cheapest opiate available, is perfectly safe even for use in neonates. 
Arguably, the risk of undertreating pain and distress in the dying child should be of greater 
concern medically and morally than the risk of suppressing respiratory effort. If prolonging life 
is no longer in a child's best interests and promoting comfort is the primary goal, clinicians 
should not hesitate to use full and effective doses of pain medication, even if a possible 
secondary effect is sedation, depression of respiration and possible hastening of death.96 
In these circumstances the ethical justification for aggressive palliation is the rule of double 
effect.98 In keeping with the criteria for double effect reasoning, the use of morphine is itself not 
immoral as long as the doctor's intent is to relieve pain and not to cause death through 
respiratory depression even though it may be foreseeable that death may be hastened. If pain 
becomes severe in the terminal stage, double effect reasoning provides a defensible rationale 
for escalating doses of morphine for physicians who support neither euthanasia nor the 
practice of allowing patients to die with untreated suffering. Thus the rule of double effect 
allows clinicians to treat specific symptoms of dying patients even at the risk of hastening 
death. 
Use of strong analgesia is also justified on grounds of the best interest standard.96 According 
to this standard, the patient should receive treatment that provides the most benefit and the 
fewest burdens. Pain relief and symptom management should be provided because they 
relieve burdensome symptoms and therefore promote the dying patient's best interests. Pain 
and symptom relief is almost always in a child's best interests and should be the standard of 
care in the absence of strong and explicit indications to the contrary. (Emanuel) 
Nurses play an extremely important role in the assessment of symptoms and the control of pain 
in dying children because they usually have the most frequent, continuous patient contact. 
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Nurses accounted for much of reported pain and distress in this study. It can only be 
speculated as to the extent of moral distress experienced by nurses unable to meet their moral 
obligations to maximise comfort through adequate management of patients' pain and 
discomfort. In 1997, almost two thirds of a sample of professional nurses at RXH reported 
having nursed a child they felt had been made to suffer unnecessarily.51 At that time, 98% of 
respondents believed RXH needed a bioethics committee, perhaps in the vain hope it could 
offer expert second opinion. According to Rushton and colleagues, ' ... patient suffering often 
results in the suffering of caregivers themselves.'147 (p.82) If this is so, adequate pain 
management would not only relieve patients' suffering but that of nurses as well. On the other 
hand, training in the use of non-pharmacological pain control measures, such as swaddling, 
non-nutritive sucking (dummy), massage and positioning would allow nurses to manage some 
of the discomfort themselves. Moreover, these interventions do not require skilled nursing and 
could be undertaken by less highly trained nursing personnel. Additionally professional 
bodies47 recommend the availability of psychological support for the caregivers of dying 
children, an example of which might be routine individual or group counselling with a trained 
peer, social worker or psychologist. 
In summary, of the 165 patients studied, only half were identified as dying and slightly more 
than 40% received a comfort care plan. This was far fewer than the number of patients with 
DNR orders. Patients also received their comfort care plans rather late in their terminal 
hospitalisations, especially long stay patients (16+ days). Moreover, the care received by 
patients with these plans was not fully consistent with a plan to institute only comfort measures, 
as indicated by frequent continued provision of IV therapies and diagnostic procedures. In 
some cases, the uncertainty of short-term prognoses for acutely ill children with progressive 
disease made a mixed management strategy appropriate. Overall, however, these patterns of 
decision making may represent a lack of clarity or ambivalence about the goals of care, 
habitual adherence to established hospital practice, concern about 'doing nothing' or a 
therapeutic disposition to maintain treatment in order to preserve life. The heterogeneity of 
care received by patients with comfort care plans may have reflected confusion among 
clinicians about use of vague terms such as 'comfort care' or 'supportive care' and a lack of a 
clear and coherent standard of practice for dying HIV/AIDS patients. Of great concern was the 
undertreatment and late treatment of pain and distress in almost half the patients, most likely 
explained by clinicians' fear of hastening death in such young patients. 
In the final chapter, recommendations are offered to address shortcomings in the end of life 
care of children dying with HIV/AIDS. 
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Chapter 5: Summary of Main Findings and Key Recommendations 
5.1 Summary of Main Findings 
5.1.1 Clinical Characteristics 
This study of hospital deaths among 165 HIV-infected children focused on 3 key decision 
making variables with distinctive clinical significance: presence of a DNR order, identification of 
the patient as dying, and comfort care plans. During the terminal hospitalisation, doctors had to 
make key decisions on gravely ill patients whose median age was 4 months and median length 
of stay was 6 days. The length of stay for three quarters of patients was less than 2 weeks and 
one quarter of patients died within 3 days of admission. The ELISA status of less than half the 
patients was known on admission and one third of patients fell in disease Category B. The 
intensity of diagnostic and therapeutic interventions received by many patients, particularly 
infants in disease Category B in the first week of admission, was dictated and justified on 
grounds of diagnostic and prognostic uncertainty, a high likelihood of PCP pneumonia which 
can be lethal, and treatment regimens whose efficacy requires prompt IV administration of 
medications over a minimum of several days. In many patients, the rapidity of deterioration, 
coupled with clinical uncertainty, likely made a decision to withdraw curative care in favour of 
palliative care difficult, despite the fact these children soon died. Since these patients face a 
substantial risk of death at any time during their hospitalisation and, in some, the fatal outcome 
cannot be anticipated in time to permit a pivotal shift from aggressive care to comfort care, the 
traditional dichotomy between curative care and palliative care needs to be replaced by a 
continuum of care in which both proceed together, regardless of outcome. For some patients 
neither a purely curative nor a purely palliative model of care is suitable. Instead, in the face of 
considerable clinical uncertainty, the most suitable model of care will reflect individual patients' 
needs and goals. Goals establish the rationale for treatment and should precede specific 
treatment decisions. If an intervention becomes more burdensome than beneficial given the 
overall goals of care, it should be limited or withdrawn. 
5.1.2 Do Not Resuscitate Orders 
Eighty four percent of patients had a DNR order. DNR orders meant patients were not subject 
to non-beneficial resuscitation and intensive care-based interventions, which might merely have 
prolonged dying. As importantly, DNR orders were not misinterpreted as implying no 
treatment, and patients continued to receive full medical treatment, such as IV therapies, short 
of resuscitation and ventilation. On the other hand, many patients with DNR orders were 
subject to extensive aggressive interventions, despite their status as patients expected to die 
imminently. 
In many respects documentation and communication of DNR orders failed to comply with 
procedural and ethical requirements laid down in professional guidelines. DNR orders 
appeared simultaneously in only 41% of medical and nursing entries. Thus the resuscitation 
status of about two thirds of patients was not written in the nursing notes. In the event of a 
cardiac or respiratory arrest, and in the absence of a DNR order, nurses have a legal duty to 
offer full medical treatment including CPR to patients. Due to failed communication between 
doctors and nurses, many terminally ill children may have unnecessarily received highly 
invasive, burdensome interventions. Furthermore, in 39% and 63% respectively of folders, 
doctors failed to provide documentation of the justification for the DNR order or whether the 
DNR order had been discussed with parents. Not only does unilateral decision making ignore 
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parental values and preferences, it also disregards professional guidelines that stipulate 
parents as principal decision makers regarding treatment decisions for their children. Rarely is 
the question of whether or not to perform CPR a purely medical one. Inconsistent use of 
terminology in the DNR orders compounded the potential for miscommunication between 
doctors and nurses. The equivalent instruction, for example, 'Not for IPPV' or "Not for CPR' 
appeared in only 54% of matched medical and nursing notes. In the remainder, doctors and 
nurses recorded incompatible orders, variously restricting ventilation, CPR, ambubagging and 
inotropes. On busy hospital wards with rotating staff-in-training, it is ill advised to assume a 
shared understanding of these instructions, which imply limitation of different interventions. It 
can only be speculated whether miscommunication or failed documentation accounted for 7 
episodes of resuscitation in patients with standing DNR orders. 
Lack of a standardised approach in the medical notes as to where DNR orders are documented 
has the potential for confusion. DNR orders were written in front of medical notes, inside 
medical notes or in both locations. In a crisis doctors are likely to waste valuable time trying to 
locate a DNR order hidden somewhere inside daily progress notes. DNR orders need to 
appear prominently and consistently in one place in doctors' and nurses' notes. 
5.1.3 Evidence of Dying 
Using terminology such as terminally ill, poor prognosis and end stage, doctors identified 50% 
of patients as dying. This is surprisingly low considering that most DNR orders were justified 
on grounds of imminent death. It is possible doctors, reluctant to label patients as dying, 
preferred to use DNR orders as proxy measures of evidence of dying. On the other hand, 
some patients with no identifiable terminal phase will deteriorate rapidly despite maximal 
treatment. In the face of clinical uncertainty, much aggressive care will appear to have been 
non-beneficial only after death when the perspective is quite different. 
Several explanations are offered to account for doctors' reluctance to label patients as terminal. 
Even in advanced disease, the clinical course of HIV/AIDS can be unpredictable and doctors 
may find it difficult to know with certainty if a patient is terminal. Whether further aggressive 
therapy is warranted in a seriously ill child is one of the most difficult decisions a clinician 
makes daily. Doctors may prefer to err on the side of biological life, and for some patients this 
will adversely affect the quality of dying. If parents are told their child is dying doctors worry 
they will lose hope. Yet systematically overoptimistic prognoses or failure to recognise a child 
is dying may lead to unrealistic expectations by parents and burdensome care at the end of life. 
Furthermore, knowledge of their child's prognosis may have increased the proportion (55%) of 
parents present at the bedside when their child died. 
5.1.4 Comfort Care Plans 
The low rate (44%) of comfort care plans, documented on average after 2 weeks' 
hospitalisation suggests doctors had difficulty making the transition from curative to palliative 
care. This ambivalence is illustrated by the incoherence of many plans, which included 
procedures and treatments neither meant for, nor likely to promote patients' comfort. 
Moreover, in 2 in 5 folders of patients with a comfort care plan there was no record of whether 
doctors had discussed the decision to change from curative care to palliative care with the 
family. A decision that the burdens of life-sustaining treatment outweigh the benefits is a non-
medical determination of how valuable it is to continue living and the degree of a patient's 
suffering. Clearly doctors should not make these judgements independently, since they may 
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be influenced by their own professional, religious and sociological backgrounds. In line with 
legal, ethical and professional norms, parents are expected to make these decisions in 
partnership with the doctor, according to the best interests standard. Even if doctors feel 
stressed and ill equipped to initiate discussions regarding palliation, it does not justify their not 
doing it at all. 
Whilst the presence of a comfort care plan significantly reduced the relative proportion of 
patients receiving IV therapies in their last 24 hours of life, 73% and 62% respectively of 
patients continued to receive IV fluids and IV antibiotics. Patients were twice as likely to 
receive intravenous than oral antibiotics. Some antibiotic drugs may promote comfort by 
reducing adverse symptoms caused by infection (1 in 4 children who died in the general wards 
experienced respiratory symptoms). However, if a patient has no distress from infection, 
antibiotics may only prolong dying and add to a patient's discomfort by requiring IV access. If 
continued use is justified, antibiotics should be administered orally rather than intravenously. 
It has been difficult to convince health care professionals that there are times when it may be 
appropriate to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration, despite ethical guidelines and court 
decisions that support the practice. Patients were 4 times as likely to receive nasogastric as 
opposed to oral feeds shortly before they died. Doctors' reluctance to withdraw artificial 
nutrition and hydration was underscored by the finding that 79% and 58% respectively of long 
stay patients (mean length of stay 29 days) with a comfort care plan received IV fluids and 
nasogastric feeds in their last 24 hours. Only 16% of these patients whose average age was 
12 months received oral feeds. The emerging consensus is that dying patients experience little 
if any discomfort upon the withdrawal of tube feedings or IV hydration. On the contrary, 
continued treatment may cause considerable discomfort from fluid overload or if restraints are 
required. Accordingly, children who are imminently dying should receive oral rather than 
artificial nutrition and hydration. Oral feeding would increase interpersonal contact between 
children and mothers and nurses, and would reduce procedural pain associated with re-siting 
IV lines when they tissue. Decreased use of non-beneficial IV lines would also reduce the risk 
of needle stick injuries among junior medical staff who struggle to find veins in extremely 
wasted infants. 
Head box oxygen administered to 38% of infants (median age 3 months) in their last 24 hours 
of life would have prevented parents holding their dying babies. Whilst increased use of nasal 
prong oxygen would give a parent more access to their child, the oxygen requirements of these 
terminal infants may have been higher than nasal prong oxygen could deliver. However, if 
morphine were optimally used, these infants may have been less distressed allowing the use of 
nasal prong oxygen, thereby giving parents more access to their dying child. 
5.1.5 Paediatric Intensive Care 
In light of inadequate outcome data from developing countries on survival rates of HIV-infected 
children discharged from intensive care units, it may have been appropriate that 23% of 
patients with apparently reversible illness were admitted to the PICU. Employing an 
individualised prognostic strategy, doctors initiated intensive care and carefully monitored a 
patient's clinical response to treatment. If a patient's clinical condition failed to improve 
treatment was withdrawn. Indeed ventilation was the intervention most commonly withdrawn 
from patients in this study. Furthermore, this approach recognises there is no intrinsic moral 
difference between performing an action and omitting an action. Fittingly, patients identified as 
dying in the PICU were more likely to be extubated. Withdrawal of intrusive machinery coupled 
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with adequate use of analgesia and sedation allowed these patients to die peacefully, often in 
their parents' arms. Thus, even in an intensive care setting, a smooth transition from cure to 
palliation was possible for some patients. 
In the future it may become necessary to develop criteria for admission of HIV-infected children 
to the PICU because it is a costly and scarce resource and there are some children who are 
unlikely to benefit from this highly invasive intervention. Because of a perceived danger that 
HIV-infected children may be unfairly discriminated against, development and implementation 
of any policies to limit access to paediatric intensive care will need to follow an explicit, rational, 
fair and democratic process among all interested parties. A policy will need to reflect moral 
values acceptable to the community, detail the mechanisms by which the policy was developed 
and the signatories to its creation, articulate appellate mechanisms and be legally admissible. 
5.1.6 Pain, Distress and Palliation 
Findings show that documented pain and distress was not treated, was undertreated or was 
treated too late. Fifty five percent of patients who died in the general wards experienced pain 
and distress in their last 48 hours of life, yet overall only 38% of patients, including those who 
died in the PICU, received morphine in their last 24 hours. That 2 in 5 patients with a comfort 
care plan failed to receive any analgesia, despite documented pain and distress, is cause for 
grave concern. By the same token, it is unacceptable that 2 in 5 patients with a comfort care 
plan received their first dose of morphine within hours of dying, despite a 2-day history of 
discomfort. If achievement of the best quality of life and relief of pain and other symptoms are 
fundamental goals of palliative care, palliation failed in many patients with a comfort care plan. 
Some dying patients may need increasingly large doses of analgesics to alleviate discomfort, 
which, in turn, if not carefully monitored, carries some risk of respiratory depression and 
hastening death. Arguably, the risk of undertreating pain and discomfort in a dying child should 
be of greater concern morally and medically than the risk of suppressing respiratory effort. If 
prolonging life is no longer in a child's best interests and promoting comfort is the primary goal, 
clinicians should not hesitate to use full and effective doses of analgesia, even if a possible 
secondary effect is sedation, respiratory depression and possible hastening of death. Double 
effect reasoning provides a defensible rationale for escalating doses of analgesia for clinicians 
who support neither euthanasia nor the practice of allowing patients to die with untreated 
suffering. 
That only 38% and 2% respectively of families benefited from social work and religious 
intervention suggests the broader goals of palliative care, concerned with families' 
psychological, psychosocial and spiritual needs, are not being addressed. High work loads and 
staff shortages probably account for the low rate of social work intervention. RXH does not 
have its own pastoral counsellors. If families require pastoral counselling, they must use their 
own religious/spiritual advisors or request referral to the pastoral care service at Groote Schuur 
Hospital. In a crisis situation this arrangement may not have suited many families. 
In conclusion, doctors find it difficult to know when and in what circumstances to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment in HIV-infected children. They proceed in faltering stages, 
usually beginning with a DNR order and cautiously moving towards withdrawal of aggressive 
interventions. All too often, they never reach the stage of only palliating the dying child. 
Trained to cure, doctors find it hard to know when 'enough is enough'. Yet, even as a child 
approaches death, the ethical standard that guides decision making for doctors and parents 
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alike is the best interests of the child. No ethical principle supports continuation of invasive 
diagnostic and therapeutic interventions, which merely increase a child's suffering and prolong 
dying. 
Once a doctor has decided a child will die soon, the doctor has implicitly determined that the 
benefits of a brief prolongation of an increasingly miserable, uncomfortable life outweigh the 
burdens of aggressive medical intervention. This provides the ethical justification for 
withholding not only CPR, but also other invasive interventions whose goal is cure, a medical 
goal that is no longer appropriate in the case of an imminently dying child. Even interventions 
that arguably provide some palliation, such as IV therapies, may be discontinued if the harm 
inflicted in their provision burdens an already suffering child, with little or no net benefit. 
Once it becomes clear the child will soon die and a DNR order should be issued, there can be 
few instances where it is in the child's best interests to continue aggressive curative medical 
interventions. The presumption should be that, simultaneously with issuance of a DNR order, a 
decision should be made that discontinues or limits invasive, aggressive curative interventions, 
and substitutes a comfort care plan. The focus should shift decidedly from curative therapy 
and its burdens to only caring for the child. Moreover, if medically feasible and parents prefer, 
it may be more humane to allow the child to die at home. 
Junior doctors with little experience and even less authority often face the above dilemmas. 
Therefore, hospitals should be encouraged to adopt protocols or policies that assist doctors 
make these hard decisions. Such policies would provide medically valid and ethically 
legitimate criteria that help determine when and under what circumstances a doctor should 
issue a DNR order or terminate curative interventions that are no longer in the interests of the 
child. In addition, a policy would outline procedures to be followed in reaching these decisions. 
5.2 Limitations of Study 
It is necessary to consider these findings against certain limitations in the study: 
I. The findings are limited by problems inherent in retrospective chart review, in particular 
the quality of medical record keeping and the extent of missing data.148 This study was 
limited to documented decisions regarding end of life care. A good proportion of 
decision making is undocumented. Furthermore, documentation by doctors and 
nurses may not have been optimal in times of stress and crisis. Conversely, care may 
have been recorded but not provided.149 
II. It was not possible to capture the complexity of factors that affected end of life decision 
making. Nor, from a retrospective record review, was it possible to accurately 
determine the frequency of decisions not to pursue a potentially life-saving therapy. 
Arguably, a decision to withdraw a current therapy is a definitive decision with practical 
and often immediate consequences. On the other hand, discussion about withholding 
therapies in the future is a hypothetical matter. The patient may never require a 
particular intervention and doctors' intentions regarding what therapies they might 
withhold are, in the absence of procedure-specific DNR orders, unlikely to have been 
recorded. 
Ill. Record review can reveal only the viewpoint of doctors and nurses. It does not include 
the views of families concerning end of life care. Future research needs to address 
parental attitudes and satisfaction with end of life care. The impact of culture on end of 
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life decision making also needs investigation. Likewise future research needs to 
consider views of hospital management regarding the development of policies on 
terminal care. 
IV. The study was limited to children who died in a single, specialised teaching institution, 
and findings may not be generalisable to other hospitals. It is possible practices will 
differ in community hospitals. 
V. The study examined patients' terminal hospitalisation. It can only be speculated if 
hospitalisation could have been avoided by greater availability of palliative or home-
based care in the community. Issues relating to home-based care for HIV-infected 
children were beyond the scope of this hospital-based study. 
VI. The ethical reasoning for treatment limitations was difficult to assess in a retrospective 
study - only rationales that were documented in the medical record were identified. 
Reasons to discontinue support such as quality of life assessments may not have been 
documented because of their subjective nature or concern over medical/legal liability. 
Likewise, doctors may have been reluctant to document decisions based on resource 
allocation considerations. 
VII. The presence of pain and distress in patients was determined by the researcher's 
subjective interpretation of documented symptomatology. For example, clinicians may 
dispute the interpretation of expressions such as 'recessing+++' as evidence of 
dyspnoea. Against this it is argued that nurses' and doctors' repeated description of 
patients as displaying these symptoms despite use of oxygen therapies and analgesia 
reasonably indicated patients' discomfort. 
5.3 Key Recommendations 
5.3.1 Improvements at the Bedside 
In light of the findings that 84% of patients had DNR orders, 50% were identified as dying and 
44% had a comfort care plan, it is recommended that at the bedside: 
• Clinicians strive to increase the proportion of patients identified as dying and the proportion 
of comfort care plans to more closely approximate the proportion of DNR orders. 
• Clinicians make more timely decisions so that patients who have DNR orders are identified 
as dying and receive comfort care plans earlier in the course of hospitalisation. Timely end 
of life decision making is particularly important among long stay patients. 
• Clinicians strive to increase the proportion of imminently dying patients who are 
appropriately withdrawn from non-beneficial life-sustaining treatments. 
• Comfort care plans are more coherent so dying patients receive only treatments that will 
promote comfort. 
• Clinicians and nurses make pain and discomfort a fifth vital sign, requiring routine 
monitoring along with pulse, blood pressure, respirations and heart rate. 
5.3.2 Improvements in Institutional Practice 
Data on the frequency, sequence and coherence of end of life decisions in particular comfort 
care plans corroborate the need for institutional reforms to better integrate palliative care into 
mainstream hospital practice. To achieve better outcomes, it will be necessary to improve 
practice patterns formulated at an institutional level, rather than rely only on enhanced decision 
making at the bedside. Thus clinicians would benefit from a directed process that would help 
them plan more timely, comprehensive and coherent end of life care. To this end, it is 
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recommended hospitals develop guidelines for treatment limitation decisions and a medical 
treatment plan (Care Plan) to discern and negotiate goals of care and manage appropriate 
transitions from life-sustaining treatment to palliation. A structured Care Plan would be 
appropriate for all HIV-infected patients across the continuum of care including those requiring 
aggressive, curative-based care, palliative care or a mixed management approach. Whilst 
some elements of the care plan will not be immediately appropriate to every individual patient, 
such a plan would prompt clinicians to think about palliative interventions and supportive 
services among patients still receiving curative-based care. Additionally, it would go some way 
to dispel negative connotations that care plans set limits but not standards of care for dying 
patients. A structured approach might also reduce ambiguity and miscommunication within the 
health care team. Determination of the format and content of a Care Plan will need the 
participation of all interested parties involved in the management of hospitalised terminally ill 
children with HIV/AIDS. 
Elements of a Care Plan should describe, among others: 
• patient's dinical condition 
• prognosis 
• goals of care (cure, prolong life, comfort/palliation, mixed) 
• intended level of medical intervention, induding DNR status 
• therapies to be instituted or continued 
• existing diagnostic and therapeutic therapies to be withdrawn and the order in which this will be done 
• family's awareness and understanding of the plan, and their preferences regarding end of life decisions 
• availability of family support, including contact telephone numbers 
• cultural, psychosocial and spiritual issues 
• planned interventions for social work or pastoral care 
• review of symptoms (for example, pain, shortness of breath, anxiety, excessive crying or irritability) 
• prescribed palliative treatments and degree of symptomatic relief 
The initial implementation of a Care Plan will need rigorous monitoring and evaluation before it 
becomes part of a formal hospital policy on end of life care for children with HIV/AIDS. In 
similar vein, a Care Plan will be a dynamic document, requiring ongoing re-evaluation, as it 
responds to changing patient, professional and institutional needs. In addition to expanding 
options for patient care, a structured Care Plan will provide a model to help medical students 
and junior staff address end of life issues comprehensively. Critics repeatedly cite deficiencies 
in this aspect of clinical education. Finally, the Care Plan would provide an opportunity to 
instruct trainees in pain management and other palliative care techniques. 
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Appendix 1 : Questionnaire 
AUDIT OF DYING IN RED CROSS CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL 
HIV Severity A B C Sex RECORD No. 
Birth dote Admission date Death date 
Time of death Length of Stay ( d) Age at death (m) 
Elisa known on admission y N 
Place of death General ICU 
ICU ADMISSION: y N Direct Transfer 
Reason for admission: 
Transfer out (date) Length of Stay in ICU ( d) Transfer out to death (d) 
Comments on ICU Admission 
RESUSCITATION: y N CPR (date) 
CPR location General ICU 
CPR outcome: survived failed CPR to death (d) 
CPR before Elisa result Y N Time of CPR 
EVIDENCE of DYING: Y N 1st evidence of dying (date) 
Admission to evidence (d) 
Verbatim Evidence of Dying: 
Evidence to death (d) 
DNR:Y N Date of DNR: 
Admission to DNR (d) 
DNR in progress notes of: 
DNR to death (d) 
Doctors y N NursesY N 
Verbatim DNR order in medical notes: 
Verbatim DNR order in nursing notes: 
Front of Folder 
Rationale for DNR: Y N If yes, specify: 
Discussed DNR with: mother father other no record 
98 
y N 
COMFORT CARE PLAN: 
Date CCP 
Discussed CCP with: mother 
y N 
Admission to CCP (d) 
father 
Verbatim Comfort Care Plan: 
CCP to death (d) 
other no record 
MORPHINE: y N Method of delivery: Oral IV 
Dose: Bolus PRN 4/6 hourly Continuous 
l>ate of first dose: Admission to 1st dose (d) pt dose to death ( d) 
Morphine given in: general ward ICU 
INTERVENTIONS IN LAST 24 HOURS of LIFE 
Oral feeds N-G feeds N-G tube Nebs NP02 HB02 Bloods X-rays 
CPR Inotropes Ventilation Transfusion Intubation Extubation 
Ringers Lactate Muscle relaxants A line CVP TPN Physiotherapy 
Oral antibiotics IV antibiotics IV fluids Nystatin Steroids Panado 
Anticonvulsants Morphine Sedation Anxiolytics 
Other: 
Documentation of treatment withdrawal/ withholding: y N Date: 
Location: General ICU Withdrawal to death (d) 
Specify: 
EVIDENCE of PAIN and DISTRESS in LAST 48 HOURS of LIFE 
SYMPTOMS (presence of medical problems expected to cause pain): 
In medical notes: 
In nursing notes: 
Mother at bedside at time of death: y N no record 
Other: 
soaAL WORK: y N No. SW visits 
Reasons for SW Visit: 
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: 
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Appendix 2 
Verbatim Rationales for DNR Orders (N=85) 
Rationale No. 
AIDS with fulminating pneumonia. 
AIDS with PCP pneumonia, already on maximal treatment. 
AIDS with cardiac failure. 
AIDS with extensive pneumonia, presumed pseudomonas. 
AIDS with fulminating, progressive pneumococcal septicaemia and encephalopathy. 
AIDS with presumed intracranial pressure. Unresponsive. Comatose. 1 
AIDS with progressive deterioration. 2 
AIDS with progressive pneumonia and hypoxia. 1 
AIDS with progressively worsening pneumonia. 1 
AIDS with rapid deterioration. 1 
AIDS with recurrent diarrhoea, pseudomonas septicaemia and protein losing enteropathy. 1 
AIDS with severe disease and cachexia. 1 
AIDS with marrow suppression and progressive deteriorating pneumonia. 1 
AIDS with severe pneumonia associated with hypoxia. 1 
AIDS. Chest condition poor and unlikely to improve. 1 
AIDS. Gravely ill. 1 
Advanced AIDS. 2 
Advanced AIDS with chronic lung disease. 3 
Advanced AIDS with recurrent admissions. Now severe pneumonia. 1 
Advanced AIDS. Septicaemia (staph) and progressive disease not responsive to treatment. 1 
Brain death. AIDS. Equipment failure. 1 
Category C disease. 
Category C disease. Poor clinical condition and biochemistry. 
Category C disease with progressive pneumonia and interstitial infiltrates, candidiasis, hepatomegaly, generalised 
lymphadonopathy, and progressive weight loss over 2 weeks. 
Category C disease. Not improving. 
Category C disease. End stage. 
Clinical AIDS. Poor response to treatment for pneumonia. 
Clinical AIDS with severe pneumonia. 
Clinical AIDS. Now septicaemia and progressive pneumonia. 1 
End stage AIDS. 6 
Futile treatment not in interests of the child. Not improving despite the best we can do. 1 
Futility. IPPV not justified. 1 
HIV-+ve early onset, severe wasting <60% expected weight and severe pneumonia. 1 
HIV-+ve not for ventilation but continue full ICU care. 1 
HIV-+ve on maximal antibiotic and medical treatment. 1 
HIV-+ve withe coli septicaemia and prolonged seizures. 1 
HIV-+ve with early onset disease. Worsening pneumonia despite treatment. 1 
HIV-+ve with early onset symptoms, severe pneumonia and hypoxia. 1 
HIV-+ve with severe recurrent pneumonia. 1 
HIV-+ve, PCP-+ve, deterioration in respiratory function with full IV therapy. 1 
HIV-+ve, chest X-ray showing diffuse infiltrates. 1 
HIV-+ve, extensive candiida, neutropenia, progressive pneumonia on maximal antibiotic therapy. 1 
HIV-+ve, severe FFT and wasting, severe pneumonia, huge abscess on the head, status epilepticus and severe gastro. 1 
HIV-+ve with ongoing diarrhoea. Wasted+++. PCP pneumonia. 1 
Moribund. 
No improvement despite full treatment for PCP and associated lower respiratory tract infection. 
No improvement despite maximal treatment. 
No improvement despite maximal treatment for bacterial pneumonia. 
Not improving. 1 
Not improving. On maximal treatment for PCP. Not for re-intubation. 1 
Poor prognosis. 4 
Poor prognosis and disease process. 1 
Poor prognosis plus drawing of a skull and cross bones. 1 
Poor prognosis and deteriorating. 1 
Poor prognosis poor. Received 11 days of treatment for PCP. No change. 1 
Progressive deterioration, despite resuscitation and inotrope support. 1 
Progressive deterioration. Not doing well. 1 
RVD and severe pneumonia. 1 
Rapid deterioration. 2 
Severe symptomatic HIV infection. 1 
Slow deterioration. 1 
Steady slow deterioration despite intensive treatment. 1 
Terminally ill. 6 
Terminal illness. 1 
Terminal. Draining effusion may precipitate another bleed. Palliation. 1 
Terminal. Mechanical ventilation would be futile and is contra-indicated. 1 
Terminally ill. Floridly ill. 1 
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Appendix 3 
Verbatim Evidence of Dying (N=83) 
Verbatim Evidence 
Condition deteriorating, not doing well, not for active resuscitation. 
Counsel parents on grave prognosis. 
Counselled parents that patient may die. 
Counselled Mom regarding poor condition. Probably dying. 
Counselled parents he may die but we will try our best. 
Critically ill infant with guarded prognosis. 
Dying. Not for further intervention at this stage. 
End stage. 
End stage and desperately ill. 
End stage - keep comfortable. Doing badly. 
End stage AIDS. 
End stage AIDS and wasting pneumonia (past admission: category C). 
End stage AIDS (cardiomyopathy). 
End stage HIV disease. Admitted for terminal care. 
End stage disease, wasted, terminally ill. 
End stage from a previous admission. 
End stage. Preterminal. 
Extremely poor prognosis. 
In extremis. No procedures to be done. 
In extremis. Seems terminal. 
Moribund. 
No improvement with aggressive treatment. He is probably dying. 
Patient dying. 
Poor outcome. 
Poor prognosis. 
Poor prognosis - brain death. 
Poor prognosis, condition deteriorating. 
Poor prognosis - terminally ill. 
Very poor prognosis. 
Very poor prognosis - not for IV antibiotics. 
Poor prognosis. Severe pneumonia not responding to treatment. 
Poor prognosis. Disease severity noted at previous ICU admission. 
Poor prognosis. Wasting away slowly. 
Preterminal. End stage AIDS. 
Preterminal this morning. Looks awful. 
Probably dying from severe sepsis. 
Prognosis is bad. 
Prognosis is poor. 
Rapidly deteriorating RVD. 
Rapidly worsening, probably terminal. 
Severely ill and on maximal treatment. Still no improvement. 
Strong possibility of demise. 
Terminal. 
Terminal HIV disease. Prognosis hopeless. 
Terminal HIV. End stage. 
Terminal illness. 
Terminal lung disease. 
Terminal phase of AIDS. 
Terminal pneumonia. 
Terminal progressive pneumonia. 
Terminal. No improvement. Continued care futile. 
Terminally ill - full blown AIDS. 
Terminally ill. 
Terminally ill with extensive pneumonia. 
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No. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
12 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
8 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
Appendix 4 
Verbatim Comfort Care Plans (N=73) 
Comfort Care Plan No. 
Analgesia. 1 
Conservative management. If distressed give morphine. 1 
Full supportive care. 1 
Full supportive care. Keep NP02, IV fluids, antibiotics. 1 
Keep comfortable. All supportive care on ward. 1 
Keep comfortable. Conservative management only. 1 
Keep comfortable. Conservative management. HB02. Side cubicle. 1 
Keep comfortable. Dolorol stat, morphine infusion. 1 
Keep comfortable. HB02, Panado 1 
Keep comfortable. Morphine PRN, continue treament. 1 
Keep comfortable. Morphine if in pain. Cut back fluids. 1 
Keep comfortable. Morphine. 1 
Keep comfortable. No invasive procedures. 2 
Keep comfortable. No IV antibiotics, no X-rays. 1 
Keep comfortable. Not for IPPV. Morphine PRN. 1 
Keep comfortable. Not for more treatment. Give morphine. 1 
Keep comfortable. Terminal care. Soft diet. Fluids. 1 
Keep comfortable with morphine and valium. Withdraw curative treatment on grounds of futility. 1 
No painful procedures. If restless give morphine po 1 mg QID. 1 
Not for aggressive investigation. For oral antibiotics and oral morphine. 1 
Palliation only. 1 
Palliation. Decrease oxygen. Opiates. 1 
Palliation. Symptomatic relief. Suggest morphine infusion. 1 
Palliation. TLC+++. Stop blood investigations. 1 
Palliative care. 1 
Palliative care. Dolorol forte, IV antibiotics, NP02 , HB02. 1 
Palliative care. Extubation. Morphine, midazolam to prevent agonal gasping. 1 
Supportive care. Chloral hydrate stat. Move to a side cubicle. 1 
Supportive care only. 2 
Supportive care only. Continue morphine. 1 
Supportive care only. Minimum blood taking. Not for IV Bactrim. 1 
Supportive care only. Not for further bloods. 1 
Supportive care only. Only give platelets if active bleeding. 1 
Supportive care only. No repeat tests. Antibiotics for 7 days, then stop. 1 
Supportive care. Change goals. Withdraw curative care. Morphine infusion. 1 
Supportive care. No more IVs. N-G tube rehydration only. 1 
Supportive therapy only. Palliative care only. 1 
Supportive treatment. If drip tissues, do not resite. 1 
TLC. 7 
TLC only. 4 
TLC only. Analgesia. 1 
TLC only. Do nothing that will cause discomfort. 1 
TLC. Continue N-G feeds and antibiotics. Add morphine. 1 
TLC. Oral Bactrim (PCP pneumonia). 1 
TLC. Analgesia. 1 
TLC. Continue oxygen 1 
TLC. Continue feeds. Analgesia PRN if needed. 1 
TLC. For conservative management only. No blood products. HB02. 1 
TLC. Full TPN, adrenaline nebs, morphine as needed. 1 
TLC. Keep comfortable. Move to side cubicle. 1 
TLC. Keep comfortable. Continue Dolorol. Morphine if needed. 1 
TLC. Low dose morphine. Minimal handling. 1 
TLC. Moved to side cubicle. Stop curative care. 1 
TLC. No procedures. Increase morphine. 1 
TLC. Nothing more can be done for the baby. 1 
TLC. Palliative care. 1 
TLC. Sedation if restless. No invasive investigations. 1 
TLC. Treat cardiac failure and maintain comfort with oxygen and morphine. 1 
TLC. Try to keep comfortable. 1 
Terminal care. Morphine, oral feeds, IV fluids, oral Bactrim. 1 
Terminal care. Not for active management. Morphine if needed. 1 
Withdraw curative care. Increase morphine, add valium. 1 
102 
Appendix 5 
Interventions in Last 24 Hours of Life According to Presence of a Do Not Resuscitate Order 
End Interventions Do Not Resuscitate Order 
N= 165 Yes (N = 138) No (N = 27) 
N % N N t2 P-value 
IV Fluids 133 81% 111 22 0.02 0.9001 
IV antibiotics 122 75% 103 19 0.21 0.6451 
N-G feeds 99 60% 92 7 15.52 0.0000 
Nystatin 88 53% 78 10 3.42 0.0642 
HB02 68 41% 63 5 6.82 0.0090 
Morphine 63 38% 56 7 2.04 0.1530 
Panado 51 31% 47 4 3.89 0.0485 
Oral antibiotics 44 27% 38 6 0.32 0.5691 
NP02 45 27% 38 7 0.03 0.8639 
Venipuncture 40 24% 30 10 2.86 0.0908 
Steroids 35 21% 29 6 0.02 0.8886 
Nebulisation 31 19% 27 4 0.33 0.5645 
Ventilation 29 18% 18 11 11.89 0.0005 
Sedation 28 17% 23 5 0.05 0.8151 
X-rays 27 16% 18 9 6.75 0.0093 
CPR 24 15% 12 12 23.08 0.0000 
Ringers Lactate 24 14% 16 8 5.87 0.0153 
lnotropes 21 13% 10 11 22.67 0.0000 
Oral feeds 20 12% 18 2 0.67 0.4132 
N-G tube 19 11% 13 6 3.61 0.0574 
Anticonvulsants 16 10% 13 3 0.07 0.7866 
Transfusion 15 9% 10 5 3.45 0.0632 
Physiotherapy 14 8% 10 4 1.66 0.1981 
Extubation 12 7% 9 3 0.70 0.4024 
Aline 8 5% 8 0 1.64 0.2313 
CVP 8 5% 6 2 1.98 0.2174 
Intubation 7 4% 3 4 8.83 0.0029 
Muscle relaxants 7 4% 6 1 1.75 0.3202 
TPN 2 1% 2 0 
LP 1% 1 0 
CT Scan 1% 0 0 
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Appendix 6 
Interventions in Last 24 Hours According to Evidence of Dying 
End Interventions Evidence 
N=165 Yes N=83 No N=82 
N % N N x2 P-value 
IV fluids 133 81% 66 67 0.13 0.7229 
IV antibiotics 122 75% 58 64 1.42 0.2334 
N-G feeds 99 60% 51 48 0.14 0.8239 
Nystatin 88 53% 44 44 0.01 0.9338 
HB02 68 41% 34 34 0.00 0.9481 
Morphine 63 38% 44 19 15.47 0.0000 
Panado 51 31% 26 25 0.01 0.9076 
Oral antibiotics 44 27% 23 21 0.09 0.7609 
NP02 45 27% 24 21 0.23 0.6345 
Venipuncture 40 24% 16 24 2.23 0.1354 
Steroids 35 21% 21 14 1.66 0.1974 
Nebulisation 31 19% 18 13 0.91 0.3389 
Ventilation 29 18% 14 15 0.06 0.9713 
Sedation 28 17% 17 11 1.45 0.2279 
X-rays 27 16% 11 16 1.17 0.2786 
CPR 24 15% 5 19 9.70 0.0018 
Ringers Lactate 24 14% 7 17 4.99 0.0255 
lnotropes 21 13% 6 15 4.52 0.0335 
Oral feeds 20 12% 13 7 1.97 0.2445 
N-G tube 19 11% 11 8 0.49 0.4830 
Anticonvulsants 16 10% 11 5 2.40 0.1215 
Transfusion 15 9% 4 11 3.67 0.0555 
Physiotherapy 14 8% 9 5 1.19 0.2754 
Extubation 12 7% 10 2 5.61 0.0178 
Aline 8 5% 6 2 2.04 0.1424 
CVP 8 5% 6 2 3.64 0.0604 
Intubation 7 4% 6 3.77 0.0565 
Muscle relaxants 7 4% 4 3 0.14 0.7123 
TPN 2 1% 1 1 0.00 0.7484 
Lumbar Puncture 1% 1 0 0.99 0.5030 
CT scan 1% 1 0 0.99 0.5030 
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Appendix 7 
Interventions in Last 24 Hours According to Presence of a Comfort Care Plan 
End Interventions Comfort Care Plan 
N=165 Yes N=73 No N=92 
N % N N x2 P-value 
IV fluids 133 81% 53 80 5.33 0.0209 
IV antibiotics 122 75% 45 77 10.21 0.0013 
N-G feeds 99 60% 48 51 1.79 0.1803 
Nystatin 88 53% 41 47 0.42 0.5174 
HB02 68 41% 29 39 0.12 0.7305 
Morphine 63 38% 34 29 3.88 0.0487 
Panado 51 31% 20 31 0.75 0.3859 
Oral antibiotics 44 27% 24 20 2.57 0.1091 
NP02 45 27% 19 26 0.10 0.7497 
Venipuncture 40 24% 11 29 5.96 0.0146 
Steroids 35 21% 9 26 6.14 0.0131 
Nebulisation 31 19% 14 17 0.01 0.9092 
Ventilation 29 18% 7 22 5.73 0.0166 
Sedation 28 17% 10 18 0.99 0.3201 
X-rays 27 16% 9 18 1.55 0.2134 
CPR 24 15% 3 21 11.40 0.0007 
Ringers lactate 24 14% 8 16 1.35 0.2458 
lnotropes 21 13% 5 16 4.05 0.0442 
Oral feeds 20 12% 12 8 2.28 0.1313 
N-G tube 19 11% 5 14 2.78 0.0954 
Anticonvulsants 16 10% 10 6 2.38 0.1229 
Transfusion 15 9% 3 12 3.91 0.0480 
Physiotherapy 14 8% 3 11 3.21 0.0732 
Extubation 12 7% 5 7 0.03 0.8524 
Aline 8 5% 3 5 0.15 0.6947 
CVP 8 5% 3 5 0.01 0.9400 
Intubation 7 4% 2 5 0.72 0.3950 
Muscle relaxants 7 4% 6 2.64 0.1039 
TPN 2 1% 1 
LP 1% 0 
CT Scan 1% 0 
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Appendix 8 
Interventions in Last 24 Hours of Life According to Absence of an End of Life Decision 
All Interventions N = 165 No Decisions N = 20 
N % N % 1.,2 P-value• 
IV fluids 133 81% 17 85% 0.28 0.4282 
IV antibiotics 122 75% 16 80% 0.43 0.5114 
N-G feeds 99 60% 4 20% 15.51 0.0000 
Nystatin 88 53% 10 50% 0.10 0.7506 
HB02 68 41% 3 15% 6.42 0.0113 
Morphine 63 38% 3 15% 5.15 0.0232 
Panado 51 31% 4 20% 1.26 0.2615 
Oral antibiotics 44 27% 4 20% 0.51 0.4733 
NP02 45 27% 7 35% 0.68 0.4092 
Venipuncture 40 24% 8 40% 3.06 0.0803 
Steroids 35 21% 3 15% 0.52 0.3465 
Nebulisation 31 19% 2 10% 1.28 0.2076 
Ventilation 29 18% 8 40% 7.85 0.0050 
Sedation 28 17% 3 15% 0.06 0.8029 
X-rays 27 16% 7 35% 5.74 0.0165 
CPR 24 14% 10 50% 22.88 0.0000 
Ringers Lactate 24 14% 7 35% 7.61 0.0057 
lnotropes 21 13% 9 45% 21.21 0.0000 
Oral feeds 20 12% 1 5% 1.08 0.2993 
N-G tube 19 11% 6 30% 7.59 0.0058 
Anticonvulsants 16 10% 5% 0.57 0.4502 
Transfusion 15 9% 4 20% 3.26 0.0711 
Physiotherapy 14 8% 3 15% 1.24 0.2661 
Extubation 12 7% 5% 0.17 0.6772 
Aline 8 5% 0 0% 1.15 0.3471 
CVP 8 5% 0 0% 1.00 0.3975 
Intubation 7 4% 3 15% 0.44 0.0111 
Muscle relaxants 7 4% 1 5% 0.03 0.6024 
TPN 2 1% 0 0% 
Lumbar Puncture 1% 0 0% 
CT Scan 1% 0 0% 
• Significantly different from patients with an end of life decision. 
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Appendix 9 
Verbatim Documentation of Pain and Distress in Last 48 Hours of Life in Patients WITH a 
Comfort Care Plan: Case Summaries (N=38)1 
Record Case Summary 
22*b c 4 months; Cat119ory C; 30 days 
Symptomatology: Recessing+++. Recessing+++. (Repeated entries) 
Evidence of Dying: Terminal, progressive pneumonia 
CCP: TLC. Do nothing that will cause discomfort. 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, Nebs, HB02. Nystatin, Steroids 
Analgesia: None (Registrar recommended morphine if necessary in clinical notes, never written in medicine chart.) 
26* 9 months; Category C; 2 days 
Symptomatology: Penile ulceration 
Evidence of dying: End stage AIDS 
CCP: Terminal care - morphine, oral feeds, IV fluids, oral Bactrim 
End Interventions: NP02 , Bloods, IV antibiotics, Nystatin, Gastric washings, Flumazine dressings, Morphine 
Analgesia: Morphine 4 hourly (3 doses) 
32* 20 months; Category C; 51 days 
Symptomatology: Distressed+++. Still distressed+++. In HB02 but remains distressed. 
Evidence of dying: Poor prognosis 
CCP: Keep comfortable. Not for more treatment. Give morphine. 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, HB02, IV fluids, Oral antibiotics, Orobase, Panado, Morphine 
Analgesia: Panado 6 hourly, Morphine (10/12 doses - commenced 5 days after it was prescribed in CCP.) 
34- 6 months; Category C; 36 days 
Symptomatology: Respiratory distress. Recessing+++. Skin on patient's back excoriated. 
Recessing+++. Still recessing+++. Distressed on NP02 Very much distressed (sic) 
Evidence of dying: Poor prognosis 
CCP: Terminal care - not for a::tive management. Morphine if distressed. Move to side cubicle. 
End Interventions: Oral feeds, N-G feeds, Nebs, HB02, Oral antibiotics, Nystatin, Panado, Morphine 
Analgesia: Morphine (1 dose) 
3S- 3 months; Category B; 35 days 
Symptomatology: Distressed+++. Recessing. Hyperinflated. 
Recession+++. Gasping - held oxygen to mouth to inhale but still gasping. Doctor said to "Keep comfortable". 
Evidence of dying: None 
CCP: Keep comfortable. Conservative management only. 
End Interventions: Nebs, HB02, IV fluids, IV antibiotics, Nystatin 
Analgesia: None 
38* 4 months, Category B; 7 days 
Symptomatology: Recessing+++. Recessing+++. (Several entries) 
Evidence of dying: Poor prognosis. Condition deteriorating. 
CCP: Keep comfortable. Give all supportive ward care. 
End Interventions: Oral feeds, Nebs, NP02, HB02, IV fluids, IV antibiotics, Nystatin, Steroids 
Analgesia: None 
39** 5 months; Category C; 30 days 
Symptomatology: Riddled with extensive oral candida 
Evidence of dying: End Stage. Doing badly. Keep comfortable. 
CCP: TLC. No procedures. Increase morphine. 
End Interventions: Oral feeds, garlic, Betadine, Morphine 
Analgesia: Morphine 6 hourly (6 doses) 
41* 12 months; Category C; 25 days 
Symptomatology: Buttocks very sore. Child even more distressed this morning. 
Evidence of dying: In extremis 
CCP: TLC. No procedures. Increase morphine. 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, Nebs, HB02, IV fluids, IV antibiotics, Nystatin, Morphine 
Analgesia: Morphine 4 hourly (9 doses) 
44* 3 months; Category B; 8 days 
Symptomatology: Recessing++. On HB02 but remains distressed++. 
Evidence of dying: Terminal pneumonia, deteriorating in sptte of best medical care. 
CCP: Palliation. Suggest morphine infusion to relieve respiratory symptoms (PICU consultant's opinion) 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, HB02, IV fluids, IV antibiotics, Nystatin, Morphine 
Analgesia: Morphine (1 bolus infusion less than 1 hour before death) 
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Table continued. 
~ 31 months; Category C; 17 days 
Symptomatology: Flaring and recessing+++. Visibly distressed. Herpes getting worse. Laboured breathing. 
Very distressed at night. Still very distressed but on oxygen and nebs. 
Evidence of dying: None 
CCP: Continue palliative care: dolorol forte, IV antibiotics, NP02, HB02 
End Interventions: Nebs, NP02, Oral antibiotics, IV antibiotics, Nystatin, Panado, Dolorol forte 
Analgesia: Panado 4 hourly (31 /50 doses), Dolorol forte (24/33 doses) 
48" 27 months; Category C; 7 days 
Symptomatology: Very distressed. Patient restrained because she is pulling oxygen tube out of her nose. 
Evidence of dying: Terminally ill. Full blown AIDS. 
CCP: Supportive therapy only. Palliaive therapy only. 
End Interventions: Oral feeds, NP02, Oral antibiotics, Nystatin, Morphine 
Analgesia: Morphine 4 hourly (6 doses) 
50** 3 months; Category C; 5 days 
Symptomatology: Severe oral thrush 
Evidence of dying: None 
CCP: TLC. Low dose morphine. Minimal handling. 
End Interventions: Nebs, HB02, Nystatin, IV fluids, Steroids, Morphine, Garlic, CPR (despite DNR order) 
Analgesia: Continuous IV infusion of morphine (following recommendation of PICU consultant post-CPR) 
54" 6 months, Category C, 3 days 
Symptomatology: Oral thrush+++. Skin lesion pustules 
Evidence of dying: None 
CCP: No painful procedures. If restless, give morphine po 1mg QID. 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, Oral antibiotics, IV antibiotics, Nystatin, Betadine, Morphine 
Analgesia: Morphine 6 hourly (3 doses) 
58* 6 months, Category C; 35 days 
Symptomatology: Extensive oral candida. Wea< cry even though in great pain. 
Evidence of dying: None 
CCP: Not for aggressive investigation. For oral antibiotics and oral morphine 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, Oral antibiotics, Nystatin, Panado, Morphine 
Analgesia: Panado PRN, Morphine 4 hourly (9 doses) 
69* 5 months; Category C; 28 days 
Symptomatology: Buttocks still excoriated 
Evidence of dying: Terminal HIV. End stage 
CCP: TLC 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, IV fluids, IV antibiotics, Morphine 
Analgesia: Morphine (1 dose a few hours before death) 
76*** 60 months, Category C; 44 days 
Symptomatology: Self report of pain in the stomach 
Patient complains of abdominal pain. (Several self reports during admission, including day of death) 
Evidence of dying: None 
CCP: TLC. Keep comfortable. Continue Dolorol and morphine if necessary. 
End Interventions: Oral feeds, Oral antibiotics, Panado, Morphine, TB medicines 
Analgesia: Panado, Morphine (6 doses) 
85** 110 months; Category C; 16 days 
Symptomatology: Patient complaining of chest pain. (Doctor's plan: ' Something for pain") 
Evidence of dying: End stage 
CCP: Keep comfortable. No invasive procedures. 
End Interventions: NP02, Physiotherapy, IV fluids, Oral antibiotics, Garlic 
Analgesia: None 
89* 3 months; Category C; 26 days 
Symptomatology: Recessing+++ and distressed 
Evidence of dying: Poor prognosis 
CCP: TLC. Nothing more can be done for the baby. 
End Interventions: Nebs, HB02, IV fluids, IV antibiotics, Steroids, Morphine 
Analgesia: Morphine (I oral dose 15 minutes before death) 
92** 12 months; Category B; 2 days 
Symptomatology: Extensive and severe dermatitis. Otitis++. 
Evidence of dying: None 
CCP: TLC. Palliative care. 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, Bloods, IV fluids, Ringers, Oral antibiotics, Nystatin 
Analgesia: None 
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Table continued. 
95* 7 months; Category C; 3 days 
Symptomatology: Coughing up blood continuously. 
Evidence of dying: End stage and desperately ill. 
CCP: Supportive care only. Minimum blood taking. Not for IV antibiotics. 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, Nebs, HB02, Xrays, IV fluids, IV antibiotics, Ringers, Sedation 
Analgesia: None. (1 dose of chloral hydrate 1 hour before death. Morphine prescribed, never administered.) 
91r 2 months; Category B; 4 days 
Symptomatology: Oral and oesophageal thrush+++. Pseudomonas skin sepsis. 
Evidence of dying: Probably dying from severe sepsis. 
CCP: TLC. Continue oxygen. 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, Nebs, HB02, IV fluids, Nystatin, Sedation 
Analgesia: None (1 dose of chloral hydrate 45 minutes before death) 
110* 11 months; Category C; 13 days 
Symptomatology: Extremely exhausted. Recessing+++. Buttocks still very sore. Both feet and hands swollen. 
(Dr called a few hours before death: Seen by Dr G • ... commence on % DD IVI infusion a 24 dpm. 
Continue adrenaline nebs.') 
Evidence of dying: Poor prognosis 
CCP: Palliation, TLC+++. Stop blood investigations. 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, Nebs, Bloods, IV fluids, Oral antibiotics, Nystatin, TB medicines 
Analgesia: None 
ti&* 12 months; Category C; 2 days 
Symptomatology: Abdo distended+++ 
Evidence of dying: Strong possibility of demise 
CCP: Keep comfortable, Dolorol stat, morphine infusion 
End Interventions: N-G drainage tube, HB02, IV antibiotics, Anticonvulsants, Dolorol, Morphine 
Analgesia: Dolorol forte (1 bolus), Morphine (1 oral dose) 
119*** 2 months, Category C; 9 days 
Symptomatology: Marked recession. Still very distressed. Extensive skin rash. 
Distressed+++. Still distressed+++. Recessing+++. 
Evidence of dying: None 
CCP: Full supportive care. For IV antibiotics, continue IV Ampicillin and Gentamycin, Nystatin and HB02 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, HB02, IV antibiotics, Nystatin 
Analgesia: None 
121* 4 months; Category C; 16 days 
Symptomatology: Recessing++++. Tried to keep baby comfortable. Shallow rapid respiration (last 12 hours) 
Evidence of dying: Poor prognosis. Not for IV antibiotics. 
CCP: TLC only, continue N-G feeds, antibiotics, add morphine. 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, HB02, Oral antibiotics, Nystatin, Morphine, Lasix 
Analgesia: Morphine 6 hourly (15 doses) 
130* 4 months; Category C; 31 days 
Buttocks red and bleeding. Miserable child. 
Evidence of dying: Poor prognosis 
CCP: Supportive care. No more IV therapies. N-G tube rehydration only. 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, Nystatin, 
Analgesia: None 
134* 8 months; Category C; 5 days 
Symptomatology: Buttocks excoriated and very sore. Mouth red and sore. Facial oedema worse. 
Seen by consultant: ' Continue palliative care.' 
Evidence of dying: Preterminal. Looks awful. Stat morphine. 
CCP: Palliation only 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, IV fluids, IV antibiotics, Nystatin 
Analgesia: None (Morphine written in medical chart, never administered.) 
137* 7 months; Category B; 6 days 
Symptomatology: Buttocks excoriated. Mouth and buttocks very sore. 
Evidence of dying: Condition deteriorating, not doing well. 
CCP: Supportive care only. No repeat tests. No blood products. HB02 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, NP02, IV fluids, IV antibiotics, Nyst.tin 
Analgesia: None 
141* 3 months; Category C; 39 days 
Symptomatology: Distressed and recessing+++. Awake most of the night. 
Evidence of dying: None 
CCP: TLC. Oral Bactrim 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, HB02, Oral antibiotics, Steroids, Morphine, Joules Solution 
Analgesia: Morphine 8 hourly (2 doses) 
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Table continued. 
14r* 14 months; Category B; 2 days 
Symptomatology: Irritability+++ 
Looks anxious, hardly slept till time of report (02h15). 
Evidence of dying: Terminal 
CCP: Keep comfortable. Morphine PRN 
End Interventions: HB02, Bloods, Xr~s. Transfusion, lnotropes, IV fluids, Panado, ECHO 
Analgesia: Panado 6 hourly. (Morphine recommended in CCP, never written on medicine chart.) 
145* 9 months; Category C; 79 days 
Symptomatology: Distressed, battling to breathe. Jtttery. 
Evidence of dying: Prognosis is bad. (14 days after admission, student intern requested physiotherapy to prevent 
contractures. Registrar • ... leave physio because prognosis is so bad". Next identified as dying on day 78: End 
stage) 
CCP: Supportive care only. Only give platelets if active bleeding (day 61) 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, IV fluids, Oral antibiotics, Cisapride 
Analgesia: None 
147*** 6 months; Category C; 3 days 
Symptomatology: Penis excoriated. Skin lesions on face, legs and elbows. 
Registrar and consultant tried all afternoon to restte drip (12 hours before death). 
Evidence of dying: End stage. Preterminal. 
CCP: Keep comfortable. Conservative management. Move to side cubicle. HB02 
End Interventions: HB02, Bloods, IV fluids, Oral antibiotics, Nystatin, Morphine 
Analgesia; Morphine (1 oral dose) 
148* 10 months; Category B; 5 days 
Symptomatology: Abdo distended+++. Seems in pain. Black necrotic stoma. 
Evidence of dying: None 
CCP: Analgesia 
End Interventions: IV fluids, Stoma care, Morphine 
Analgesia: IV morphine. Infusion increased in last few hours. 
149* 1 month; Category B; 13 days 
Symptomatology: Skin peeling, nappy rash wtth deep sores. Buttocks very sore. 
Evidence of dying: None 
CCP: Full supportive care. Keep NP02, IV fluids, antibiotics. 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, IV fluids, IV antibiotics, Nystatin, Acyclovir, CPR (despite DNR order) 
Analgesia: None 
151*** 4 months; Category B; 14 days 
Symptomatology: Severe stomatttis, extensive skin lesions, sepsis. 
Skin excoriated. Still looks horrible. Bleeding from the mouth. 
Evidence of dying: Dying, not for further interventions at this stage. 
CCP: TLC. Try to keep comfortable. 
End Interventions: Oral feeds, HB02, Oral antibiotics, IV antibiotics, Nystatin 
Analgesia: None (Panado written on medicine chart, never administered.) 
154** 11 months; Category C, 7 days 
Symptomatology: Candida and nappy rash+++ 
Evidence of dying; None 
CCP: Keep comfortable. Morphine if in pain. Cut back fluids. 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, NP02, IV fluids, IV antibiotics, Nystatin, Anticonvulsants 
Analgesia: None. (Morphine never written on medicine chart desptte CCP) 
1~ 3 months; Category C; 9 days 
Symptomatology: Buttocks excoriated. Oral thrush+++ 
Mouth very sore. Mouth very sore+++. (Repeated entries) 
Evidence of dying: Terminally ill 
CCP: TLC only 
End Interventions: NP02, IV fluids, IV antibiotics, Morphine 
Analgesia: Morphine 6 hourly (5 doses) 
161* 2 months; Category B; 6 days 
Symptomatology: Looks distressed, gasping. High oxygen requirements. Still distressed+++. 
Evidence of dying: Poor prognosis 
CCP: Keep comfortable. Morphine if necessary. Move to side cubicle. 
(Last entry: "Found not breathing and a vomit on linen saver. R.I.P.") 
End Interventions: N-G feeds, HB02, Physiotherapy, IV fluids, IV antibiotics, Nystatin, Steroids, TB medicines 
Analgesia: Morphine (1 dose a few hours before death 
• Excludes patients who died in the PICU. 
• *Nursing notes only .. Medical notes only -Medical and nursing notes 
0 Highlighted records indicate administration of analgesia (Panado, Dolorol and Morphine) 
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Appendix 10 
Verbatim Documentation of Pain and Distress in Last 48 Hours of Life in Patients WITHOUT a 
Comfort Care Plan (N=34) 
Record1 
1*b 
8* 
11** 
17*** 
18** 
19*** 
24* 
33* 
36* 
40* 
43*** 
59* 
63* 
66* 
67* 
73*** 
74* 
82*** 
91** 
93** 
99*** 
101*** 
103*** 
106* 
107* 
108* 
114* 
120*** 
123** 
135* 
144* 
150 
156*** 
164*** 
Pain and Distress 
Oral thrush+++. Abdomen distended+++. 
Chronic supporative otitis. 
Distended+++. Breathing with difficulty. 
Working hard ... needs IPPV. 
Terrible coughing spells. Very restless. 
Abdomen distended+++. 
Still uses a lot of effort for breathing. Still recessing+++. 
Very distressed. Nebs of little effect. Still distressed+++. {18x nebs on the hour on last day) 
Extensive oral ulceration. 
Very sore mouth. Very sore mouth. Mouth is very sore. {Repeated entries over period) 
Recessing+++. 
Bad coughing spells. Drip resited day of death. 
Oral candida+++ 
Recessing+++. Troublesome cough. Cyanosed. 
Severe oral thrush. Mouth very sore. 
Mouth very sore. Abdomen distended+++. 
Recessing, gasping. Patient very uncomfortable. Abdomen distended+++. 
Recessing+++. Short of breath. HB02 given. Still short of breath. 
Laboured, acidotic breathing. Working hard. Not looking good. 
Acidotic breathing. Lethargic. 
Oral thrush+++. 
Severe nappy rash. Mouth sore. Disseminated herpes. 
Buttocks and vaginal area too sore for urine bag to stick. 
Severe thrush. Distended abdomen+++ {NEC). 
Oral and oesophageal thrush+++. 
Working very hard. 
Recessing+++. Patient remains lethargic and distressed. 
Distressed+++. 
Recessing+++. Oral thrush+++. 
Distension+++. 
Abdomen distended+++. Very distressed. 
Very distressed with nasal flares, gasping respiration. Still very distressed. {Repeated entries). 
Patient complained of pain in the ribs. 
Oral thrush+++. Distressed+++. 
Very restless. Recessing++. 
Extensive oral thrush. Stop nebs - increasing distress. Cyanotic. Cold. Kusmall breathing 
Very distressed. Vomiting and coughing. 
Distressed+++. Eyes wide open, looks very anxious. Hardly slept. {Entry by student intern) 
Buttocks excoriated+++. Buttocks very sore. {Repeated entries) 
Very miserable. Cries when handled. Very distressed. 
Skin lesions++++ and ulceration. 
Distended+++. 
Abscess and distinct lesions - painful to touch. Staph osteitis. 
Hot, red swollen ann -very tender to touch . 
Oral candidiasis and ulceration. 
Mouth still very sore. Dry bloody crust on both lips. Buttocks still very sore. Respiratory distress+++. 
a Highlighted records indicate administration of analgesia (Panado x8, Morphine x7). 
b *Nursing notes only **Medical notes only ***Medical and nursing notes 
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Appendix 11 
Patients in Pain and Distress in Last 48 Hours of Life WITH a Comfort Care Plan Life: Summary 
Distribution of Demographic and Clinical Characteristics and End of Life Decisions (N=38)• 
Patient Age Severity Length DNR Evidence Analgesia Morphine Sedation 
record (m) of stay (d) of dying (mild/ moderate) 
22*b 4 C 30 y y N N N 
26** 9 C 2 y y N y N 
32* 20 C 51 y y Panado y N 
34*** 6 C 36 y y N y N 
35*** 3 B 7 y N N N N 
38* 4 B 7 y y N N N 
39** 5 C 30 y y N y N 
41* 12 C 25 y y N y N 
44* 3 B 8 y y N y N 
46*** 31 C 17 y N Panado & Dolorol N N 
48* 27 C 7 y y N y N 
50** 3 C 5 y N N y N 
54** 6 C 3 y N N y N 
58* 6 C 35 y N Panado y N 
69* 5 C 28 y y N y N 
76*** 60 C 44 y N Panado y N 
85** 110 C 16 y y N N N 
89* 3 C 26 y y N y N 
92** 12 B 2 y N N N N 
95" 7 C 3 y y N N Chloral Hydrate 
98** 2 B 4 y y N N Chloral Hydrate 
110* 11 C 13 y y N N N 
116* 12 C 2 y y Dolorol Forte y N 
119*** 2 C 9 y N N N N 
121* 4 C 16 y y N y N 
130* 4 C 31 y y N N N 
134* 8 C 5 y y N N N 
137* 7 B 6 y y N N N 
141* 3 C 39 y N N y N 
142*** 14 B 2 y y Panado N N 
145* 9 C 79 y y N N N 
147*** 6 C 3 y y N y N 
148* 10 B 5 y N N y N 
149* 1 B 13 y N N N N 
151*** 4 B 14 y y N N N 
154** 11 C 7 y N N N N 
158*** 3 C 9 y y N y N 
161* 2 B 6 y y N y N 
• Excludes patients who died in the PICU b *Nursing notes only ** Medical notes only ***Medical and nursing notes 
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Appendix 12 
Patients in Pain and Distress in Last 48 Hours of Life WITHOUT a Comfort Care Plan: Summary 
Distribution of Demographic and Clinical Characteristics and End of Life Decisions (N=34)1 
Patient Age Severity Length DNR Evidence Analgesia Morphine Sedation 
record (m) of stay (d) of dying (mild) 
1*b 3 C 3 N N N N N 
8* 3 C 5 N y N N N 
11** 7 C 26 y y N y N 
17*** 2 B 2 y y N N N 
18** 2 B y N N N N 
19*** 4 C 5 y y N N Chloral Hydrate 
24* 17 C 25 N N Panado N N 
33* 6 B 30 y y N N N 
36* 4 B 6 y N N y N 
40* 3 B 12 y y N N N 
43- 4 B 5 y N N y N 
59* 3 B 2 y N N N N 
63* 3 C 6 N N N N N 
66* 25 C 5 N N N N N 
67* 2 B 5 N N N N N 
73*** 37 C 8 y N Panado N N 
74* 4 C 1 y N Panado y N 
82*** 9 C 9 y N N N N 
91** 7 C 6 N N N N N 
93** 4 C 5 y N N N N 
99*** 5 C 11 y N Panado N N 
101- 2 B 4 y N Panado N N 
103*** 4 B 5 y y N N N 
106* 4 C 12 y N N y N 
107* 4 B 5 y y N N N 
108* 4 C 3 y N Panado N N 
114* 4 C 6 y N N N N 
120*** 3 C 10 y N N N N 
123** 3 B 8 y N N N N 
135* 5 B 16 y y N N N 
144* 17 C 88 y y N y N 
150*** B 2 y y N y N 
156*** 5 C 3 y N Panado N N 
164- 17 C 5 y N Panado N N 
• Excludes patients who died in the PICU 
b*Nursing notes only **Medical notes only ***Medical and nursing notes 
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